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ABSTRACT
WILL AND CAPABILITY: WESTERN GOVERNMENTS’ RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN
DISINFORMATION SINCE 2013
Brian McDowell
Matthew Levendusky
In 2013, the Kremlin resourced and launched a multiyear global operation to subvert
democracy. The operation’s main weapon was intentionally harmful information—
disinformation—spread through networks of paid trolls, bot networks, and users around
the world. The information was aimed at sowing division within democracies and
between democracies, particularly in NATO and the European Union. Some governments
chose stronger responses than others. What explains the variation in government
responses? I argue that each democracy’s combination of will and capability determined
its response and that states with similar endowments of will and capability chose similar
policies. I conduct an in depth cross-national of thirteen Western democracies supported
by two case studies of specific states: Finland and the United States. My findings show
that Kremlin disinformation has repeatedly adapted to changing contexts over the last
century, is likely to continue adapting, and that Kremlin tactics having shown
effectiveness, have spread to more state governments and even domestic actors. Future
attacks will likely follow similar themes and patterns, so the lessons learned in this
dissertation can help inform future responses.
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PREFACE
As Senator Cardin noted ahead of transmitting a 2018 minority staff report to the
Committee on Foreign Relations:
It is important to draw a distinction between Mr. Putin’s corrupt regime and the
people of Russia. Many Russian citizens strive for a transparent, accountable
government that operates under the democratic rule of law, and we hold hope for
better relations in the future with a Russian government that reflects these
demands. In the meantime, the United States must work with our allies to build
defenses against Mr. Putin’s asymmetric arsenal and strengthen international
norms and values to deter such behavior by Russia or any other country.1
Throughout this dissertation, any reference to “Russia” or “Russian” refers not to the
people of Russia, but to the country’s political leadership. These terms are used
synonymously and with “the Kremlin,” mixed to avoid repetitiveness, and meant to
indicate the regime led by President Vladimir Putin.

1. See “Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for United States National
Security”, 2018, p. vi.

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“The most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of
information warfare”
-General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. September 2014.2
The Issue of Russian Disinformation
Much of the United States became familiar with Russian disinformation during and
after the 2016 Presidential election. Contrary to popular sentiment at the time, the
Kremlin attack on a United States election was not a one-off attack against American
democracy. Rather, the attack was part of an ongoing and accelerating global operation
aimed at subverting the democratic world order.
Students of disinformation have defined several concepts that aid in discussing the
operation. For example, misinformation is simply incorrect information. Incorrect
information matters in a democracy because, as Kuklinski writes:
people often are not uninformed about policy… but misinformed. People hold
inaccurate factual beliefs and do so confidently. The problem, then, at least with
respect to attitudes about public policy, is not that people simply lack
information, but that they firmly hold the wrong information—and use it to
form preferences. Not only does this misinformation function as a barrier to
factually educating citizens, it can lead to collective preferences that differ
significantly from those that would exist if people were adequately informed.3
By contrast, disinformation is “information that is false and deliberately created to harm a
person, social group, organization or country.”4 So disinformation can be created by an
attacker to cause harm, spread by other malicious actors, or spread by neutral and
unwitting users as misinformation. Additionally, disinformation and misinformation can

2. Quoted in Pomerantsev, 2014.
3. Kuklinski, et al., 2000, p. 792.
4. Wardle, et al., 2017, p. 20.
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be amplified through inauthentic accounts, bots, and impostors online using the
anonymity afforded by many platforms. As Former President Obama recently detailed in
a speech, the amplification and spread of disinformation and misinformation using digital
tools presents has grown into a challenge to democracy itself.5
The Kremlin adopted a strategy that intentionally combined disinformation, digital
media, and inauthentic accounts in 2013, which became a turning point for subverting
democracy through disinformation. In the months immediately preceding Russia’s
February 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin
launched an operation that ushered in a new era in information operations.6 Moscow had
by then been experimenting for several years in applying digital propaganda as part of a
suite of capabilities aimed at degrading adversaries in ways historically associated with
military invasion.7 Russia had applied disinformation coordinated with cyberattacks,
military invasion, diplomatic pressure, economic coercion, and other elements of state
power to pursue a series of aggressive actions in Ukraine, Estonia, Georgia, and others.
But while initially focusing on Ukraine in 2013, the Kremlin swiftly escalated its
information operations against a host of nations globally, not just those that neighbored
Russia. This was the beginning of a sustained global assault on the United States-led
democratic world order.

5. Dwoskin and Scott, 2022.
6. Vandiver, 2014.
7. Pynnöniemi, 2019, p. 159. “In traditional understanding, an armed conflict (war) means the physical destruction of
the enemy. At the same time, an attack can be regarded as successful when it leads to the “self-disorganization” and
“self-disorientation” of the adversary, and the subsequent capture of the enemy’s resource base and its usage to the
benefit of the attacker.”
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The operation which began with a goal of creating confusion to provide cover for its
imminent annexation of Crimea later morphed into the sprawling international effort that
so brazenly attacked the American election. 8 The operation also included significant
attacks on many other democracies including Brexit in the United Kingdom, election
interference across Europe, fomenting multiple border crises in Norway, Finland, and
Poland, enflaming separatist movements in Spain and the United States, and spreading
emotionally charged disinformation about child custody cases in multiple countries.9
Ben Nimmo and his Graphika coauthors (2020) dubbed the operation “Secondary
Infektion.” This name is a nod to a successful 1980s Soviet operation, Operation
Infektion, which blamed the United States for developing AIDS as a bioweapon.10 The
former Naval cryptologist and intelligence expert Malcolm Nance called the operation
“Global Grizzly.”11 Whatever name one applies to the operation, it was a remarkably
ambitious and sweeping effort.
The Kremlin’s main weapon in this operation was the now infamous Internet
Research Agency (IRA) troll farm in St. Petersburg.12 The hundreds of trolls operated
thousands of accounts to seed division through false narratives, mostly on social media.
These narratives were amplified by an army of bots to accomplish several different
Russian aims. Lucas et al., 2021 provide a good list of Moscow’s motivations:
The Russian regime’s foremost interest is its own hold on power. All policy,
internal and external, stems from this overriding goal. The Kremlin sees the
West, the European Union (.), and NATO as threats to this stability, and as
potential instigators of “color revolutions” that will exploit Russia’s ethnic,
8. Vandiver, 2014.
9. Nance and Reiner, 2018.
10. Nimmo et al., 2020.
11. Nance and Reiner, 2018.
12. Nimmo et al., 2020.
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religious, political, and other fissures. The long-term goal is, therefore, a
polycentric or multipolar world in which multilateral, rules-based organizations
are unable to dictate terms to Russia. Instead, the Kremlin aims to be the
dominant power in Eurasia, using Russia’s size to exert strong influence over its
neighbors and over small countries, and to bargain with big countries on an
equal basis.13
Disinformation was not simply a supporting effort in this campaign, it was a weapon.
To accomplish its operational objectives, the Kremlin pushed thousands of false,
manipulative, incendiary, and sometimes plainly ridiculous stories. Ben Nimmo’s team
analyzed 2,500 articles, for example, to map the operation’s themes. By far the top three
narratives focused on portraying Ukraine as an unreliable failed state (830 articles),
NATO and the West as aggressors (536 articles), and the European Union as weak and
divided (508 articles).14 The attacks continued at a dizzying pace and targeted all prodemocratic states with tailored messaging designed to exacerbate existing divisions—
both within and between— democratic states.
Each of the targeted countries responded in different ways. Some acted to prevent
widespread acceptance of false narratives within their populations and other states did
not. The United Kingdom, for example, developed rapid response mechanisms that
monitored false Kremlin narratives and ensured algorithms prioritized availability of
official United Kingdom Government sources.15 By contrast, the Polish Government
chose to target internal political dissent with populist disinformation of its own, ignoring
the Russian threat and suffering major declines in scores for democratic health.16 This

13. Lucas et al., 2021
14. Nimmo et al., 2020
15. See Levush, 2019.
16. See Gregor and Mlejnková, 2021 and Kosc, 2020.
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dissertation aims to explain the varied responses by a wide range of democratic
governments that were targeted with Russian disinformation campaigns.
I argue that democratic state responses to disinformation are the result of each state’s
combination of will and capability at the time of an attack. In my framework, the United
Kingdom is a high will high capability state. I expect high will high capability states to be
leaders protecting democracy domestically and internationally. And by contrast again,
Poland is a low will low capability state. I expect low will low capability democracies to
do little or nothing responding to disinformation attacks while the intended corrosive
effects manifest in weakened institutions. The states with high will and low capability or
low will and high capability should make similar policy choices to states similarly
endowed, and states can move between groups over time since the two variables are not
fixed. While capabilities can ebb and flow, they generally take longer to develop than the
more volatile will. When Russian aggression operates below the threshold of public
reaction, will recedes. But when a democratic state perceives it is under subversive
attack, will to resist can rapidly increase. All of this is outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.
Before analyzing democratic responses, however, it is essential to first define the
nature and scope of Russian disinformation campaigns. Of course, such efforts did not
begin de novo in 2013 when Moscow invaded Crimea. Instead, these efforts drew on
decades of Soviet disinformation tactics and doctrine, adapted and honed during the first
decade of President Vladimir Putin’s first decade in power, and only later unleashed on
an unevenly prepared democratic West.
Russian disinformation has roots in Soviet doctrine. As far back as Lenin, Soviet
5

thinking about disinformation has posited that it should always be tied to the physical
world.17 Information is not an abstraction, but itself a tool for contestation. It should be
used internally to organize and externally to disorganize. So, information, spread as
propaganda should always be aimed at a concrete goal and it must always adapt to
changing contexts.18 Context includes changes in media landscape, relations with Russia,
and internal cultures of other states. Early in his presidency, Vladimir Putin began a
campaign to prioritize regaining Soviet-like information dominance— domestically at
first and then internationally. And as Soviet thinkers like Lenin outlined, the Russian
approach adapted to a changed context.
Throughout decades of Soviet propaganda efforts, influencing Western audiences
required elaborate efforts to create forgeries, generate misleading print newspaper and
journal articles, and cultivate reliable messengers who could credibly promote Kremlin
narratives.19 These efforts were mostly inefficient. Western broadcast media was
concentrated and controlled, so gaining amplification required a message to make it
through many layers of filters before any opportunity to reach wide audiences.
By 2000, the media context had changed. When President Putin took power, he
immediately prioritized pushing back on Western influence; within the first few years of
his presidency, he prioritized creation of powerful media organizations oriented on

17. See Pynnöniemi, 2019, p. 157. “The underlying idea expressed in one form or another in this debate is derived from
Lenin, who asserted that propaganda should be a matter of action rather than words. In the Soviet propaganda
campaigns that followed, this idea was interpreted to mean that all agitation should be tied to some concrete goal.”
18. See Pynnöniemi, 2019, p. 163. “Two issues should be highlighted in this connection. First, while Active Measures
have a systemic character (and certain patterns can be observed in themes and narratives), Lenin’s dictum about
working with material is still important. This means that the context (historical relations with Russia, criminal
environment, media space, etc.) shapes the ways in which Active Measures are used.”
19. Rid, 2020.
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competing globally in a media environment that now included influential cable news
networks. Russia’s answer was the creation of RT, Sputnik, and other outlets to get
Russian narratives included directly into Western media environments in ways
inconceivable in Soviet times. 20 As social media grew through the late 2000s and early
2010s, capabilities for tailored messaging and reach to individual users offered even
greater opportunities for meddling. The Kremlin created an increased ability to reach
users directly in formats that looked, sounded, and felt credible to Western audiences.
Not only did Putin adapt to a changing media environment, but he also adapted the
messaging. Russian disinformation goals are different than their Soviet predecessors.
While the Soviet Union and the United States competed in a bipolar order, each working
to supplant the other, competition between Russia and the United States is different. After
the Cold War, the United States emerged as the hegemon in a unipolar order. It benefits
most from structuring and protecting the order. Russia, unable to compete directly, has
used disinformation as part of a strategy to subvert that order.21 This is a key difference
from Soviet times; Russia does not seek to replace United States order with anything,
instead the Kremlin is operating in a zero-sum competition assessing that it wins just by
making democracies less attractive.
Garry Kasparov summed up the challenge succinctly: “The point of modern
propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda. It is to exhaust your critical

20. See “Fog of falsehood: Russian strategy of deception and the conflict in Ukraine”, 2016, p. 48. “The two most
emblematic actors are RT and Sputnik, in addition to a wide network of information websites and groups on social
media networks. The Soviet Union was never able to massively implant its own messages and narratives into
mainstream Western media… Contrary to the Soviet times, however, now Moscow can easily and steadily reach
Western consumers, and thus deliver its propaganda and disinformation messages directly.”
21. Radin et al., 2020, p. 3
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thinking, to annihilate truth.”22 The changes in media landscape and regime goals make
modern propaganda a decidedly new twist on an old problem. Once truth is eliminated,
debate becomes impossible and those with the loudest megaphones can rule by dictate.
As Snyder wrote, post-truth is pre-fascism: “When we give up on truth, we concede
power to those with the wealth and charisma to create spectacle in its place. Without
agreement about some basic facts, citizens cannot form the civil society that would allow
them to defend themselves.”23 Seeing an opportunity to use disinformation to subvert the
West,24 Russia pressed its advantage by pouring money, people, and its considerable
cultural expertise into a sprawling campaign against democracy everywhere.25 Western
democracies varied in their responses to this subversive operation.
Core Argument
My claim in this dissertation is that while there are myriad factors at play in an
anarchic international political environment, it is each state’s combination of will and
capability that broadly explain differences in policy choices. This is true both for the
Kremlin’s choice to fund disinformation operations as an attack against democracy, as
well as for the democratic states’ response to those operations. There exists a wide
spectrum of policy options available to combat disinformation. Some of the most
common options include inaction, downplaying or ignoring the threat, bolstering

22. Quoted in Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 638
23. Snyder, 2021.
24. See Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014, p. 20. “Putin is onto something big... He has discovered a significant weapon
with which to beat the West and divide its potential allies around the world... In short, Vladimir Putin knows what he’s
doing.”
25. See Radin et al., 2020, p. 3. “The Kremlin’s financial and human resources give it a unique ability to mimic and
influence legitimate social groups in ways that are often not discovered until long after they are perpetrated, if they are
recognized at all.”
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democratic norms domestically, building coalitions to isolate Russia internationally,
employing sanctions, updating legal frameworks to slow amplification, manipulating
algorithms, enabling civilian organizations, creating new counter-disinformation
organizations, clarifying false narratives, educating publics, or even deploying Russian
disinformation domestically. If each state’s choices result from its relative ability to act
(it’s capability) and desire to act (it’s will), then I expect there should be trends among
states grouped by comparable will and capability.
Chapter 2 makes this argument in detail. In brief, will is a state’s commitment to
resisting disinformation. Russia employs disinformation to challenge the existing
international system in ways that typically involved physical fighting to accomplish.
Although in some cases Russia has in recent years invaded and occupied neighboring
states, it has not invaded a major western democracy seeking to destroy its national
capabilities or political system. Attacking a NATO member would result in armed
conflict with a unified military alliance of thirty nations. This direct confrontation would
be suicidal. Russia therefore adapts its strategy, seeking instead asymmetric weapons like
disinformation to weaken democracies from within. In different cases, Russia uses
disinformation to impose its will on adversary states through narratives or reflexive
control, creates space for maneuver by confusing adversary decision making, undermines
faith in truth itself through whataboutism, and undermines morale through fear. All these
effects are particularly dangerous to democracy which fundamentally depends on reliable
information to enable effective collective judgements from which democratic regimes
derive legitimacy. Undermining information, especially at critical points like elections,
9

can change a result, affect policy, undermine faith in institutions, or force a state to turn
inward away from Russian actions abroad. All these attack democracy by subverting will.
In this dissertation, the concept of state will is the decision to counter effects of
Russian disinformation attacks and the ability to sustain efforts to counter disinformation
over time. Will springs from factors such as perceived intensity and persistence of threat,
unity and social cohesion, trust in government, structure of political system, elite
behavior, and commitment to democratic norms. In the short term, a state’s will can be
considered fixed; creating will in an open society requires trust, education, coordination,
and competence. All take time to develop. Shocking attacks like Pearl Harbor or 9/11 can
generate will quickly within democratic systems, but disinformation is designed as a slow
burn. The Kremlin’s intended effect is not disrupting will in the short term, but through
long term systemic subversion. Dew describes the Kremlin’s goal as incrementally
“weakening the internal cohesion of societies and strengthening the perception of the
dysfunction of the Western democratic and economic system"26 to give Russia freedom
of action. Will determines how intensely a state will or will not respond to
disinformation.
The other main variable, capability, determines what options are available from
which to choose. A state’s capabilities responding to Russian disinformation results from
different component elements of its power, including its aggregate national power, cyber
capabilities, geography, leadership and governance, economic power, industrial and
technological capacity, military power, ideology, diplomacy, national character and

26. Dew, 2019, p. 156.
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morale, and foreign support. Some states are closer to Russia than others. Most Western
democracies are richer than Russia. Some are more capably governed and ideologically
committed to democracy than others. The menu of options available to each state derives
from its capabilities. More capable states will naturally have more options from which to
choose. But not all capability translates into effective response to disinformation
operations. Raw military power or nuclear capability, for example, are not practically
useful in fighting disinformation.
Of course, while aggregate capabilities are important, they do not tell the complete
story. To dig deeper, I also considered states’ disinformation-specific capabilities. A
state’s overall capabilities and its capabilities in controlling information environments
will determine its range of available responses.
Sorting states by high and low will and capability allows some predictions for each
group. Expectations appear in the quad above and are detailed in Chapter 2. High will,
high capability democratic states should be the leaders pushing back against
disinformation employing capabilities not only within their own societies, but also
working to bolster and protect democratic norms internationally. High will, low
capability states should be innovative protectors of domestic institutions and norms,
building resilient societies and maximizing participation in international efforts as a
defense against Russian aggression. I expect low will, high capability states to experience
democratic backsliding since their governments will respond to the threat weakly or not
at all. As democracy erodes, the capabilities resident in these states will eventually even
be turned towards targeting disinformation at domestic populations accelerating divisions
11

already inflamed by Kremlin efforts. Finally, low will, low capability states are likely to
do nothing at the state level. This creates a vacuum which will be filled by uncoordinated
responses by non-state entities. These states will also experience backsliding as
disinformation corrodes their democracies.
Methods and Case Selection
To explore my framework around will and capability, this dissertation employs a mix
of methods: grounded theory research, case studies, and practitioner research. Grounded
theory involves researching actions taken by a select group of democracies and coding
their responses at the state level to see what patterns emerge. Case studies then explore
specific states in greater depth and in historical context. And practitioner research rounds
out the study by considering national security doctrines, and expert testimony, and
document analysis. These approaches complement each other to provide a comprehensive
understanding of how Western democracies responded to the Russian operation since
2013. The overall structure of the project includes three main sections: a cross-national
comparison of actions taken to address Russian disinformation, a case study on Finland’s
actions, and a case study on the United States’ actions.
First, I conducted a cross-national survey focusing on how thirteen countries each
responded to Russian disinformation campaigns, compared to how my model predicted
they would respond. Each is a democracy, has been attacked as part of Russia’s post2013 disinformation operation, and is either a NATO member or enjoys privileged
relationships with NATO (i.e., they are Extended Opportunity Partners, or EOPs). Hybrid
and new threats, including information warfare, are part of the reasoning for granting a
12

state Enhanced Opportunity Partner status so including them rounds out the list of states
most relevant to investigating democratic response to Russian disinformation. Selection
of these states is covered in greater detail in Chapter 3.
As a complement to this broad cross-national survey, I also researched case studies to
explore state responses in greater depth. This dissertation includes two case studies:
Finland and the United States of America. While the cross-national survey allows me to
examine the key elements of a wide variety of nations, case studies are an opportunity for
me to delve much more deeply into the mechanisms by considering both sides of a
disinformation attack: the attacker and the attacked. Case studies allow room to explore
the different ways Russia uses similar themes and tactics modified for country-specific
targets and goals. Although Russian themes repeat, attacks are highly designed to exploit
the differences in the Finnish and American societies. Further, case studies allow for
more specific discussion of varying capabilities and limitations that impact domestic
decisions within two very different democracies. Finally, case studies better describe how
outcomes conform— or not— to expectations of my theory. These factors drove my
focus on two states that are sufficiently different from each other that their study
enhances understanding of variance within democracies writ large.
Finland, as a full democracy that borders Russia, has for decades been a target of
Kremlin subversion. It and the United States are in opposite quadrants within my two-bytwo framework of will and capability. Finland is high will and low capability. It is a small
NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner. Russia has long sought to destabilize the country
internally, fomenting divisions between Finland and Europe, and preventing Finland from
13

full membership in NATO. Finland has been a model, however, for responding
comprehensively to the threat from Russian disinformation. It is a good case study to
understand the full array of options available for responding to disinformation.
On the other hand, the United States is a low will high capability state. When attacked
during Russia’s operation, the United States struggled. It responded sub optimally to
disinformation— both from Russia and from within. The threat of domestic
disinformation largely follows similar tactics of Russian disinformation but is potentially
even more corrosive to democracy than external attack. I will now briefly introduce some
key definitions used in this project.
Case Summaries
Cross-national Survey
Looking across my 13 nations, while there was a general correspondence between
predictions and reality, there was some important, and theoretically informative, variation
as well. States in the high will and high capability grouping include Canada, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. My theory predicted that these states should lead
democratic pushback against Russian disinformation, using a mix of offense to punish
Russia and defense to protect democratic norms.
Except for Germany, these states mostly opted for the kinds of responses anticipated
by my framework. They led internationally and protected democracy domestically.
Germany stood out as an outlier among this group for giving less public voice to the
Russian threat, balancing sanctions for the Kremlin’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea
with pursuit of increasing economic ties through projects like the Nordstream 2 pipeline.
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But given its decades as ground zero for Cold War disinformation and espionage and its
partition until 1989, there are pockets of significant Russian sympathy in Germany. A
confluence of other factors including American dysfunction and unreliability likely
account for a very pragmatic approach dealing with Russia. The other high will grouping
was the closest fit with expectations.
High will and low capability states within my sample consisted of Australia, Finland,
Lithuania, Netherlands, and Sweden. My framework expected these states to be
innovators, maximizing limited resources by integrating societal responses domestically
and seeking cooperative arrangements internationally. This group more consistently
recognized the Russian threat as immediate and serious, driving innovative use of limited
capabilities responding to Russian influence. They employed defensive alliances, total
defense doctrines, and public education to protect themselves from Russia. These states
supported democratic institutions and processes, built integrated resilient domestic
responses, and generally punched above their weight addressing disinformation as a
societal threat.
By contrast, Italy and the United States coded as low will and high capability. These
two states largely acted in accordance with expectations, with some notable exceptions. I
expected low will high capability states would show weakened or no state reaction to an
external threat, employ state capabilities to spread disinformation domestically, backslide
democratically, and polarize internally. Italy demonstrated all these predictions, but the
United States’ reaction was more mixed. Domestically, the United States acted more like
a low will state backsliding and targeting disinformation at domestic audiences.
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Internationally, however, its actions were more like that of a high will state leading
international efforts to support democratic push back against Russia. This dynamic is
explored in greater detail in the Chapter 5 United States case study.
Finally, my survey included two low will, low capability states: Poland and Spain. I
expected little to no response by their state governments, leading to democratic
backsliding and an attempt by other organizations to fill the void. These governments
acted mostly according to expectations, focusing inwards even while the Kremlin
attacked them from without. Both states suffered major declines in their democracies—
Poland turned its state apparatus against its own people and Spain suffered a highly
contested Russian-supported secession of a major subordinate region. There were also
surprises studying these states. Mostly, that when external meddling is perceived as
having gone too far, even low will states can quickly turn to addressing the threat.
Overall, the cross-national survey indicates of the two variables, will is more
determinative of effective response to Russian disinformation. The high will low
capability grouping, for example, were very active resisting Kremlin disinformation.
Their elevated will drove integration of sectors across relatively small populations with
weaker militaries. And their mixed histories with Soviet propaganda also yielded
comprehensive policy approaches domestically and internationally. These states, though
limited in resources, found creative ways to maximize those capabilities to fight
disinformation more effectively than some high capability states. Further, states with low
will struggled to find consistent, effective policies whether they were low or high
capability.
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Within groups of high or low will, a state’s capability matters to the response. High
will states had robust responses, but limited capability meant that the responses would be
primarily diplomatic and defensive. High capability meant that the response would also
include offensive actions to punish or disrupt Kremlin attacks. The two case studies
provide greater context in this regard. The Finnish and United States Government are
opposites in both will and capability. The case studies showed how their different
endowments affected their responses to disinformation.
Finland
The Finland case study supports the importance of will and offers three main lessons:
disinformation should not be considered in isolation from other aggressive influence
tactics, Finland has found a way to maintain its high will in the face of Russian
aggression, and what generates such high will in Finland may be impossible to repeat in
other states. First, disinformation must be considered as part of a suite of capabilities that
Russia employs to pursue it prerogatives internationally. The closer a state is located to
Moscow, the more capabilities Russia uses to subvert it including not only
disinformation, but energy policy, manufactured border crises, cyberattack, intimidation
and threats, and even military invasion. Second, because it borders Russia and has long
experience dealing with Soviet subversion, it highly attuned to the threat from Russian
influence. Finland has invested in long term resilience emphasizing education of its
citizens, coordination between public and private sectors, and trust and competence in its
government leaders. The result is a stable society which maintains high will to resist
Russian narratives. Finally, a close look at Finland shows that replicating its will against
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disinformation may be impossible to replicate elsewhere. The country has a unique
familiarity and skepticism from a century of near-constant struggle to balance asserting
its democratic independence without triggering military aggression from Moscow. This
struggle has imprinted deeply in Finnish society and cannot be quickly approximated in
other contexts.
United States
My framework’s predictions for the United States Government’s response to Russian
disinformation since 2013 was mixed. In some ways the response conformed with
expectations. For example, Russian tactics employed within the United States have
contributed to a decline in American democratic health. The last several years have seen
multiple cases of disinformation intensifying divisions, fueling threats of violence against
election officials, and motivating political violence at the Capitol. These trends are
consistent with predictions of a state with great capability, but low will. By contrast,
absence of unity in the United States system is not always evidence of absence of will.
Because many of its world class state capabilities are foreign facing, my framework
would better explain the United States’ response if it made a clearer distinction between
foreign and domestic spheres. For instance, the United States was highly engaged abroad
helping other democracies providing intelligence to facilitate election protection.
Domestically, though, political actors prevented government action during the 2016
election on intelligence that the Kremlin was interfering in our own elections. In a system
inherently distrustful of government action domestically, especially in matters related to
freedom of expression, American Civil Society Organizations (CSO) play a critical role
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domestically. United States CSOs have been effective in exposing disinformation by
attributing attacks, through investigative journalism, and in analyzing publicly available
information. In many ways, the United States Government responded as a hybrid case:
high will abroad, low will at home.
Chapter Outline
The rest of this work will explore these arguments and cases in detail. Chapter 2
outlines my framework centering on state will, capability, and how the combination of
those two variables yields predictions about how government responses to Kremlin
disinformation. Chapter 3 details the cross-national survey. It includes details on case
selection criteria, measurements of will and capability, then discussion of how each
grouping of states conformed (or did not conform) with theoretical expectations. Chapter
3 is supported by Appendix A which details findings for every state considered in my
sample. Chapters 4 and 5 are case studies covering Finland and the United States,
respectively, in greater context including Russian aims in attacking each. Finally, Chapter
6 summarizes the work including logical implications for the future of Russian
disinformation targeting the West.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Core Theoretical Argument
In this chapter, I outline my theory in greater detail to describe why different
democracies respond differently to the threat of Russian disinformation. I am interested
primarily in why states pursue different strategies and though there are myriad factors at
play in an anarchic international political environment, a state’s combination of capability
and will broadly anticipate policy choices. I argue that both Russian employment of
disinformation operations and the range of democratic states’ response to those
operations can be predicted through understanding balances of capability and will
between democracies and Russia.
There is a wide spectrum of policy options available to combat disinformation. Some
of the most common options I observed included weak responses like inaction,
downplaying or ignoring the threat, or even amplifying Russian disinformation for
domestic aims. More impactful responses included bolstering democratic norms
domestically, enabling civilian sector organizations, updating laws aimed at slowing
amplification and spread, clarifying false narratives, and educating the public. On the
stronger end of the spectrum, actions like building coalitions to isolate Russia
internationally, organizing sanctions, manipulating algorithmic promotion, and building
new counter-disinformation organizations required significant will and capabilities. My
expectation is that among states with comparable will and capability will select similar
policy options. Below, I clarify what I mean by capability and will in the context of
disinformation.
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Capability
A state’s capabilities responding to Russian disinformation results from different
component elements of its power. There are several ways to determine a state’s
capabilities: some rough and some more precise. Important elements for responding to
disinformation operations include Gross Domestic Product, cyber capabilities,
geography, leadership and governance, economic power, industrial and technological
capacity, military power, ideology, diplomacy, national character and morale, and foreign
support. Among the countries I studied, for example, some are closer to Russia than
others. Most are richer than Russia. Some are more capably governed and ideologically
committed to democracy than others. Not all capabilities are particularly relevant to
combatting disinformation. Raw military power or nuclear capability, for example, are
not practically useful in fighting disinformation.
The menu of options available to each state responding to disinformation will derive
from its capabilities. More capable states will naturally have more options from which to
choose. In the extreme cases, a state with no capability can do nothing while a state with
infinite capability can do anything it chooses. The states I have chosen all fall somewhere
in between. Importantly, the states are sufficiently varied to yield meaningful conclusions
from observing trends among the group.
As I will detail later, I sorted states by a combined measure of their capabilities.
Aggregate capabilities are important, but do not tell a complete story; for that, we also
need to consider disinformation-specific capabilities. A state’s overall capabilities and its
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capabilities in controlling information environments will determine its range of available
responses.
Will
Like capability, a state’s will is the manifestation of different component
characteristics. Many different definitions of will exist. The operative definition for this
work is that described in military conceptualizations of war, which describes that
competition between two states is a “struggle between two hostile, independent, and
irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.”27 Will is the commitment
to seek policy preferences in a chaotic, competitive world while preventing other actors
from imposing their preferences. From a Kremlin view, disinformation operations are
meant to compete as intensely as possible without triggering a violent, damaging, and
costly war which would run a risk of making Russia an international pariah.
Russia is employing disinformation to challenge the existing international system in
ways that typically involved physical fighting to accomplish. Although in some cases
Russia has in recent years invaded and occupied neighboring states, it has not invaded a
major western democracy seeking to destroy its national capabilities or political system.
Instead, it employs disinformation to weaken democracies from within. The tactics are
different than popular imaginings of war, but the goals and some outcomes are similar.
Russian disinformation challenges the existing world order by undermining democratic
will in several ways.

27. See Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting.
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Ben Nimmo has a helpful “four D” construct that describes how Russia employs
disinformation. The four “Ds” are dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay:
And for practically any event where the Kremlin or the Russian government is
criticized you can be sure that they will do at least one of those four things. To
dismiss they will insult the critics. The important words are “ignore them.” It's
all about dismissing the critic without looking at the evidence. Then distort; if
you don't have the evidence that supports your story you make your own up.
Distraction is the classic Soviet “what about you” technique—whataboutism—
“So what if we are bombing Ukraine? You bombed Vietnam.” And then
dismaying tactics are you come out with lurid and terrifying hypotheses. “If you
keep on doing this World War III will break out,” but the idea is to say
something so shocking and scary that people will actually back off and think
“Whoa, do we really want to do this? Is this worth the risk?” Dismiss, distort,
distract, and dismay.28
In different cases, Russia uses disinformation to impose its will on adversary states
through narratives or reflexive control, creates space for maneuver by confusing
adversary decision making, undermines faith in truth itself through whataboutism, and
undermines morale through fear. All these effects are particularly dangerous to
democracy which fundamentally depends on reliable information to enable effective
collective judgements from which democratic regimes derive legitimacy. Undermining
information, especially at critical points like elections, can change a result, affect policy,
undermine faith in institutions, or force a state to turn inward away from Russian actions
abroad. All of these are bad for democracy by undermining targeting democratic will.
In this dissertation, the concept of state will is the willingness to bear costs-- and to
forgo potential benefits-- combatting the external threat from Russian disinformation.
Will springs from factors such as perceived intensity and persistence of threat, unity and

28. See Haynes and Scott, Episode 2.
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social cohesion, trust in government, structure of political system, elite behavior, partisan
interests, and commitment to democratic norms. States that I considered are distributed
on a spectrum of low to high will to fight Russian disinformation.
I expect states with high will to choose stronger and more comprehensive responses
to the threat from Russia, but no state can have such high will that it can pay all costs and
forgo all potential benefits to combat every potential threat. States must prioritize where
it will exert will, as if each state had a “will budget” from which to draw. Varying
history, geography, capability, and culture relative to Russia will determine how the
Kremlin’s potential threat rates among all potential threats, then would allocate
commensurate will according to where Russia fit among its priorities.
Finland, for example, is a high will state which consistently prioritizes the threat from
Russia. For more than a century, it has fought and competed against a much larger
neighbor. It has lost territory and lives, at multiple times narrowly avoiding total
domination from the Soviet Union. Although it has a long history of Russian, Soviet, and
Russian again interference in its politics, it has firmly pursued an independent middle
path between the West and Moscow. It borders Russia, it is much smaller, and it has
fought wars of survival against Russia before. The threat to Finland, then, from Russia is
direct, sustained, and existential so Finland’s will remains consistently high.
A state with low will, especially those governed by leaders or parties who perceive a
benefit from deploying disinformation, will do less or even nothing. Italy, for example,
codes as low will. It has a history with Russia, even during the Cold War, that was more
sympathetic and supportive than most other states in my sample. The Italian citizenry is
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generally distrustful of its government, which has been led by some famously corrupt
elites and pro-Kremlin propagandists. It does not share a border with Russia. The threat
from Russian disinformation does not rank sufficiently high among Italy’s security
concerns to warrant paying the costs to combat it.
This is not to say that will is basically a function of whether Russian disinformation
helps the political leader of a country in its domestic battles. While it may be the case that
the Kremlin sometimes tries to get anti-establishment candidates into power, Russian
operations are generally designed to support extreme candidates and conflicting positions
on many sides of the same argument and to avoid discovery “until long after they are
perpetrated, if they are recognized at all.”29 A candidate who takes office, even having
been supported by Russian narratives in a campaign, is likely to be tarred as weak,
corrupt, insane, and incompetent compared to more extreme options especially compared
to Vladimir Putin.30 Ultimately, the main side Russia takes in other countries’ domestic
battles is the one that most degrades consensus and formation of democratic will.
The level of will within a state generally will have predictable outcomes. High will
states will perceive as serious and sustained the threat to democracy posed by
disinformation. They will act not only to defend itself in the short term, but also seek to
push back on purveyors of disinformation and work to elevate the threat perception of its
allies. The low will states are likely to see the most pernicious effects of disinformation
seep in, undermining the pillars of democratic governance intentionally or not.

29. Radin, et al., 2020, p. 3.
30. Gregor and Mlejnková, 2021.
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The combination of these factors makes possible several predictions about whether a
state will respond to disinformation and what types of options it is likely to choose if it
State
Will:
High

-State employs indirect (defensive) efforts. -State employs mix of direct (offensive) and
Examples: defense alliances, multinational indirect (defensive) efforts. Examples: punish
institutions, public education campaigns,
attackers, educate population, build and bolster
total defense doctrine
multinational institutions
-Protect democratic institutions/processes
-Protect democratic institutions, processes, and
domestically
norms domestically and internationally
-Build resiliency domestically
-Leadership role integrating response to
-Integration among domestic sectors:
disinformation: domestically and internationally
government, media, society
State
-State inaction; do nothing
-Weakened or no state reaction against external
Will:
-Inchoate response by domestic sectors,
threat
Low
limited to no role internationally
-Employment of state capability to use
-Democratic backsliding: institutions
disinformation tactics against domestic audiences
weaken, reduction in domestic freedoms and -Democratic backsliding: broken trust, institutions
rights
weaken, reduction in domestic freedoms and rights
-Social division and struggle between domestic
sectors, balance of power determines future
direction
State Capability: Low
State Capability: High
Table 1: Expectations by Will and Capability

does respond. Table 1 highlights the different expectations I have for each combination of
high and low capability with high and low will. I will discuss each combination in the
following pages.
Measuring Capability and Will
Measuring capability and measuring will require different approaches. Capability is a
more clearly defined set of quantifiable characteristics and there are well developed
indices. Capability is more stable than will. However, the capability of a state is useless
without a will to make use of its powers. Will, therefore is not only the less stable factor,
but also the more essential element of the two. This section outlines how I measure and
compare state capability and will throughout this project.
First, capability is the simpler of these two variables to compare across states. There
are several approaches already available to compare states to other states and to compare
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states to themselves over time. Aggregate measures like Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
are readily available and tracked over decades or even centuries. Big measures like GDP
are rough. Measuring the output of a state is a way to consider its capabilities, but it lacks
context. It is possible, for instance, to have a large state and a small state each with
significantly different capability but equal GDP.
By contrast, other measures compare states with greater context. Michael Beckley, for
instance, recognizing that GDP overstates the power of large states, proposes using GDP
per capita (GDPPC)31 to include consideration of not just a state’s resources but also how
efficiently it employs its resources.
At the root of Russian strategy to undermine democracy is its own realization that it is
relatively weak relative to many leading democracies. Unable to compete successfully in
a rules-based international order, Russia has adopted a zero-sum view of state power:
whatever weakens its adversaries makes Russia stronger.32 During the COVID pandemic,
for example, as a NATO expert on Russian disinformation has written about vaccine
disinformation:
There's a reason why countries with which Russia has an argument find
themselves facing public health crises because of well-funded and wellorganized anti-vaccine campaigns. It is all just a measure to destabilize and
erode and subvert adversary societies— not necessarily for any particular
political outcomes. Because if you take as Russia does a zero-sum view of
security then anything that you do to weaken your adversary, and that includes
the United Kingdom, in relative terms makes you stronger.”25
For my project, I believe a middle solution considering both a state’s absolute

31. See Beckley, 2018, Unrivaled: Administering large states requires more overhead than governing small states.
Additionally, corrupt and otherwise inefficient regimes consume more resources in running their states; this devalues
rough measures of GDP since not all wealth created by a state is equally available for deployment.
32. Keir Giles, quoted in Haynes and Scott, Episode 2.

27

capability and specific information-related capability fits best. Overall capability is
important, but the asymmetric nature of Russia’s weaponized disinformation makes
measuring specific capabilities important too.
I suggest an appropriate way to consider both aspects is in using two measures: the
Correlates of War Project’s Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)33 and
specific measures included in the Belfer Center’s National Cyber Power Index (NCPI)34.
The CINC shows states’ general power relative to each other and over time by comparing
more specific resource attributes than GDP.35 And the NCPI is a composite score of
several cyber capabilities among thirty different states. Although my interest is not cyber
operations, some of the capabilities that the Belfer Center’s index measures also bear on a
state’s capabilities to combat disinformation which is enabled and amplified through
digital networks. Since my project focuses on 2013-2020, I will sort states primarily by
their 2012 CINC scores relative to Russia. I will augment this general score with
discussion of NCPI rankings for “information control” and “norms”36 in the cyber
domain, both of which are directly applicable to combatting disinformation.

33. See Singer, 1987. I used version 6.0 of the Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities database which
was published July 22, 2021. This database and covers the international system from 1816-2016 and is the basis for
CINC.
34. Voo et al., 2020.
35. See Singer, 1987. The Correlates of War version 6.0 CINC Scores are annual measures from 1816-2016 for each
state’s share of total global material power. The index measures six factors: military expenditures, military personnel,
energy consumption, iron and steel production, total population, and urban population.
36. Voo et al., 2020. p 19. The National Cyberpower Index defines Controlling and Manipulating the Information
Environment as “Reflecting the duality of information controls, a country has prioritized using electronic means to
control information and change narratives at home and abroad, AND/OR attempted to protect the internet privacy and
free speech of its citizens. The form includes spreading domestic propaganda, creating and amplifying disinformation
overseas, and using cyber capabilities to target and disrupt groups otherwise outside of its jurisdiction. The latter
includes taking down extremist material from social media, and refuting foreign propaganda.” It Defines International
Cyber Norms and Technical Standards means: “A country has actively participated in international legal, policy, and
technical debates around cyber norms. This might include signing cyber treaties, participating in technical working
groups, and joining cyber partnerships and alliances to combat cybercrime and share technical expertise and
capabilities.”
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In contrast, measuring will is much more subjective. Again, it is important to consider
the aim of disinformation when thinking about how to frame a state’s will to combat it.
As Pomerantsev describes, Russia seeds disinformation to undermine trust in facts:
Russian political parties are hollow and Russian news outlets are churning out
fantasies. But insisting on the lie, the Kremlin intimidates others by showing
that it is in control of defining ‘reality.’ This is why it’s so important for
Moscow to do away with truth. If nothing is true, then anything is possible. We
are left with the sense that we don’t know what Putin will do next—that he’s
unpredictable and thus dangerous. We’re rendered stunned, spun, and
flummoxed by the Kremlin’s weaponization of absurdity and unreality.”37
Undermining trust in facts degrades the ability to debate issues and solutions, in turn
distorting or destroying collective decision making through majority rule, which is the
essence of democratic governance. Combatting disinformation has two aspects: what a
state does and what a state says. As mentioned previously, will springs from factors such
as perceived intensity and persistence of threat, unity and social cohesion, trust in
government, structure of political system, elite behavior, and commitment to democratic
norms. There are publicly available databases that can measure some aspects of will
including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s measurements
of people’s trust in their national government. My project contributes measures of a
state’s will to oppose Russian disinformation by looking through publicly available
government, media, and academic documents to determine individual states’ history with
the Soviet Union, and what states have done through policy to protect democracy from
disinformation. These elements combine to describe why a state either did or did not
perceive a threat from Russia and contribute to the intensity with which a state perceived

37. Pomerantsev, 2014.
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that threat. The combination of trust, history, actions, and statements is used to measure
the level of will each state brings to securing democracy from disinformation.
Since analyzing history, actions, and statements to derive a measure of trust would be
its own project, I relied specifically on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Trust numbers to sort states by will. For each of the thirteen states, I
downloaded its rating for each year starting in 2012 and ending in 2020. Taking each
state’s average over that period and summary statistics of that sample, I sorted states into
their respective quadrants quickly indicating a relative cross-national measure for the
degree to which domestic populations trusted—and distrusted—their state governments.
Expectations
Low Will, Low Capability States
“If you want to boil a frog, you don't drop it in the boiling water because it'll jump
straight out again. You put it in cold water, and you slowly bring the water up to boil. in
doing so, by the time the frog realizes it's getting too hot, it's lost the energy to be able
to jump out. We're being boiled like a frog.” Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb.38
Expectations:
-State inaction; do nothing
-inchoate response by domestic sectors, limited to no role internationally
-Democratic backsliding: institutions weaken, reduction in domestic freedoms and
rights

Because my project considers only wealthy and democratic states, states in my
sample with low will and low capability are most limited. Other regime types derive their
legitimacy from different power arrangements, but democracies depend more directly on
popular support for state responses to Russian disinformation. This leads to several

38. Haynes and Scott, 2021. Episode 1.
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predictions regarding their likely behavior and impacts felt within their democracies.
First, low will, low capability states are likely to do little or nothing to address the
threat. States with low capability are typically smaller, less powerful democracies. Facing
a threat from a larger adversary like Russia, these states are not powerful enough to push
back directly. They may not even have capability enough to mount an effective defense.
Small economies, small militaries, or weak cyber capabilities all reduce options available.
These states are doubly unlikely to act because they lack the will. They may not perceive
an intensity or persistence of a Russian threat. They may be especially divided or
distrustful of government. The structure of their government may incentivize elites to
ignore the threat or, more detrimentally, decide to adopt disinformation as a tool of
domestic control. States with a mix of low capabilities and low will likely respond to
disinformation ineffectively if it even chooses to respond in the first place.
A second prediction is that domestic actors sufficiently motivated by their threat
perception will fill the void when they view their country is not sufficiently addressing
the problem. These actors in weaker states will be generally ineffective since they lack
the resources of a national government. Civil society organizations (CSO) are not large
compared with states, but the same information environment that enables viral
disinformation can correspondingly increase the reach of those who would resist. CSO
will be unable to compel Russia to do anything. Still, their small size can incentivize
innovation and flexibility. They can leverage international networks to influence
domestic politics in the hope of preserving or building democratic values. I expect nongovernmental entities within low will, low capability states to focus their efforts inward,
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aimed at addressing their own governments, and not primarily fighting against foreign
influence from Moscow. This creates a situation where the state and CSOs will be
inwardly focused, unable, and unwilling to work with other states to generate
international pushback against Russian interference. Such states will remain divided and
vulnerable to effects of disinformation over time.
A final prediction is that when states do not act to mitigate the corrosive effects of
disinformation, the campaigns will continue degrading the state’s democratic institutions.
Institutions will weaken and may even turn against domestic opposition and individual
freedoms and rights will be curtailed. States with low capability and low will are likely to
increasingly enact policies that advance anti-democratic aims which, intentionally or not,
align with Russian strategic goals of weakening democracy globally. The states will be
divided at home and will weaken ties between democracies internationally. Exact
mechanisms of degradation within individual states will vary but will be mostly around
key nodes of information processing and distribution effecting democratic functions:
elections are likely to become less free, parties are likely to become more extreme,
minority segments within the state’s population will be targeted through legislation or
courts, and dissent is likely to be punished using state power.
The saving grace of states with low capability and low will is that even if its leaders
do choose to use disinformation as a tool for social control, it will be with considerably
less effectiveness than a more capable state which decides similarly. Though they will
have an inward focus, it will be with a less capable state apparatus power to instantly
oppress its own people. But the Russian threat is external; low capability and low will
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states are least likely to protect themselves from Russian disinformation and they are thus
most likely to internalize the harms to democracy intended by foreign adversaries. These
states are the frogs described above by General Lamb.
Low Will, High Capability States
“To put it bluntly, it's really hard— it's impossible— to excel at democracy and
disinformation at the same time. Why? Because disinformation is designed to
insidiously undermine the authority of the factual to undermine trust in institutions. And
if you refine the capability of doing that to your adversary in the semi-covert way over
years and decades then ultimately what history clearly shows is you will infect yourself.
There’s a blow back effect. You will start to believe in your own myths and your own
constructions, as the Stasi called it, and the risk of self-disinformation if you do it for
too long.” Thomas Rid.39
Expectations:
-Weakened or no state reaction against external threat
-Employment of state capability to use disinformation tactics against domestic
audiences
-Democratic backsliding: broken trust, institutions weaken, reduction in domestic
freedoms and rights
-Social division and struggle between domestic sectors, balance of power determines
future direction

I expect that low will high capability states will also struggle to internalize the
external threat. To start with, these democracies are not short of policy options from
which to choose. Being high capability means they are at least on par with Russia in
terms of state power, and many democracies are much more powerful than Russia. If
these states so chose, they have sufficient capability to apply offensive, defensive,
unilateral, or multilateral responses to the problem. But, these states’ plentiful resources
make them better able to bear potential costs associated with confrontation. Where small

39. Haynes and Scott, 2021. Episode 2.
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states’ options are limited by capability, high capability states’ choices are more likely to
be limited by will. Whether these states intentionally underestimate the disinformation
threat, seek to leverage the threat for domestic political reasons, or seek to ignore the
threat all together, the results will eventually accumulate manifesting in the ways listed
above.
Any actions a low will state chooses is likely to be ineffective against Russian
disinformation. Russia has invested significant resources in weaponizing disinformation
within an asymmetric hybrid warfare strategy. It knows it cannot compete with capable
western democracies in a traditional confrontation, so it is pursuing an asymmetric
challenge to the United States-led international order through nonconventional techniques
of political warfare.40 Democracies that underestimate the seriousness of that challenge
do so at their own peril. These low will states will not organize sufficiently to match the
intensity of Russian disinformation campaigns. This asymmetry allows Russia to operate
at an advantage even within democracies that are more capable states. The effects of this
dynamic are likely especially pernicious in more capable states than in less capable states.
Another likely response of a high capability low will to address Russian
disinformation is highlighted by Thomas Rid’s quote opening this section. This passage
shows that such states risk self-disinformation. Although a powerful state’s government
may not have the will to use its capabilities combat Russian influence, those capabilities
can be aimed at domestic audiences.
The techniques Russia uses to sow disinformation are not overly complex, but

40. Polyakova and Boyer, 2018.
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they are effective attacks because they get right at the root of democracies.
Disinformation undermines belief in facts as a way of kneecapping trust in institutions.
Because institutions create fora for deliberation over time, healthy democracies will not
employ disinformation. Doing so is counter to self-interest since it degrades the quality of
collective decision making.
Anti-democratic elements within democratic societies, however, target dissolution of
institutions. In capable states, there are tools and resources available to leverage
disinformation techniques at home even if the state is uninterested in seriously countering
influence from abroad. Like the low will, low capability states, this sets the conditions for
disinformation to seep into a society.
Unlike the low capability states, however, the negative outcomes are likely to be
more damaging if the tools are taken up by powerful actors. More capable states will be
able to put greater resources into subversive efforts, further amplifying and disseminating
attacks on institutions. Damage will accrue over time like collective body blows to a
body politic: democratic backsliding, falling trust, weakened institutions, and curtailed
rights will result.
Already existing social divisions within a capable state will widen and deepen. Once
facts and arguments are devalued in debate and belief formation, what remains is
spectacle and the raw power of might makes right.41 This dynamic accelerates
polarization and will eventually yield political violence if left unchecked for too long.
This is the blowback of self-disinformation that Professor Rid describes above.

41. Snyder, 2017.

35

High Will, Low Capability States
“There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the long run the
sword will always be conquered by the spirit.” Napoleon Bonaparte
“We are on the front lines here. Brainwashing is a threat. If you are demotivating
people, if you're spending fake news on whatever happens, if you are organizing
referendum without informing people properly it's also a threat. You really can make
big damage. This is not artillery, it’s not conventional force, it’s something else but it’s
very detrimental.” Linas Linkevicius, foreign minister of Lithuania until December
2020.
Expectations:
-State employs indirect (defensive) efforts. Examples: defense alliances, multinational
institutions, public education campaigns, total defense doctrine
-Protect democratic institutions/processes domestically
-Build resiliency domestically
-Integration among domestic sectors: government, media, society

States with high will and low capability are opposite of the high capability states with
low will. Their lack of capability somewhat counterintuitively makes them more likely to
push back effectively against Russian disinformation. These democratic states are
relatively weaker than Russia. They have smaller economies, fewer people, and smaller
militaries. This can predictably lead them to choose external balancing strategies to
ensure state survival.42 Building internal capabilities requires time and resources. In states
which are dwarfed by Russia, choosing such a strategy could be futile; even if all
resources a state could bring to bear were put against a Russian threat, they could still be
insufficient to compete for survival. So, I expect the capability gap with Russia will lead
these states to look for help externally through treaties, alliances, and cooperation.
Further, just as states with high relative capabilities may underestimate their

42. Waltz, 1979.
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vulnerability to the threat of Russian disinformation, I expect that states with low relative
capabilities will be more sensitive to the danger and perceive the threats from
disinformation differently in both time and intensity. Small states will have fewer layers
of institutions, competing power centers, myriad interests, and heterogeneous populations
than larger states, which makes achieving consensus easier. Smaller states face less
inertia and fewer collective action problems than larger states, requiring less time to
achieve some sense of consensus recognition of a threat.
Smaller states are also likely to feel threats more acutely than powerful states. Smaller
states have seen Russian aggression not only in other small states like Georgia and
Estonia, but also repeatedly in large states like Ukraine43. Russian actions in those states
have included efforts of redrawing borders in Europe through force of arms and military
campaigns have been preceded by disinformation campaigns the forces in other wars
have prepared areas with artillery or air power. The threat is more intense in smaller
states on Russia’s border which assess Kremlin aggression as potentially existential. The
difference in threat perception is an important driver in generating will. Because threats
are recognized faster and taken more seriously, I expect high will low capability states to
pursue a rigorous strategy of self-defense and working with others to ensure survival.
As outlined above, I expect high will low capability democracies to respond to
Russian disinformation through aggressively hardening their domestic capabilities while
cooperating with other states to balance externally against a persistent threat by a more
powerful adversary. Some more specific types of responses follow. I expect a low

43. Lucas et al., 2021.
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capability high will state to innovate ways to become more effective through balancing.
This can include not only participation in defense arrangements, alliances, and
multinational institutions which counter Russian disinformation, but leadership in
creating such arrangements and elevating awareness of the Russian threat. Because of the
asymmetry in the intensity and duration of threat perception between small states and
large states, I expect that small states will be more motivated than larger states to rally as
many external capabilities as possible to response. Additionally, I expect that small states
will respond more aggressively within their borders to harden themselves against attack.
Defense doctrines, public education campaigns, legal structures, and formation of
governmental organizations, for example, are likely options for these states to pursue.
Domestically, defensive strategies pursued by states relatively weaker than Russia
will include bolstering institutions, building resilience among the population, and
integrating different societal sectors to resist the corrosive effects of disinformation.
Because Russian aims are to undermine democratic institutions, small states with a will to
resist will likely act to shore up their domestic democratic institutions. Elections and
political parties are key areas where Russian influence can change the internal dynamic
within democratic states. Low capability states will make efforts to defend them.
Also, small states with high will will build resilience within its population to the
individual level. Digitally enabled Russian influence operations are aimed at individuals
to sow division. Cell phones and web browsers can put disinformation directly in front of
individual citizens; a coordinated defense will include training and education programs
for detecting disinformation and blunting its effectiveness. Finally, coordination between
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sectors should be more readily apparent in smaller democracies. Just as small states will
seek to defend through leveraging international cooperation, they will also organize
internally to mitigate disinformation. I expect that there will be coordination between
government, civil, and media groups working together against Russian meddling.
Because these states have high will, there will be more extant trust in institutions and
government or other characteristics that make unity of effort more achievable.
Because high will states will integrate their international and domestic efforts, I
expect they will be more effective in pushing back against Russian disinformation. The
threat posed will be perceived earlier and taken more seriously because it comes from a
relatively more powerful adversary. The combination of low capability and high will
forces these states to find creative responses, making them innovators.
High Will, High Capability States
“What they mean by unresolved contradictions is frictions, for example nascent
antisemitism in Germany in the 1960s or unresolved racial tensions in the United States
also in the 1960s or even today, and then designing and driving a wedge into those
cracks in order to pry them open— for example to drive a wedge between West
Germany and the United States or between NATO allies.”44 Thomas Rid
Expectations:
-State employs mix of direct (offensive) and indirect (defensive) efforts. Examples:
punish attackers, educate population, build and bolster multinational institutions
-Protect democratic institutions, processes, and norms domestically and
internationally
-Leadership role integrating response to disinformation: domestically and
internationally

In states with high will and capability, all options of response are available. These

44. Quoted in Haynes and Scott, 2021. Episode 2.
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states come to conflict with Russia with equal or greater state capability. This offers
opportunities unavailable to smaller states similarly disposed to counter Russian
disinformation. But the pairing of high will with high capability is a double-edged sword.
On one hand, these states are likely to be among those most targeted by Russia because
the attacks can have the highest payoff degrading democracy globally. On the other, these
states are most capable in pushing back against disinformation and can impose large costs
against Russia for its efforts.
The high will high capability states are likely to be most targeted because Russia’s
strategic goal is challenging the postwar democratic world order. As discussed, Russia’s
challenge is posed by degrading that order by weakening ties between democratic states
globally and attacking individual states to degrade democratic states domestically. The
high capability states in this grouping will be targeted more because they are leading
democracies internationally. Therefore, the payoff for weakening a big democracy is
increased: weakening an individual state is good, but driving a wedge between a
multinational organization like NATO, designed to contain Soviet power after World
War II and refocused after the Cold War on expanding further into Russia’s sphere of
influence, is much better.
High will high capability states will also include many democracies which are more
capable than Russia. Russia does not employ disinformation because it is strong; Russia
employs disinformation as an asymmetric tactic to close a growing capability gap with
rich democracies. These states should be motivated to respond. While low capability
states are highly motivated by costs since they face potential threats to their survival, high
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capability democracies are those that have reaped the most benefit from the postwar
international order. Disruption to that order will manifest as serious costs in rich
democracies. So, differently than its use in smaller states, in powerful democracies
Russia does not use disinformation from a position of strategic strength, but one of
strategic weakness. Excepting the use of its nuclear weapons, Russia does not have
sufficient capability to pose an immediate existential threat to this group. This impacts
how these democracies perceive the threat and drives a different set of expectations for
their responses.
Among the four categories of democracies, this group should be expected to be the
most active in dealing with Russian disinformation. They have sufficient capabilities to
push back directly against Russia if they choose. They also can coordinate and lead other
states in opposing Russian interference. This should manifest in high capability, high will
states opting for a mix of both approaches acting with allies when possible and
unilaterally when necessary.
Second, because the most capable democracies have benefitted most from the postwar
international order, they have more to lose to the degree Russia and other challengers to
that order are able to undermine that order. This leads to the other expected types of
responses from this group of democracies. They are likely to bolster the key institutions
targeted by disinformation campaigns. These institutions are not only the recurring
venues and international bodies where repeated interactions between states drives
geopolitics, 45 but also the embedded norms that have allowed democracy to thrive

45. Keohane, 1984.

41

internationally.46
The most likely areas to protect in democracies are the most vulnerable: free
elections, rule of law, anti-corruption, and free expression. Different states will protect
these institutions and values differently, but these areas are simultaneously what makes
democracy function and potential vectors for disinformation to corrode governance most
effectively from within. In addition to protecting institutions and norms domestically, the
high capability, high will democracies will also be those leading efforts between
democratic states in promoting democracy internationally.
The low capability, high will states may be entrepreneurs that innovate and elevate
potential solutions to combat disinformation, but it is high will, high capability states that
will get engaged to scale responses to powerful groups of states. Once engaged, the
capabilities these states can bring to bear are each greater than Russia can muster. In
concert with others, the collective capabilities of big democracies dwarf Russian state
power.
The goal of Russian strategy is to push just hard enough to undermine its enemies
without precipitating a forceful response from more powerful international actors. Again,
this is a strategy favored by the weaker state in an asymmetric competition. States with
high capability and high will face the biggest potential costs of disruption to the
international order, can counter Russian influence domestically, and have the power to
lead internationally. It is these states which will be decisively succeed or fail to secure
and promote democracy in the face of threats from Russia.

46. Ruggie, 1982.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, my theory is that different democratic states should be expected to
respond to Russian disinformation operations according to each state’s mix of capability
and will. Between capability and will, capability will be more stable and easier to
measure. A state’s capability determines the range of policy options available to protect
democracy both domestically and internationally. However, it is will that is the more
important factor. If capability determines the options available, it is only through will that
a state will choose and sustain a set of policies to fight against a relentless flood of
disinformation. Russia is a large state with considerable capabilities, especially in
conducting deliberate disinformation operations to undermine the United States led
international order. The range of expected responses should break down along states with
high or low capability and high or low will.
Low capability, low will democratic states will do little to nothing against the external
threat. They will be the most susceptible to the corrosive effects of disinformation. High
capability, low will states will also fail to defend themselves effectively but because they
are relatively powerful, run the risk of self-disinformation if capable powers within the
state use disinformation as a tool of internal control. In both low will groupings, the
rights and protections of domestic actors will erode.
Low capability, high will states will be highly sensitive to the threat of disinformation
from Russia. Their relatively small size will make them sensitive to external aggression
leading to a sustained, possibly existential threat. This perception will lead to innovative
solutions. Plus, these small states will be advocates for elevating the threat among other
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democracies to balance. Finally, high capability, high will states will be the decisive
group in determining how effective democracies will be in countering the disinformation
component of Russia’s strategy undermining the global order. These states will likely be
less sensitive to the threat since they are likely to overlook a relatively less powerful
Russia, but these states also have the most to lose. If they realize the threat in time to
sustain their will, these states have the power to punish Russia unilaterally and the
influence to organize collective response by democracies internationally.
The next chapter will show how this dynamic unfolded among a select group of
democracies from 2013-2020, a period when Russia significantly escalated its
employment of disinformation supporting aggressive military invasions into neighboring
states and hybrid political warfare interfering with several other states, including leading
global democracies.
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CHAPTER 3
CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY
Introduction
The Russian escalation after 2013 seemed in some ways like a random flood of
sometimes ridiculously unbelievable lies. But the operation was far from random.
Instead, it was a highly tailored global influence campaign against the democratic world
order. The operation had specific objectives, key among them was maintaining power in
Russia.
As Lucas et al describe, this strategy is meant to maintain stability domestically while
creating or threatening instability abroad:
The Russian regime’s foremost interest is its own hold on power. All policy,
internal and external, stems from this overriding goal. The Kremlin sees the
West, the European Union (EU), and NATO as threats to this stability, and as
potential instigators of “color revolutions” that will exploit Russia’s ethnic,
religious, political, and other fissures. The long-term goal is, therefore, a
polycentric or multipolar world in which multilateral, rules-based organizations
are unable to dictate terms to Russia. Instead, the Kremlin aims to be the
dominant power in Eurasia, using Russia’s size to exert strong influence over its
neighbors and over small countries, and to bargain with big countries on an
equal basis.47
To bring about its goal, Russia began in the mid 2000s a series of campaigns against
Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine, and other neighboring states that included further adaptation
of information warfare to advances in digital technology. By 2013, the Kremlin had been
experimenting for a decade on how to employ disinformation in what many claimed was
a new form of hybrid war. According to Peters, the invasion in Ukraine was proof of
concept for new applications of Soviet techniques like:
47. Lucas et al., 2021.
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denial and deception, concealment of the Kremlin’s goals, ‘retaining
superficially plausible legality,’ using threats of military power and using threat
of nuclear weapons, deployment of resources globally and through social media
a recrafting of the narrative of conflict.48
Recrafting the narrative is meant to generate disorganization and disunity within foreign
competitors.49 At the time, the United States’ Supreme Allied Commander Europe
declared invasion “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in
the history of information warfare.”50 For the first months of the operation, Ukraine was
the main target of Russian disinformation. That soon changed as the operation expanded
to attack the United States and most states in the European Union and NATO.
Adapting Soviet tactics and with a goal of subverting the West, the Kremlin used new
tools of a networked world to gain unprecedented dissemination of propaganda. Freed
from any desire to bring recipients along with a movement in the direction of global
communism, Russia instead just started sowing doubt within and between democracies
using a far-reaching army of trolls, bots, social media, and fake websites. Now, as
described by Bola and Papadakis, the digital propaganda employed against the West
since 2013 “works differently. It is primarily interested in the destruction of the
epistemological foundation that informs the process of validation and adjudication of
claims of political relevance for the constitution of contemporary societies.”51
In this new context, contaminating global information flows with lies is not a bug, but
a feature designed to advance Kremlin objectives by distracting and confusing its

48. Peters, 2017.
49. Pynnöniemi and Rácz, 2016, p. 33. “The Soviet and subsequent Russian approach to strategic deception can be
explained with three different but complementary concepts: organizational weapon, reflexive control and active
measures.”
50. Vandiver, 2014.
51. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 639.
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democratic adversaries.52 This chapter seeks to understand what different states did in
response during the operation. Some did a lot. Others did nothing. As described in the
previous chapter, I argue that a combination of democratic states’ will and capability
drive their policy responses. In this chapter, I draw on the experiences of thirteen
democracies targeted by Russia from 2013-2020 to test that argument.
Selection of States
Before comparing what western democracies did to combat Russian disinformation, I
applied several screening criteria to define what subset of states to consider. Three
criteria yield thirteen democracies most relevant to studying state-level responses.
First, my interest was in studying democracies. The Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU) annually ranks democracies according to 60 indicators of electoral process and
pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political
culture. Scores in those categories are then adjusted if a country does not get a full score
for free and fair national elections, voter security, foreign influence in government, and
civil service capability. Each country then gets ranked as a full democracy, flawed
democracy, hybrid regime, or authoritarian regime.53 In the 2020 rankings, 75 national
governments scored as full or flawed democracies.
Second, although there are several states employing disinformation campaigns to
influence foreign audiences and elections, this project focused on Russian disinformation.
As such, screening for NATO countries made sense. NATO is a decades old military

52. Pynnöniemi and Rácz, 2016, p. 17-18. “openly false, rapidly varying Russian communication is aimed not at
convincing the decision-makers, but at dazzling the public audience by providing numerous alternative narratives to the
Western ones… the main objective of these measures is to dazzle and disorient.”
53. Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2020, p. 56-57.
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alliance established after World War II to contain the Soviet Union. Since the end of the
Cold War, the alliance has refocused, expanding to include several former Soviet
Republics and Satellites, and the alliance continues to contain Russia. In addition to
formal signatory member states, however, I also consider five countries who are NATO
Enhanced Opportunity Partners. Enhanced Opportunity Partners, several of which are
very near Russia, have privileged relationships protections under NATO despite not
being treaty signatories. Part of the reasoning for Enhanced Opportunity Partners is to
coordinate multinational responses to hybrid and new threats. This includes information
warfare, which Russia has accelerated and intensified in the early decades of the 21st
century. Including Enhanced Opportunity Partners offers a fuller picture of responses to
Russian aggression. The list of full or flawed democracies which are NATO members or
Enhanced Opportunity Partners narrowed the Economist Intelligence Unit list to 30
countries.
Third, I focused on the 13 of these 30 states publicly known as targets for Russian
influence efforts. Martin, Shapiro, and Ilhardt have studied nearly 1000 media reports on
state sponsored attempts at foreign influence using coordinated disinformation
campaigns. They identified 76 foreign influence efforts between 2011 and 2020. Of
those, 64% emanated from Russia and most targeted NATO and Enhanced Opportunity
Partner democracies.54
I scoped this even more narrowly, focusing on 2013 to 2020. This period coincides
with Russia’s invasion into Ukraine and ends with the World Health Organization’s

54 Martin et al., 2020.
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declaration of COVID-19 pandemic. The invasion into Ukraine included an
unprecedented escalation of Russian information operations which had been honed in
earlier attacks on Georgia, Estonia, and others. The escalation continued to involve
attacks on elections and democratic
norms in democratic states and
between democracies
internationally.
The COVID pandemic marked a
new opportunity for more actors,
having seen the impact of Russia’s
campaigns, to adopt disinformation
techniques exacerbating divisions.
By then, however, governments had
had time to study, understand, and
respond to disinformation. I aimed
to study what different states did
during that recent explosion of
aggressive information operations.
Using Martin, Shapiro, and Ilhart’s

EIU ranking 2020
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Country

Regime type

United States Flawed democracy

NATO+EOP

Attacks by
Russia 2013-18
14

16

United Kingdom Full democracy

3

9

Australia Full democracy

2

14

Germany Full democracy

2

9

Netherlands Full democracy

2

5

Canada Full democracy

1

6

Finland Full democracy

1

22

Spain Full democracy

1

3

Sweden Full democracy

1

24

France Flawed democracy

1

29

Italy Flawed democracy

1

42

Lithuania Flawed democracy

1

50

Poland Flawed democracy

1

7

Denmark Full democracy

2

Iceland Full democracy

13

Luxembourg Full democracy

1

Norway Full democracy

71

Albania Flawed democracy

36

Belgium Flawed democracy

52

Bulgaria Flawed democracy

59

Croatia Flawed democracy

31

Czech Republic Flawed democracy

27

Estonia Flawed democracy

37

Greece Flawed democracy

55

Hungary Flawed democracy

38

Latvia Flawed democracy

26

Portugal Flawed democracy

62

Romania Flawed democracy

47

Slovakia Flawed democracy

35

Slovenia Flawed democracy

18

Austria Full democracy

1

45

South Africa Flawed democracy

1

49

Brazil Flawed democracy

1

4

New Zealand Full democracy

8

Ireland Full democracy

11

Taiwan Full democracy

12

Switzerland Full democracy

15

Uruguay Full democracy

17

Chile Full democracy

Table 2: Selection Criteria for States in Cross-national
Survey

foreign influence efforts database, 13 NATO and Enhanced Opportunity Partner states
are publicly known to have experienced Russian disinformation campaigns at least once
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from 2013 to 2020.55 Of course, it bears noting that because of attribution problems, there
almost certainly have been attacks which are not publicly known.
The multiple screening criteria resulted in a list that includes the United States plus 12
other democracies, each in formal security agreements with the United States, and each
known to have been attacked by Russian disinformation in recent years. This list is
shown in Table 2.
Methodology
For this chapter, I relied on grounded theory looking at actions taken by a select
group of democracies and coding their responses at a state level through a specific period.
I used the data to test my theory that capability and will cause different states to respond
differently.56 As a starting point, Martin, Shapiro, and Ilhardt’s database of Foreign
Information Efforts (FIE) was useful. The database provides rich contexts about various
operations conducted from 2013-2018, including numerous characteristics of attackers,
actors, strategies, platforms, sources, approaches, tactics, and topics.57 They detail FIEs
from the attackers’ perspective. My contribution is to explain the flip side of those
efforts, creating a list of broadly corresponding characteristics of responses taken by the
targets of FIEs— specifically Russian FIE. Because of the dual nature of conflict, many
of the same categories of variables that describe an attack can be reversed to describe a
corresponding defense or countermeasure.58 I relied on official documents and publicly

55. Martin et al., 2020.
56. Ravitch and Carl, 2021.
57. Martin et al., 2020.
58. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, “Warfighting”
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accessed documents including books, government documents, chapters, journal articles,
blog posts, and press reports to describe each states’ actions.59
None of what I reviewed is classified. Although specific operations are classified, my
interest is in the broader strategic and societal impacts of disinformation. Assessing this
does not require access to anything not publicly available. In fact, because I was
interested in the responses to disinformation, I believe it was better to focus only on
public reports. Main goals of Russian disinformation include disorientation, distrust, and
confusion. Muddying the water and making all information seem untrustworthy is an
end.60 That goal is accomplished across society, not limited to the halls of the Pentagon,
State Department, or Congress. Public acceptance of false narratives or of preventive
measures meant to combat disinformation mainly determines of how corrosive
disinformation will be within a society. So, publicly observable actions are what really
matters.
This approach did risk blind spots, however. Not only did I not consider classified
information, but also disinformation often relies on anonymity or misrepresentation of
sources. Skilled propagandists exploit media biases for elite institutional focus, headline
seeking, and neutrality61. This required other methods besides analyzing press reports to
ensure an accurate description of democratic responses. I used several different sources
and methods to enhance the validity of this survey. This helped ensure that my findings
presented a layered, coherent interpretation of state-level responses. I used a mix of

59. Ravitch and Carl, 2021.
60. See Snyder, 2017 and Pomerantsev, 2019.
61. Benkler et al., 2020.
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documents, expert testimony, practitioners from different states, and a wide range of
publications over nearly a decade. This ensured I was not seeing the phenomenon through
the limited perspective of one individual, source, or time. 62Interestingly, during this
study I came across a breadth of perspectives that was wide enough to include articles
which themselves voiced Russian propaganda. I discarded sources that made
demonstrably false claims like Russia had not invaded Ukraine. I will not cite that source
here to avoid amplifying falsehoods.
I also worked to account for two blind spots resulting from my sample of states. First,
I acknowledge that the sample consisted of a small group of exceptional states—Western
democracies in some level of formal security relationship with the United States and
which have been attacked by Russian disinformation since 2013. Within this small group,
however, I believe there was a sufficiently wide range of population, size, historical
context, legal systems, institutions, traditions, and geography to draw valid conclusions
about capabilities and will as variables that shape how states responded to disinformation.
Second, I only worked in English. Because disinformation adapts to changing
contexts, language can be an important screen; some of the smaller states with their own
languages have an advantage when non-native speakers attempt to push disinformation.
Grammatical errors can sometimes be easy flags that call into question a message’s
authenticity. This raises the bar for narratives to penetrate information filters, especially
in a small state with a distinct language like Finland. I tried to mitigate this by looking at
sufficiently broad accounts from multinational sources like NATO documents, which are

62. Ravitch and Carl, 2021.
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compiled by experts who regularly work in multiple languages, and English translation of
foreign documents.
To structure my collection of evidence, I developed a codebook detailing state level
governmental actions taken from 2013-2020. I had one codebook per state, covering
responses to specific attacks and general approaches to managing the information
environment. Typical responses included education campaigns, changes to election law,
and updated media practices meant to deal with disinformation.
This study was inductive. I learned through the process and adapted the codebook
after completing each of the first several states. Given its small size and my language
limitations, I started with Lithuania to determine feasibility of collecting data on my
sample. I analyzed the collected data at each step of the project to ensure there was
sufficient information to support conclusions.63 Collecting sources for each state provided
iterative opportunity to refine the codebook as a collection instrument. That required me
to also update past instruments before moving forward. After collecting data, I grouped
the states into groups according to their level of will and capability as outlined in Chapter
2. I include narrative summaries of each state in Appendix A. In the next section of this
chapter, I will outline my findings by states grouped according to will and capability.

63. Maxwell, 2013.
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Findings
Low Will, Low Capability: Poland, Spain

Table 3: Ratings for Low Will, Low Capability States

Table 4: Overall Findings for Low Will, Low Capability States

According to my framework, there are two low will, low capability states in the
sample: Poland and Spain. As shown in Table 3, these states are both in the lower half of
average CINC scores from 2013-2016. Spain is in the lowest quartile of the Belfer
Center’s NCPI rankings for Information Control and Norms. Yoo et al. did not even rank
Poland in its measure of national cyber powers. And both states were in the bottom three
rankings for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trust scores.
They are two of the least capable, lowest will states according to my selected measures.
As low will low capability states, my theory predicts that they would be inwardly
focused with a weak state apparatus not oriented on protecting itself from the threat of
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external Russian propaganda. I also expected that these states would be most likely to
internalize the harms to democracy intended by foreign adversaries. I saw evidence that
mostly supported these expectations and the policy choices I thought would result: that
the state governments would mostly do nothing about Russian disinformation, that there
would be an inchoate response by domestic sectors trying to address vulnerabilities, and
that there would be corrosion of democratic norms within the states. These findings are
shown in Table 4.
Both Spain and Poland ignored Russian disinformation and focused domestically.
Spain eventually named Russia for meddling in Spanish domestic politics, but not until
years of choosing to talk about disinformation without directly accusing Russia.64 Poland
also focused internally. Its ruling party, PiS or Law and Justice, focused its efforts on
undermining its domestic political opposition, demonizing immigrants, and promoting
nationalist policies.65 In the face of government inaction, particularly in Poland, civil
society organizations (CSO) did organize to address disinformation. Dozens of
organizations sprouted some directly inspired by Ukrainian organizations that had stood
up to combat Russian disinformation. The growth in the number of CSO forming in
Poland accelerated early in the period, peaked at 14 in 2017, but tapered off dramatically
as Law and Justice consolidated power. By 2019, no new CSOs were established.66
Spain and Poland also both saw significant democratic backsliding. As Law and
Justice consolidated power, it continued ignoring Russian disinformation and took its

64. Jopling, 2018.
65. Gregor and Mlejnková, 2021.
66. Ibid.
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own actions to weaken democratic norms domestically. The government fired and
harassed hundreds of journalists, employed botnets and troll farms in elections, and
turned public media into a party propaganda outlet.67 As a result, Poland has effectively
become a one-party state and slipped dramatically in press freedom rankings.68
During the period, Spain also backslid. In 2017, there was a vote for Catalonia to
secede from Spain. This was a highly divisive issue that Russia exploited and
exacerbated. The vote for secession prompted strong reaction from the national
government which jailed some opposition politicians, dissolved the Catalan government,
and instituted direct rule from Madrid.69 This is a serious degradation of democracy—
both in splitting a state and then in jailing opposition leaders while disbanding
subordinate governments. The inward focus of Poland and Spain, plus the resulting
curtailment of domestic freedoms are all consistent with predictions. I also found
evidence of reactions that my framework did not anticipate.
Poland and Spain both defied predictions in limited incidents. For example, at a time
while the Polish government was using disinformation against its own people, they also
contributed senior level employees at NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of
Excellence (StratCom CoE).70 That organization’s mission is to coordinate NATO
narratives, founded during Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine, and so can be seen as a
response to Russian information operations. This exception may be due to timing,
however. The Center of Excellence was established in 2014 while Law and Justice was

67. Kosc, 2020.
68. Ibid.
69. Minder, 2019.
70. Gregor and Mlejnková, 2021
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still a minority party in Poland. Law and Justice only became Poland’s governing party in
2015. Perhaps after Law and Justice took power, Poland would not have been such an
active participant in a multinational counter-disinformation effort.
Spain also challenged my assumptions. As mentioned, early in the period I saw no
evidence of Spanish state concern for Russian disinformation. That changed with the
Catalan independence vote; by 2017, Spain reorganized its defense strategy acknowledge
Russian disinformation. It also called out Russia for election meddling during European
Union elections.71 I underestimated low will low capability states’ potential to regain
focus so quickly. Acceptance of the threat cannot come too soon; as COVID bookended
the period of my exploration, Spain was an early pandemic target of medical
disinformation. Further study can add to understanding whether Spain adapted better
counter-disinformation policies after the Catalan secession and European Union election
lessons.
In conclusion, the low will low capability states largely conformed with what I
expected to see. The Polish and Spanish Governments were inwardly focused even while
Russian attacked them from without. Both states suffered major declines in their
democracies— Poland turned its state apparatus against its own people and Spain
suffered a highly contested Russian-supported secession of a major subordinate region.
There were also surprises studying these states. Mostly, that if and when external
meddling is perceived as having gone too far, even low will states can quickly turn to
addressing the threat.

71. Booth and Birnbaum, 2017.
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Low Will, High Capability: Italy, United States:

Table 5: Ratings for Low Will, High Capability States

Table 6: Overall Findings for Low Will, High Capability States

Of the thirteen states in my sample, Italy and the United States coded as low will and
high capability. My framework expects these countries to experience widening and
deepening social divisions as domestic elements compete in a more post fact and post
truth information environment. As mentioned previously, once facts are devalued within
democratic debate and belief formation, what remains is attacking people who hold
opposing beliefs.72 This dynamic accelerates polarization and will eventually move
beyond words to political violence if left unchecked for too long.73 The two states largely
conformed to my expectations that low will high capability states would show weak or no

72. Snyder, 2021.
73. Mason, 2018.
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state reaction to an external threat, employ state capabilities to spread disinformation
domestically, backslide democratically, and polarize internally with increasingly
divergent groups competing for power. Italy demonstrated all these predictions, but the
United States Government reaction was more mixed.
Italy and the United States, while both grouped as low will and high capability as
reflected in Table 5, are quite different from each other. Both are among the most
powerful states as ranked by CINC score. The United States for this period was still far
and away the world’s most capable democracy with an average of 13% share of global
power according to CINC metrics. Italy, while still above average even among this group
of mostly rich Western states, still averaged about one tenth of the United States’ overall
capability at 1.1% of global material capability. In addition to that gap, the Belfer ranking
for Information Control and Norms ranked the United States first and Italy last among my
sample. The United States’ ranking is somewhat misleading, however, since it was
earned by virtue of its efforts combatting Islamic State influence. The United States, then,
demonstrated success combatting narratives in a contested environment, just not
necessarily in a domestic environment being challenged by Russia. In other words, when
the United States had the will to disrupt and degrade Islamic State influence, it did so. Its
will to respond to Russian attacks was less clear. These high capability states did not
demonstrate will to respond to Russian disinformation throughout the period and so my
framework largely predicts what resulted.
Table 6 shows that responses to Russian disinformation in the United States and Italy
conformed with my expectations. First, each showed weakened or no state reaction
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against the external threat. Italy has a long history of close support for Russia. Even
during the Cold War, it had the largest Communist Party in Western Europe. Now, in a
post-Soviet era, it still has segments of pro-Russian sympathy, especially in the Five Star
movement that led Italy for much of the period under consideration.74 And in a Trumpled United States, even the significant efforts the United States Government eventually
took to address Russian meddling was despite, not because of, Presidential leadership.
This muted the response from the world’s oldest democracy.
Second, both states’ ruling parties employed disinformation tactics against domestic
audiences. The Italian former Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, for example, spread
disinformation, including pro-Putin disinformation, and used to build his official
campaign website the same propagandist who built other sites including “I’m with
Putin,” and “StopEURO.”75 In the United States, Donald Trump long dabbled in
conspiracy theories including questioning President Obama’s citizenship, campaigned
while enabling Russian interference, and used social media during his administration to
spread conspiracy theories aimed at undermining the legitimacy of his critics and
opponents.76
Third, democratic backsliding occurred in both states over this period. And elections
have turned into a tribal competition for power rather than a competition of policy
differences. Trust in government among Italian citizens is generally low and they
recorded the lowest score of any annual measure among the sample for my period; in

74. Christiani, 2020 and Weiss, 2020.
75. Appuzo and Satariano, 2019.
76. Benkler, 2018.
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2013, only 14% of Italians voiced trust. By the end of the period, the government
justified this lack of trust, releasing previously classified intelligence that showed the
government knew Russia and China had been interfering in their democracy.77
Democracy in the United States also backslid. Its ranking in the Economist Intelligence
Unit and other methodologies no longer classify the system as a full democracy.78
President Trump systematically sought to undermine the legitimacy of elections by
spreading disinformation about voting fraud, stoking conspiracy theories, and even
kneecapping the post office.79 Former President Trump’s party has not developed a party
platform since the 2016 election, instead relying on nativist and nationalist appeals to a
base, amplifying lies, conspiracies, and threats of violence not to win a battle of ideas
within a political framework, but to motivate a coercive struggle of de facto power
preferred by autocrats.80
Although the 2020 election occurred outside the period of my study, it clearly
continued the application of disinformation as a divisive weapon which eventually lead
violence at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Political violence is a predicted and
predictable result of disinformation as applied by Russia or those who adopt Russian
tactics. In all these ways, Italy and the United States conformed with expectations.
However, the United States Government did also act unexpectedly in some other ways.
The United States response to Russian disinformation varied from my predictions in
two main ways. First, although the government was handicapped from 2016-2020 by a

77. Christiani, 2020 and Bechis, 2020.
78. Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2020, p. 9.
79. Benkler, 2020.
80. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006.
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chief executive who actively obstructed full reckoning with the most damaging Russian
influence operation of the period, still the government took strong actions against Russia.
For example, President Obama with Congress created the Global Engagement Center in
2016 to combat not only Islamic State but also Russian propaganda.81 And multiple
investigations by Congressional committees, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement
all resulted in a consensus view that Russia had attacked United States elections.82 This
resulted in arrests, indictments of Russian individuals and organizations, and new
sanctions against Russia agreed to by a veto-proof majority of Senators even while the
body was Republican controlled.83 Despite the President’s protest, the government still
found ways to respond directly to the threat. And, just as the United States Government
was not completely dissuaded by the President’s lies and subversion, the United States
Government, neither was it focused solely on domestic responses. Following the
disastrous 2016 attack and lack of public acknowledgement from Republican leaders that
Russia had interfered in the election, the United States Government remained engaged
abroad to help allies avoid similar worst-case outcomes in their elections. American
intelligence, for example, was helpful in blunting Russian interference in the 2017 French
Presidential election. The National Security Agency established and shared with France
attribution that tied Russian actors to election attacks, enabling the Macron campaign’s
effective response.84 The United States changed over this period and acted. The actions
were late and weaker than they likely would have been had they been headed by a

81. Stengel, 2019.
82. Applebaum, 2021 and Davis, 2018.
83. Jopling, 2018.
84. Nance and Reiner, 2018, and Jopling, 2018.
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President who placed United States interests above his own, but the actions were still
significant and not just in the United States.
Overall, the high capability low will states’ responses repeated a theme from the low
capability low will states that there is a temporal quality to state action combatting
disinformation. A state’s response to similar types of disinformation can vary over
relatively short periods. Before the 2016 election in the United States, for example,
disinformation was one issue among many in a noisy democracy which mainly expected
a continuation of Obama administration policies under the first female president. Instead,
the issue instantly moved to the top of many policy agendas and parts of the government
pursued it even as the President did not. And even in Italy, the government officially
acknowledged publicly by 2020 that Russia and China were spreading disinformation in
Italy to undermine democracy.85 This leaves open the question moving forward of who
will control policy. If actors like Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini, or other purveyors of
disinformation regain power in the United States and Italy, democracy will continue to
backslide. If actors who support democracy at home and abroad are chosen to lead,
perhaps the lessons learned from 2013-2020 can inform actions taken to rebuild damage
done to institutions.

85. Christiani, 2020 and Bechis, 2020.
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High Will, Low Capability: Australia, Finland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Sweden

Table 7: Ratings for High Will, Low Capability States

Table 8: Overall Findings for High Will, Low Capability States

Because large states garner outsize attention in international media and global
politics, I had little familiarity with many aspects of the responses by the high will low
capability states highlighted in Table 7. As such, I found this group most interesting to
research. As outlined in Table 8, my theory predicts that because the Russian threat to
them comes from a relatively more powerful adversary and because this is more likely to
be perceived earlier and taken more seriously, these states would be effective as
laboratories for developing creative ways to push back against Russian disinformation.
Overall, evidence supported those predictions.
The high will low capability states in my sample are Australia, Finland, Lithuania,
Netherlands, and Sweden. All of them are below average in the aggregate CINC measure.
In fact, these states include the lowest four and five of the lowest six average CINC
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scores from 2013-2016. Their small size, then, does seem correlated to taking the Russian
threat more seriously than the more powerful states in the sample. These states are also
mostly middle of the pack for Belfer NCPI rankings of Information Control and Norms.
Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands are all clustered around the mean. Lithuania was
far down the list, only above Italy. Unfortunately, the Belfer NCPI rating did not consider
Finland. But I assume that Finland would score close to Sweden since the two are so
similar in their other measurable scores, in their approaches, and in their geography,
history, and longstanding suspicion of Russia. These states do vary in their Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development Trust rankings but made up four of the top
six scores among the sample. Lithuania is an outlier here, scoring in the bottom quartile. I
believe in the case of Lithuania, high will to resist Russian disinformation is consistent
with low trust in government; Lithuania is a former Soviet Republic bordering Russia. It
is a new democracy with a long history of Soviet control and Russian influence so it is
understanding that its people could both distrust its government and maintain alertness to
Russian interference.
Of the four groups of states in my sample, the high will, low capability grouping most
closely conformed to expectations in that these states employed defensive efforts, acted
to protect democratic institutions domestically, emphasized building resiliency
domestically, and integrated responses among domestic sectors.
First, these states employed indirect or defensive efforts. Being too small to confront
Russia head-on, I predicted that these states would employ responses like prioritizing
defense alliances, multinational institutions, public education campaigns, and total
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defense doctrines. From 2013 to 2020, many of these states already had or updated “total
defense” doctrines which put responsibilities on all citizens to resist Russian
disinformation— in regular day to day life, but also as part of resisting any period of
crisis, such as an invasion by, or conflict with Russia. The doctrines are not only part of
the National Security community, as some of these states publish handbooks to every
household detailing why Russia is a threat, what to do about it, and how to resist in the
case of an invasion.86 This shows the degree to which these states assess Russian
information operations.
Further, when I was thinking through my theory, my conceptualization of defense
alliances and multinational organization really included just NATO and the European
Union. However, these states are involved in supporting not only each of those, but also
layers of multinational efforts of which I was previously unaware. Sweden, Finland, and
Lithuania, for example, cooperate with each other and several other states in the NordicBaltic 8 defense framework.87 The mix of states in that framework include NATO
members and states which have decided against NATO membership— largely because of
the Russian threat— but highlights the strategy of cooperating to balance against a large
external foe.
Second, the high will low capability states acted to protect democratic institutions and
processes domestically. The Netherlands provided a particularly clear example. Although
there were significant changes to laws protecting democratic processes, particularly
surrounding elections and freedom of expression issues, the Netherlands methodically

86. Hanzelka and Pavlikova, 2021, and Flanagan et al., 2019.
87. Flanagan et al., 2019.
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and publicly underscored its commitment to rule of law. Famously, a Russian-made
missile in 2014 brought down a commercial airliner over Ukraine killing all aboard
including nearly 200 Dutch citizens.88 The Russian Government immediately began
employing disinformation about the incident as part of its invasion of Ukraine. The Dutch
Government, however, launched through its Safety Board and investigation to establish
the facts, emphasize truth and accountability, and push over time against Russian
disinformation.89 Through the investigation and follow-on calls for legal accountability,
the Dutch Government has through its actions underscored the rule of law and exposed
Russian lies regarding the deaths of hundreds of Dutch citizens.
Finally, these states work to build resiliency domestically and to integrate efforts
among domestic sectors including government, media, and society. Finland is an example
here. The Finnish Government integrates many different leaders and stakeholders in
developing its policies regarding media literacy. These include leaders from Ministries of
Education and Culture, Justice, Culture and Sport, and others.90 The government also
relies on celebrities and influencers to highlight the threat from disinformation. Because
the Finnish government has educated leaders across sectors on the social science
underpinning tactics of disinformation, each contributes to pushing back against it.91 And,
the national broadcast network does some reporting in Russian. This not only reaches
Russian-speaking Finns, but also achieves influence across the border into Russia.92 The

88. Higgins, 2017.
89. Golovchenko et al., 2018.
90. Jankowicz, 2018.
91. Ibid.
92. Tiido, 2019.

67

Finnish approach has been so successful that the Finnish-language version of Sputnik
closed because not enough people read it93.
All the states in this group showed the responses my framework predicted of low
capability high will states. The main outlier here was not in how state governments
responded, but in how I measured Trust. As mentioned above, Lithuania is an outlier in
terms of will. It is clearly a small state and it behaved as a high will state, but its
combined lack of disinformation-relevant capabilities and its very low Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Trust rating could have made it seem as a low
will low capability state. In this case, I emphasized not the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Trust rating, but the government’s statements and actions
regarding Russian disinformation. Although its generic will may be low, its will to deal
with Russian disinformation specifically is high.
Lithuania clearly views Russia as an existential threat. It has not only taken all the
steps I expected of a high will low capability state, but its civil sector has also led the
response in some cases organizing informally with other groups, including Ukrainians
and actors across Europe, to resist disinformation.94 I believe that the low trust in
government manifested in Lithuania’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Trust rating is a combination of hangover from its Soviet history, newness
of democratic institutions, and continuous subversion and undermining from Russia. In
this case, the Lithuanian Government and its people are attuned to the threat and have a

93. Schia and Gjesvik, 2020.
94. Gerdziunas, 2018, and “Lithuanians Are Using Software to Fight Back against Fake News,” 2019.
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high will to resist it, but the state is so small and new that its leadership is not so critical
as it is in a state like Finland.
Finland and Lithuania are the two smallest states in my sample. They both border
Russia, they both understand the threat, and they both have the will to resist. The main
difference here is in their histories. During the days of the Soviet Union, Lithuania was
subsumed behind the iron curtain whereas Finland was able to stave off full Soviet
control through unlikely victories in multiple costly wars. Having maintain its
independence, the Finnish Government had decades to build trust among its people while
the Lithuanian Government had to wait until 1991 before it could operate without central
control from Moscow. As a result, Lithuania’s history accounts for its low trust, but high
will.
In conclusion, this group conformed most to my predictions. The states with limited
capability combined with high will were very active in defending against Russian
aggression. They employed defensive alliances, total defense doctrines, and public
education to protect themselves from Russia. They acted to support democratic
institutions and processes, and they built integrated resilient domestic efforts combatting
disinformation. These states punch above their weight in showing how to
comprehensively address disinformation as a societal threat.
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High Will, High Capability: Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom

Table 9: Ratings for High Will, High Capability States

Table 10: Overall Findings for High Will, High Capability States

The last, but certainly not least group of states is those with high will and high
capability. Cases in my sample include the states highlighted in Table 9: Canada, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. My framework expects these states will be leaders in
the push back against Russia and protecting democracy in their own societies and
internationally. Even in rough aggregate measures, the capabilities these states can bring
to bear are collectively greater than Russia can muster. When leading in concert with
states from other groups, the capabilities of democracies dwarf Russian state power. As
described earlier, the main goal of Russian strategy is to pursue its interests aggressively,
but just hard enough to undermine its enemies while avoiding triggering a forceful
international response. It is these states which will be decisive in succeeding or failing to
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secure and promote democracy. These leading states mostly opted for the kinds of
responses anticipated by my framing according to will and capability.
According to my conceptual framework, the high will high capability states should
have chosen a range of direct and indirect efforts responding to Russian disinformation
like punishing attackers, educating domestic populations, and bolstering multinational
institutions. They also should have worked to protect democratic institutions, processes,
and norms domestically and internationally while taking an active leadership role
integrating responses to disinformation at home and abroad. The expected actions are
summarized in Table 10.
High will high capability states took a mix of offense and defense against the Russian
threat. The United Kingdom provides a good illustration of taking this comprehensive
mix of responses. The United States 2016 Presidential election attack was the most
successful Russian campaign of the period that I studied. The second biggest blow to
democracy was in the United Kingdom’s so called Brexit referendum. The attack was
part of Russia’s same global operation against democracy that targeted the United States
election and future European elections.95 Importantly, the United Kingdom experienced
Russian attacks which went beyond electoral interference and included assassinations
using poison and nerve agents on British soil. These attacks informed the United
Kingdom’s adoption of rapid response to Russian operations and disinformation. In 2006,
Alexander Litvinenko’s murder was a shocking Russian transgression of international
norms. When Russian agents subsequently attempted to murder Sergei Skripal and his

95. Nance and Reiner, 2018.
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daughter, the United Kingdom Government understood its response needed to be swift
and forceful. Within weeks, the newly formed Rapid Reaction Unit (RRU) was formed to
take back a fact based narrative and British spies and police gathered enough evidence to
expel Russia spies internationally.96 The United Kingdom Government also moved to a
Fusion Doctrine which elevates strategic communications to the same level of national
security policy actions as military and financial response options. As such, the RRU is a
Cabinet level office and takes two approaches to disinformation: identifying and
responding to threats around predictable events like elections and implementing
emergency procedures reacting to unanticipated attacks.97 Both approaches increase the
availability of reliable government information that remain visible to the public in an
attack, including moving official United Kingdom information to the top of search
algorithms which otherwise can get swamped when propagandists flood the zone with
disinformation.98 The United Kingdom in this period showed that it is acting to both
defend against disinformation and to take the initiative in prioritizing visibility of reliable
information.
France and Canada demonstrated the second expected response for high capability
high will states; they integrated responses not only domestically, but also internationally.
Any state with high will to fight Russian attacks on democracy should protect its
domestic populations from the intended harms. The predicted difference between high
and low capability states is how they would behave internationally. Small states will

96. Haynes and Scott, 2021. Episode 1.
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support international efforts, but high capability states should be leaders in protecting
democratic norms and institutions. France and Canada led in this period. First, France
showed the way forward in fighting Russian disinformation. The French President has
consistently sounded warnings about the threat from Russia, employed decoy documents
to feed Russian hackers bad information, banned RT and Sputnik from his media pool
labeling them “Pro-Kremlin” outlets, hosted the Christchurch conference, and appealed
directly to all citizens of Europe to create an European Union democracy protection
agency.99 Additionally, France has used its power to set rules with impacts beyond its
borders. French requirements for social media platforms have become de facto European
Union standards adopted by large corporations like Facebook and Twitter which have
opted to have one standard for operating in many states rather than many state-specific
regimes.100 France has been a vocal, active, and public leader for democracy promotion.
Somewhat surprisingly, Canada has also lead. For the period, Canada adopted
significant domestic reforms to protect its elections and raise awareness of Russian
influence.101 Canada also came to lead some international efforts, filling a role which the
United States historically could be expected to have filled. With the United States’
dysfunction readily apparent from across the shared border, Canada stepped up to fill a
leadership vacuum protecting democratic institutions abroad. In stark juxtaposition with
President Trump’s advocacy to bring Russia back into the G7, Canada built new
capabilities like its own Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force,
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and it took the lead in 2018 establishing the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. Both
organizations are efforts integrating domestic and joint international responses protecting
democratic processes from increasing threat.102 The lack of American leadership has even
made some strategists in Canada voice the need to consider how the country will act if
the United States continues its anti-democratic direction.103 France and Canada were two
leading states integrating responses by democracies to Russian disinformation. The other
state in this group did not pursue expected responses as fully as the framework would
have predicted.
Germany was an outlier in this group in that its government’s responses were least
consistent with expectations of a high will high capability state. It was not a consistently
strong leader for democratic norms and institutions. Instead, its policies sometimes took
both sides of major issues involving Russian attacks on democracy in Europe and
globally. For example, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany was a major
proponent of the Ukrainian democratic movement.104 And after Russia invaded, Germany
was a strong advocate for sanctions. But, it has also pursued the Nordstream II pipeline
construction which would allow Russia to undermine Ukrainian democracy by
circumventing the state, dividing it from Europe, and depriving it of major resources
collected through transit fees.105 Germany has acted strongly to fight disinformation
domestically through laws targeting disinformation and hate speech, protecting elections,
attributing attacks to Russia, fining outlets that propagate disinformation, and educating
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its population.106 However, its focus has been more domestically protective than
internationally leading. Perhaps this makes sense given Germany’s history, however. It
was for decades ground zero for Cold War disinformation and espionage. And, I believe
more importantly, there are pockets of significant Russian sympathy in Germany. A
confluence of factors— again including American dysfunction and unreliability— its
population likely account for its pragmatism in dealing with Russia.107 Germany’s
response was not as comprehensive or internationally oriented as predicted for a high
capability high will power, especially for one of two major leading states of the European
Union.
In conclusion, most of the high will high capability states responded as predicted to
Russian disinformation. They employed a mix of state responses aimed at defending
themselves while also working to advance democratic norms and institutions within their
own systems and internationally. The responses they took from 2013-2020 will be
relevant for the foreseeable future. Events since 2020 have only underscored the
importance of pushing back against disinformation. Since then, the threat has only
metastasized.
Conclusion
Having considered each group of states according to their will and capability ratings,
there are two lessons that emerge from their reactions: will is more important than
capability, and individual states’ responses are not as static throughout the period as I
expected.

106. Hanzelka and Pavlikova, 2021, and Levush, 2019.
107. Wood, 2020.
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In the end, will seems to be more the more important driver. As evidence, the group
which most conformed to my theory was the high will and low capability grouping.
These states were very active resisting Kremlin disinformation. Their relative lack of
capability compared with Russia, small populations and militaries, social cohesion, and
mixed histories with Soviet propaganda all resulted in comprehensive policy approaches.
These states, though limited in resources, found creative ways to maximize those
capabilities to fight disinformation more effectively than some high capability states.
Their will generated integrated action at all levels within society— emphasizing
responsibility even to the individual level— and with neighbors and allies. Further, states
that had low will struggled to find consistent, effective policies whether they were low or
high capability. Even the most capable state in the sample, the United States, was
schizophrenic throughout the period. Some elements including the Congress, and, at
times, various Executive agencies took strong actions to punish Russian propagandists.
However, the response was hamstrung by a sitting President who did not fully organize
the United States response. The United States’ capability, then, was still deployed to push
back against Russian attacks but could have been much more effective with a leader who
chose to generate will instead of undermining will.
This recalls the second lesson: many of the states’ approaches morphed throughout
2013-2020. My going in assumption was that the low will low capability states would be
unlikely to take any action at all. Like a fighter who has been knocked out, these
democracies lack the capability or will to resist. So, it was surprising to see that if
external meddling is perceived as having gone too far, even low will states can quickly
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turn to addressing the threat. In the period, low will states like Spain and Italy began to
stir to get off the mat. That indicates reason to hope that the other low will states—
Poland and the United States— can similarly wake up to the threat before backsliding any
further than they already have.
In the next chapters, I will consider two states in greater depth: the United States and
Finland. In many ways, these states are opposites in will, capability, and outcomes
dealing with Kremlin information attacks since 2013.
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CHAPTER 4
FINLAND: HIGH WILL, LOW CAPABILITY
“The term itself may indeed be new but the concept is as old as warfare and diplomacy,
and Russia’s neighbors have had to live with it for a long time. Few countries can match
Finland’s long experience of dealing with Soviet and Russian hybrid warfare —before,
during, and after the Cold War—and few countries have had as much success in standing
up to it.”
-René Nyberg, former Finnish ambassador to Russia, on Russian Hybrid
Operations108
Introduction
If one designed a state to provide a counterpoint example to the United States, in
many ways, that state would resemble Finland. While the United States is a large,
diverse, global power separated by an ocean from Russia, Finland is not. It is a small,
homogeneous nation with a long history of struggling with Russia, the much larger state
with whom they share an 830-mile border.109
Given these differences from the United States, we might also expect a different
approach to Russian disinformation campaigns. This chapter investigates whether that
was the case. In Chapter 3, I argued that Finland was a high will low capability state,
which implies that it should respond to the Russian disinformation campaign in four main
ways: by employing defensive efforts like alliances and public education campaigns, by
protecting democratic institutions and processes domestically, by building domestic
resiliency, and by coordinating integrated responses that include several sectors of
society.

108. Nyberg, 2018.
109. Standish, 2017, p. 7. “But Finland does have one thing that drives the Kremlin to distraction: an 830-mile border
with Russia. Fears over NATO’s eastward expansion — including, potentially, to Finland — are behind much of
Russia’s aggressive posture toward the West.”
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Overall, I find, consistent with my argument, that Finland’s response included all
those expectations of a high will and low capability state. The Finnish Government
coordinates with a wide range of government and civil society actors to combat
disinformation.
Coordination on disinformation is only one aspect of a much broader Finnish
response; the government prizes a long-term resilience strategy, as outlined in its
Yhteiskunnan Turvallisuusstrategia (Security Strategy for Society).110 This strategy
embodies a security approach that Finland has practiced at least since the early Cold War.
In managing a long history with Russia and the Soviet Union, Finland has had to balance
its ties to Europe and the United States as a small state of the West with its security
imperative to avoid provoking overt aggression from its immediate existential threat next
door in Moscow.111 This has led to a policy of partnering with, but never joining, NATO.
The Security Strategy for Society’s balance is temporal; it includes measures for short
term emergencies, but its real purpose is recovery and long-term social stability.112
This policy approach is how Finland has achieved success against Russian
disinformation. Over decades, the Finnish Government has prioritized building a stable
society built on education, capable governance, and shared responsibility of leaders and

110. “Security Strategy for Society – Turvallisuuskomitea”, 2017, p. 7. “The fact that the comprehensive security
model applied in Finland covers all levels and actors of society is its strength…In this model, all actors taking part in
coordinated security work or security activities closely supporting it are security actors. Individual citizens also play an
important role in independent preparedness and in enhancing the resilience of Finnish society.”
111. Szymański, 2018, p. 32. “Finland assumes that as a country situated in the periphery of its civilisational base (the
West) and bordering on a potentially hostile power, it must constantly demonstrate its will and readiness to defend its
sovereignty.”
112. “Security Strategy for Society – Turvallisuuskomitea”, 2017, p. 22. “Trust is built during normal conditions. The
authorities must observe the same fundamental principles and values in normal conditions, during incidents and in
emergencies so that they can retain the trust of the citizens.”
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citizens.113 This strategy has paid off in the highest single-year Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development trust rating among all countries in the crossnational survey sample.
This approach has also yielded a firm but flexible posture regarding threats from a
diminished but adapting Moscow.114 Such threats have included disinformation launched
from Moscow during the Cold War and now from Russia during a major resurgence early
in the 21st Century.
This chapter and the United States case study will follow a similar structure to test my
theoretical framework. First, each case study will begin by placing Russian attacks in
their country specific context. Understanding the attacks in each state helped explain the
degree to which each state displayed will and capability to respond effectively. Second,
the case studies analyze what unique characteristics resulted in the state’s will and
capability categorization. Third, I assessed how closely the states’ responses conformed
with predicted responses internationally and domestically. Finally, each case study
discusses lessons learned for my framework and concludes with a discussion of what the
findings may mean for the states in the future.
Background and Context of Disinformation in Finland
Russian disinformation in Finland is nothing new: for decades, the Soviet Union had
active disinformation campaigns in Finland, and recent Russian efforts need to be seen

113. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 658. Finland’s education system prioritizes “teaching citizens to identify bias or
skewed narratives in their information sphere and to critically engage with new technological platforms like social
media.”
114. Pynnöniemi, 2019, p. 156. Russia is not as powerful as the United States or the former Soviet Union, leading
strategists to a conclusion that the Kremlin, “must respond to emerging threats in a more flexible manner and, if
possible, not directly, but with asymmetric measures.”
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through that historical lens. And the specific applications of Soviet disinformation in
Finland have their roots in a long and unique history. That history has not only shaped the
intensity of Soviet activity aimed at keeping Finland from fully joining the West, but also
in Finland’s fierce will to protect its independence from the existential threat of
annexation under Soviet or Russian rule.
Finland was part of the Russian Empire since the days of Napoleon, opportunistically
declaring independence in 1917 just weeks into the confusion of the Russian Revolution.
According to Trotter,
Seeds of future war had in fact been planted at the moment of Finland’s birth.
Lenin’s government had bitterly resented having to give up Finland so
compliantly, but at the time it was done, Lenin was beset by so many other and
far more dangerous and immediate threats that he simply had no alternative. The
Politburo assumed that propaganda, internal domestic unrest, and a bit of
routine subversion would ultimately be enough to bring Finland back into the
Communist sphere.115
From that moment through the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow came close
several times to conquering Finland. Finland fought two wars against the Soviet Union
during World War II, for instance. The first, or Winter War, started just a month after the
German Army invaded Poland. At roughly the same time, the Soviet Union under Stalin
attempted to Annex Finland. The Finnish Army lost valuable territory but avoided total
defeat in what was a brutal campaign.
During the second campaign within World War II, Finland even fought along with
Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. This is known as the Continuation War and
ended only because the Soviet Union, exhausted in 1944 by the wider war, had to

115. Trotter, 1991. page 7.
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prioritize resources to fight the Nazis elsewhere.116 Finland, then, again maintained its
independence at a high cost by taking extreme measures to avoid annexation.117
Moscow continued influence campaigns throughout the Cold War. The KGB
penetrated states and parties throughout Europe, especially in the Baltic region seeking to
keep a buffer between the West and Moscow.118 Specifically in bordering Finland, the
Kremlin kept up pressure to keep Finland out of NATO. This ultimately compelled
Finland’s neutrality, forcing the adoption of Soviet preferences by a nominally
independent neighbor. The tactic was even derisively coined “Finlandization,” remaining
in the Kremlin’s lexicon today to belittle their neighbor. The term is offensive to Finns
specifically, but also describes Russia’s preferred way of dealing with states in its
periphery generally.119
The technique remains active. The Kremlin aims to compel Ukraine from joining the
European Union and it is still pressuring Finland whenever the issue of NATO
membership arises. As recently as the month of this dissertation’s writing, April 2022,
Russia continues its use of threats and military shows of force to compel Finnish
neutrality, reportedly having moved heavy military equipment to the border in response
to Finland’s consideration of joining NATO.120
Similarly, the Kremlin also continues its use of propaganda and disinformation

116. Rusi, 2017 and Trotter, 1991.
117. Nyberg, 2018. “Although Finland lost almost fifteen percent of its territory, the country retained its independence.
This marked Finland as a unique case among Russia’s neighbors. It was the only country that stood up and held its own
against the vastly bigger neighbor.”
118. Ibid.
119. Lucas et al., 2021. “The ideal relationship for Russia with a neighbor is broadly what it currently enjoys with
Belarus, or what in Russian literature is described as ‘Finlandization,’” Finns “regard the term… as insulting and
inaccurate”
120. Bunyan and Finch, 2022.
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targeting Finland. As a Baltic state, and especially as the lone Baltic state directly
bordering Russia which successfully maintained its independence from the Soviet Union,
Finland is a significant focus of Russian disinformation. Themes of Russian
disinformation include a narrative that portrays it as historically part of the Russian
empire, who collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II, and as part of a
decadent, declining West bent on bringing social disorder into Russia.121
These themes fit into Nimmo’s “four Ds” construct introduced in Chapter 2: dismiss,
distort, distract, and dismay. The Kremlin’s information attacks in Finland highlight the
state’s history, futility of its security efforts should Russia choose to act against it, and
western moral decay. All of this is aimed at “distracting attention from Russian
subversion and projecting an impression of indefensibility.”122 The indefensibility
narrative tends to portray Finland as a state isolated, peripheral, and marginal within
Europe. And while that narrative aims to devalue Finland, the Kremlin also seeks to play
up the unity and importance of Finland’s Russian speaking population.123 These themes
appeared in several Russian disinformation attacks from 2013-2020 in Finland as
discussed in the next section.
Russian Disinformation in Finland
Capabilities and Targets
The Kremlin has pursued its disinformation campaigns in Finland as part of its

121. Lucas et al., 2021.
122. Ibid.
123. Pynnöniemi and Saari, 2017. “specific Russian narratives tailored to the situational context in Finland seeks to
portray the country as sidelined within the European Union… Another narrative strives to present the Russian-speaking
population in Finland as a united group that is being discriminated against or even threatened.”
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broader strategic efforts to undermine democracy globally since 2013.124 Because Finland
shares a border and long history with Russia, the range of efforts the Kremlin has pursued
is wider than other states more distant from Moscow. Disinformation has been an
integrated effort included among other weapons employed in hybrid attacks in Estonia
and with outright Russian military invasions into Georgia, and Ukraine. Estonia, for
example, experienced in 2007:
A disinformation blitz claiming falsely… systematic persecution of the Russian
minority; A major distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on computer
networks. This disabled, briefly, banking and other public services and the
mobile phone network, and cut the country off from the global internet making
it hard for media outlets and the authorities to get their message across;
Kremlin-sponsored youth groups rioting in the streets of Tallinn and besieging
the Estonian embassy in Moscow; Economic sanctions on transit and energy
supplies; Russian politicians and officials, and those of allied countries, applied
intense diplomatic pressure on Estonia, with demands including the dismissal of
the prime minister and government.125
Georgia and Ukraine experienced many similar activities in addition to military
aggression.
Finland has avoided these more extreme mixes of capabilities but is still at risk. As a
NATO partner, it does not enjoy Article 5 collective defense guarantee of a full member.
Instead, it stays well integrated with Sweden, the European Union, and even more
militarily integrated with NATO than some full members. While this has likely
contributed to preventing a Kremlin attack using all elements of Russian power, Russia
has still employed a mix of capabilities aimed at destabilizing the country since 2013.
The main Kremlin capability employed, as in other attacks globally, was the Internet

124. Nimmo et al., 2020 call the global operation “Secondary Infektion.” They describe it as “multiple campaigns on
social media run by a central entity, which was already active in 2014 and that was still running in early 2020.”
125. Lucas et al., 2021.
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Research Agency. The paid trolls who targeted Brexit, the 2016 United States election,
and many of the other attacks detailed in Appendix A also targeted Finland.126 The
campaign used the Internet Research Agency’s mix of trolls and automated bots to
amplify its “pro-Putin, pro-Russia, anti-NATO, and anti-governmental” themes along
with messages twisting historical narratives and stirring up extreme nationalism.127
The targets of these messages are Finland’s Russian-speaking minority and Finnish
nationalists. These groups are targeted within Finnish society because Russia assesses
they are the most likely groups to accept propaganda and because they have demonstrated
desire to undermine and disrupt Finland’s democracy. Bjola and Papadakis term such
groups “counterpublics” which “aim to establish their own counter-knowledge that
actively seeks to delegitimise current institutions, on the one hand, and to elevate populist
counter-claims to the realm of public debate on the other hand.”128
The small size does not discount their value in subverting Finnish will. Russian
speakers in Finland were only around 1.5 percent of the population in 2018.129 But, they
are growing and present a group that could undermine Finland’s high level of unity, trust
in government, and Western orientation over time. These counterpublics make great
targets for disinformation since they can be “constituted online and empowered by digital
platforms, seeking to use themes and topics, often in alignment with the digital
propaganda of a foreign government, to undermine or even block the functioning of the

126. See Nimmo et al., 2020.
127. Haynes, 2017.
128. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 656
129. Tiido, p. 2. “In Finland, the number of Russian speakers has grown steadily since 1991, when it was fewer than
10,000, and in 2018 was approaching 80,000, which constitutes around 1.5% of the total population.”
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public sphere.”130
Finally, there are prominent Finnish media outlets and personalities on which the
Kremlin relies to spread its narratives. Two large outlets, MV-Lehti and Hommaforum
have been equated with filling the same role in Finnish media that outlets like Breitbart
plays in the United States.131 One individual was particularly helpful in spreading
disinformation. Johan Bäckman’s name appeared repeatedly in multiple attacks over the
period. Bäckman, a Finn, was outspoken attacking Finnish journalists and pushing ProRussian propaganda during several operations since 2013. The next section will detail
how the Kremlin employed its themes and capabilities to pursue its divisive aims
targeting Finland.
Attacks Since 2013
The Finnish Government operates with knowledge that the Kremlin continues
persistent information warfare with the same strategic goals pursued by the Soviet Union:
undermine the Finnish Government and negatively influence the Finnish public to disrupt
Finnish relations with the West generally, and with regards to NATO membership
specifically.132
First, the Kremlin worked to undermine Finland’s high trust in its government
through information campaigns that blended physical and online elements. As discussed
earlier, from Lenin on, Soviet and Russian propaganda has aimed to bring about physical

130. Ibid, p. 657.
131. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 655.
132. Haynes, 2017. “Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) identified an advanced persistent threat (APT) in
their computer systems that extracted sensitive political and military intelligence over several years.” And Szymański,
2018, p. 19 lists Russia’s goals as “undermining public confidence in the government, weakening people’s proEuropean orientation and entrenching the low level of support for NATO membership.”
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force as an organizational weapon.133 The Finnish border became a setting for a Kremlinfueled migrant crisis aimed at making the Finnish government look inept. In fall 2015,
Russian border security allowed thousands of undocumented people, including many
Afghans who had lived for years in Russia, to cross into Norway and northern Finland.134
These people were corralled by Russian authorities and criminal smugglers to illegally
cross what had been very stable borders for decades.
The Russian government used the physical facts they created on the ground to feed
propaganda showing a disorderly border and assigning blame to the Finns. The Finnish
government calls such an attack an “information influencing” operation and angrily
accused the Kremlin of creating the crisis, offering to help fix it, and then never quite
resolving the issue.135
The Kremlin picked the timing of the crisis to coincide with European-wide crises of
dealing with the flow of refugees out of Syria. The winter of 2015-2016 was an
opportunity, then, to concoct a situation of asylum seekers in Finland which could repeat
themes playing out in European states everywhere.136
In addition to the information influencing at the border, purely disinformation attacks
played out online targeting the Finnish government. According to Lucas et al., Russian
information attacks continued to push historical grievance and a theme of Finnish

133. Tiido, 2019, p. 5. “As for mobilisation, the most visible events are connected with the remembrance of World War
II. In 2018, an “Immortal Regiment” event was organised in Helsinki, at which, according to estimates, between 80 and
200 people took part, beginning with a march through the city centre. The idea… was later taken over by the state for
propaganda purposes. The event in Helsinki was well organised, and some of the participants were reportedly brought
from outside Finland especially for the occasion.”
134. Nyberg, 2018, p. 9.
135. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 651.
136. See Pynnöniemi and Saari, 2017. “In the winter of 2015–2016, Russia suddenly began to let third country citizens
access the Russian-Finnish border to seek asylum in Finland.”
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duplicity. The Kremlin attacked the Finnish Government as Nazis and war criminals for
its actions dating back to the Winter War and the War of Continuation.137
While undermining the national government, two Kremlin attacks also focused on the
Finnish population itself. One involved children and another targeted a journalist.
Regarding children, the Kremlin pushed a highly charged narrative designed to cleave
Finnish society internally. Russian media peddled a narrative that Finnish social services
were discriminating against Russians Europe-wide by taking away their children, putting
them up for adoption, selling them, or handing them to same-sex Western couples. This
narrative targets intentionally hyperemotional themes surrounding parents and children,
homosexuality, discrimination, and Russophobia.138 The aim here is reflexive control—to
create pressure and division within Finnish society that results in self-disorganization,
forcing the government to overreact through strong condemnation. It was meant to
distract Finland from taking a strong position against Russia’s 2014 invasion into
Ukraine.
The other attack specifically targeted free press who had been reporting on the
Internet Research Agency. Jessikka Aro, an investigative journalist in Finland, is credited
with being the first Western journalist to investigate the troll farm in St. Petersburg. She
was severely harassed, doxed, pranked. The attacks on her were led by Johan Bäckman
within Finland and propagated mainly on Russian state outlets like Russia Today,
Sputnik, and Pravda. Backman held himself up as a human rights activist who was just

137. Lucas et al., page 16. “Russian information attacks have blamed Finland for purported war crimes during its wars
with the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 and 1941-1944.”
138. Bjola and Papadakis, p 649-50.
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working to protect the rights of Finland’s Russian minority.139 Eventually Aro was
hounded to the point where she left Finland for personal security concerns.140 The case
resulted in punishment for Bäckman and new laws protecting against the kind of
harassment targeted at Aro.
Finally, the Kremlin has consistently worked to spread disinformation to prevent
Finland from pursuing full membership in NATO. To accomplish this, Russia uses its
information operations to demonize NATO and threaten Finland. To demonize NATO,
the Kremlin propagates a narrative that seeks to flip responsibility for aggression in
Russia’s periphery. In the Baltic region, particularly, Russia claims that it is a victim, not
a threat. Rather, it is NATO and the other defense arrangements Finland pursues— like
the Nordic Baltic 8 format— which threatens peace.141 And, the threats to Finland are
consistent. Any time the Kremlin perceives Finnish actions or words indicating closeness
with NATO, threats ensue to instill fear of military escalation. Russia repeatedly
“declares that Finland’s NATO membership would result in an adjustment of the Russian
military posture to the new situation in the region.”142 These attacks continued throughout
the period following Russia’s 2014 invasion into Ukraine. Finland has over decades
developed multiple capabilities and strategies to blunt the effects of Kremlin propaganda.
In the next section, I will outline some of its important actions responding to the Russian
attacks.
Finnish Response

139. Bjola and Papadakis, p 650.
140. Lucas et al., 2021 and Tiido, 2019.
141. Lucas et al., 2021.
142. Szymański, 2018, p. 23.
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Will and Capability
Given the country’s long history of fighting Russian then Soviet then Russian
interference in its internal affairs, my framework predicts that Finland will have a high
will to resist not only Kremlin disinformation attacks, but all threats from Russia. The
threat from Moscow has repeatedly been clear, sustained, and existential. Therefore, the
Finnish Government will always view their most serious threat as the much larger state
just across the border with which it has already fought multiple costly wars. The
government has long budgeted its resources to sustain its society’s will deterring, and if
necessary, combatting Russian aggression. Given the degree to which Finland has
embedded this will in its culture, it is likely to remain high will against all forms of
Russian attack, disinformation included, for the foreseeable future.
I recently had the opportunity to talk with a former Prime Minister of Sweden. When
the opportunity presented itself, I asked him what the West needs to do confronting
Russian disinformation. His response was telling; he appeared exasperated for a moment
before outlining that even stronger tactics have been used against Sweden and Finland for
decades. Beyond disinformation, Russian influence has historically involved direct
meddling within the political parties of Nordic states. Finland and Sweden have been had
parallel experiences with Soviet and Russian aggression, but Finland has directly faced
all elements of Russian influence.
It made sense, therefore, that in conducting research for the cross-national survey in
Chapter 3, Finland was the state which most clearly demonstrated the highest will to
resist Russian aggression and malign influence. Finland’s shared border and history
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alertly guarding its independence from threats emanating out of Moscow have ensured
resistance to Russian disinformation has permeated widely throughout all levels of
society.
Finland was in the top quartile for average annual Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Trust ratings among its citizens. Within that high average,
however, two trends make its score even more impressive. First, Finland’s trust has
generally increased from 2012-2020. And second the states measured each year since
2012, Finland had the highest single-year rating of 81% trust in the most recent year
measured. Finland has high will to resist Russian disinformation. At the same time, it is a
tiny state relative to its powerful neighboring state.

Table 11: Will and Capability Ratings for Finland

Table 11 shows that while Finland ranked among the highest of states over the
last decade in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trust rankings,
it simultaneously ranked among the lowest ratings for capability. It is the quintessential
high will, low capability state. Finland’s CINC score ranked second lowest among the
cross-national survey sample. And, for the disinformation-relevant scores for cyber
power, the Belfer Center NCPI did not even include Finland in their sample, but it is
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possible from looking at Finland’s actions and other states in the sample to impute how
Finland would rank.
If the NCPI had included Finland, it is likely that the Finland would have been
somewhere in the middle of the pack. Finland, according to its interest in surviving as a
state, has balanced firm defense domestically against Russian influence with keeping a
lower, more flexible profile internationally for decades. This is a way to stay sovereign
without unnecessarily provoking Russia. As such, I expect that Finland would get high
marks for “Information Control” since it has been able to fend off Russian
disinformation, but lower marks for “Norms” since it has achieved its information control
quietly. This would rank them close to Sweden— which, again, given their similar
approach and direct cooperation, is usually a reasonable general comparison.
Some specific Finnish capabilities, though, give it opportunities to prevent the worst
effects of Russian disinformation. Two capabilities which long predate disinformation
attacks include Finland’s long history of self-government and its language.143 Finland’s
self-governance has been an antidote to disinformation because the tradition is one of
stability and consensus. As such, the government offers ways for minority views to, if not
rule, at least have a voice at the table. This provides the opportunity for counterpublics to
vent frustrations and participate in the political process without less risk of tearing down
the whole system. Integration and assimilation are prized over marginalization and
exclusion.

143. Nyberg, 2018. “A high level of trust, both private and public, characterizes Scandinavian societies and is
underpinned by a centuries-old tradition of self-government. A small linguistic community is also protected by the
effective wall of its language.”
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If Finnish traditions are democratically inclusive, the Finnish language provides a
complementing exclusionary filter. There are only roughly five million Finnish language
speakers in the world and unsurprisingly, almost all of them live in Finland.144
Disinformation is most effective when it penetrates an information environment without
making recipients feel like they are being manipulated. Because almost all native Finnish
speakers are in Finland, it is hard for trolls to speak authentically into the media
ecosystem. Mistakes in grammar, spelling, and syntax that native speakers would not
make result in easy queues for inauthentic, even comically so, narratives out of
Moscow.145
Besides tradition and language, Finnish authorities have invested in several long-term
efforts to build capabilities that make the country resilient. Finland has prioritized
education, public awareness, and creating a positive national narrative. All of these have
contributed to its ability to resist Kremlin disinformation. According to Nyberg, a former
Finnish Ambassador to Russia, Finland’s emphasis on education has been critical. The
society is resilient not because they became alert to disinformation as a threat after
Russia’s 2013 escalation, but because the government has had a long-term understanding
that “Governments must help citizens to become educated, sophisticated, and discerning
consumers of information.”146 Resilience cannot be generated in emergencies, it must be
cultivated through education in periods of normalcy.
Finland also integrates its resiliency efforts across sectors of society including

144. See “Languages of Finland” by the Institute for the Languages of Finland.
145. Nimmo et al., 2020.
146. Nyberg, 2018.
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government, media, intelligence, business, and citizens. While the country’s Council for
Mass Media focuses on causes and journalistic responses to disinformation, other
authorities highlight narratives that the Kremlin repeatedly tries to falsely insert into
current events coverage. The overlapping capabilities provide a defense in depth against
lies, boost transparency and credibility, eventually yielding Finland’s high levels of
trust.147
Lastly, Finland has invested in training for government officials on combating
Russian disinformation by focusing not on what Russia says or does, but on Finland’s
own dipositive narrative.148 The President went to the training himself, again
underscoring commitment to addressing the problem. Since then, Finland has been
communicating effectively, praised for success resisting Russian disinformation, and
their trust in government scores have only gone up. This is the result in long term
development of capabilities to combat the Kremlin threat.
Finland is a clear case of high will and low capability. It is at the same time one of
the least powerful democracies I researched and in possession of sustained high will to
fight against Russian disinformation. According to my framework, this means that
Finland should demonstrate the four expectations outlined for a high will low capability
state in Table 12: it should employ defensive efforts like alliances and public education

147. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020. 649, 59.
148. Standish, 2017, p. 3. “A homogeneous country of 5.4 million people, Finland routinely ranks at the top of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s quality of life metrics and, in addition to strong social
welfare programs, the country’s education system is the best in the world, according to the World Economic Forum.”
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Table 12: Overall Findings for Finland

campaigns, it should protect democratic institutions and processes domestically, it should
build domestic resiliency, and it should coordinate integrated responses that include
several sectors of society.
External Expectations: Deterrence and Balancing
Finland has employed defensive measures including bolstering multinational
institutions, public education, and defense alliances. As highlighted before, Russian
attacks targeting Finland’s international ties have included fabricated border incidents
and consistent threats over any Finnish decision to join NATO. The Finnish government
has chosen a path of delicate balance; on one hand Finland is a full democracy, member
of the European Union, and NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner. It is not only a
Western democracy, but also in many ways an exemplary democracy with high marks for
delivering what its citizens want. On the other hand, Finland has for decades remained
very engaged with Russia, maintaining highly visible military readiness and political
connections at the highest levels aimed at reducing the risk of triggering Russia.149 The

149. Milne, 2022. “Finland is one of the few European countries that did not significantly cut its military strength after
the cold war, as its 1,340km border with Russia, and memories of the bitterly fought 1939-40 winter war against the
Soviet Union ensured security matters retained a high priority. But Finland has also preserved close diplomatic and
commercial ties with Russia.”
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constant interaction Finland maintains to achieve that balance stems from a clear-eyed
assessment of its interests.
Because of its small size, Finland not only balances the West and Russia, but also
between defense and engagement with Russia individually. As neighbors, Russian trade
provides important opportunity for the Finnish economy. But the threat from Russia is
never far from Finnish security policy. Finland knows that it cannot survive fighting
Russia alone, but it also assesses that without NATO guarantees, it must maintain a force
sufficient to deter another Russian invasion.
So, Finland seeks to deter and balance. Finland avoids Russian inclusion in military
supply chains and maintains nearly 300,000 forces in reserve as a deterrent, a relatively
large defense force for a country of only five million people.150 And to balance, it is
militarily more integrated with NATO than some full NATO members. It has maintained
as close of a relationship with the West as possible while keeping Russia satisfied enough
in its neutrality to prevent aggression.151 Such defensive measures are in line with threat
perceptions predicted by my framework.
To combat Russian interference with Finnish NATO membership, Finland has
maintained nominal neutrality, but done everything to support NATO short of applying
formal membership and Article 5 protection. Finland is a member of the NATO Strategic
Communications Center of Excellence. Helsinki is host to the European Centre of

150. Szymański, 2018, p.. 5. “Finland’s strategy towards Russia combines economic and political co-operation,
intended at reducing the risk of bilateral tensions, with military deterrence. Finland is concerned by Russia’s rising
military and the Russian vision of the international order based on great powers’ spheres of influence in which Finland
has to play the role of a buffer zone between Russia and NATO.”
151. Pynnöniemi and Saari, 2017.
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Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which has been operating since 2017.152
Finland has further signaled through personnel assignments its emphasis on the
seriousness of its perceived threat from Kremlin disinformation. For example, Finland
created a new position of Ambassador for Hybrid Affairs then named an experienced
diplomat to the post.153 This elevates the threat of hybrid conflict through creating the
position, then underscoring the seriousness by appointing a prestigious leader to rally
international efforts. Bjola and Papdakis (2020) describe the action as one that
“contributed to creating a centre of institutional gravity for addressing the issue of
disinformation in a more systemic fashion.154”
In addition to working directly with NATO, Finland has worked with other partner
states in the region in ways designed to move forward deterring Russian aggression in the
Baltic. Several NATO members have engaged with Finland bilaterally or through defense
alliances such as the Nordic-Baltic 8 format. Though it is not tied through formal
agreement directly with NATO, Finland’s friends are. And Finland has led specific
NATO actions aimed at countering Russian disinformation.
It has also acted against disinformation that Russia employed as a weapon during the
Kremlin-manufactured border crisis. At otherwise long-stable Finnish crossing points,
Finland responded with updated efforts to seize control of false narratives. In 2016,
Finland and Sweden jointly condemned Russian propaganda in the region.155 And it was
after the crisis that Finland sent its officials to Harvard for training on effective

152. Tiido, 2019 and Splidsboel, 2017.
153. See “Mikko Kinnunen Appointed Finland’s First Ambassador for Hybrid Affairs,” press release from the Finnish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2018.
154. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 659.
155. Pynnöniemi, 2019.
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techniques for responding to information attacks. Russia instigated the crisis over Finnish
support for sanctions resulting from Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine; Finland took the
opportunity to confirm support for the sanctions.156 Finland has shown it will work with
anyone who will help push back against Russia: regional neighbors, European Union
members, NATO, and the United States. All these measures are in line with defensive
measures my framework predicts for a high will state which aims to maximize use of low
capability.
Domestic Expectations: Norms, Resilience, Institutions
Finnish authorities have in the recent decade continued to generally emphasize
resiliency and protection of their tradition of self-governance. The specific responses to
the child custody attacks and the attacks on Jessika Aro demonstrated some innovative
approaches and reinforced the value of a resilient society.
As Ambassador Nyberg described, the government has protected domestic
institutions to cultivate resiliency at home.157 The Finnish intelligence service has
identified dozens of recent Russian information operations.158 Most, like the Jesikka Aro
campaign and the child custody issue were either initiated, enflamed, or both from
Moscow.
The government has taken steps to bolster democratic institutions domestically. In
March 2019, the Finnish government passed a law that requests candidates for security
postings to prove they do not have dual loyalties to other nations or beliefs that might

156. Ibid.
157. Nyberg, 2018: “The Finnish government has organized courses with Harvard University to train civil servants to
recognize a hybrid operation and how to act. The background of the Finnish initiative is the comprehensive security
concept built over decades… it emphasizes building awareness and strengthening the resilience of Finnish society.”
158. Pynnöniemi, 2019.
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undermine national security.159 This appears to have been in response to concerns raised
not only during the cross-border tensions including disinformation operations, but also to
recalling previous Soviet infiltration of Finnish politics. Also, responding to the wideranging Kremlin efforts to attack democratic elections across Western democracies,
prominent national celebrities and officials publicly bolstered the security and reliability
of the electoral system leading up to elections in 2019.160
In addition to shoring up security positions and elections, the government established
new norms responding to information attacks on journalist Jesikka Aro. One of the first
new norms advanced by the Hybrid Affairs minister said that harassment “is part of
influencing, [trolls/harassers] try to tire individuals so they switch to silence or make
journalists write on something else.”161 This is a novel way to link disinformation with
criminality. Just as Russian propagandists do not have separate conceptions of physical
and information domains in political warfare, this Finnish approach treats disinformation
attacking journalists as a weapon against democracy since self-censorship degrades the
range of participants who engage in the public sphere.
Finnish law has also reframed the problematic debate of bad faith actors who exploit
freedom of speech protections to harm democracy. Finland has developed a concept of
freedom of communication through a new principle: “viestintärauha. Though there is no
exact English equivalent, it approximately translates to ‘communication peace,’ which
can be interpreted in this context as freedom from unsolicited communication.”162

159. Tiido, 2019.
160. Schia and Gjesvik, 2020.
161. Quoted in Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 653.
162. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 654.
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The leading Finnish propagandists attacking Aro were convicted of defamation and
stalking. Their sentence was made more significant because their motivation was to
undermine a journalist doing work critical of Russia.163 Finland’s long-term commitment
to domestic resilience also informed the government’s reaction to the Russian child
custody attacks. All these steps indicate that, in accordance with my framework, the high
will Finnish Government acted to protect democratic norms and institutions domestically
while building a resilient society.
Finland also demonstrated the final expectation pursuing a comprehensive response to
disinformation that integrates many different leaders and stakeholders. This showed in its
policies regarding media literacy which were developed by leaders from Ministries of
Education and Culture, Justice, Culture and Sport, and others.164 Because the Finnish
government has educated leaders across sectors on the social science underpinning tactics
of disinformation, each contributes to pushing back against it.165
These education campaigns have included not just training for government officials,
but the public and especially children. Since the 1960s Finland has recognized the
security implications of Soviet, now Russian, propaganda and has emphasized media and
information literacy as a “civic competence.”166 The government has supported this goal
in school curricula and in media campaigns. Critical reading of the news is taught in

163. Ibid: “In a landmark decision, the Helsinki District Court found in October 2018 that Mr. Janitskin and Mr.
Backman had worked together to slander Ms. Aro and had committed “an exceptionally aggravated set of crimes”
because their primary motive was to undermine her work investigating “Russian information threats” by destroying her
“professional credibility and reputation as a journalist specializing in Russian affairs.”
164. Jannkowicz, 2018.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
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schools.167 This strategy of education, along with cultivating trust in the government,
prevented highly emotional and Kremlin-scripted disinformation from gaining traction
during the child custody attack.
The integrated response during the child custody attack included the ministry most
directly targeted— the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. Since a framework for
coordinating responses across the government already existed, Social Affairs and Health
had open lines of communications to other critical Finnish actors in Foreign Affairs and
embassies. Further, the trust established with including media organizations in the effort
facilitated “debunking child-custody disinformation almost in real-time.168”
Further, this campaign highlights another effect of Finland’s strategic engagement
with Russia. Finnish elites can translate outreach to Russia to bolster credibility with
Russian-speaking Finns.169 As a result of some combination of a resilient public and trust
in government credibility, the child custody attack failed. Not even the targeted Russian
speaking Finnish counterpublic accepted the narrative. 170
That dynamic has also been evident more widely. The collective understanding that
Russian disinformation is a threat impacts media coverage of other Russian themes. Main
Finnish outlets were critical of Russian narratives leading up to their 2014 invasion of
Ukraine, for instance, in ways that contrasted with media in other countries which have

167. Haciyakupoglu, et al., 2018.
168. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 650.
169. Szymański, 2018, p. 5. “Finnish decision-makers also capitalise on diplomatic contacts with Russia in domestic
policy: as an opportunity to demonstrate to the electorate their pragmatic attitude in relations with a country which is
viewed in Finland as a great power.”
170. Ibid. “Despite the intense promotion of the Russian media, the ‘child custody’ campaign has failed to become an
identity defining issue for the Finnish counterpublic.”
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journalistic norms that help propaganda to spread.171 In fact, the Kremlin even closed the
Finnish-language version of Sputnik closed because not enough people read it.172
Even better from a Finnish perspective, Finnish credibility extends into Russia. For
example, the Finnish national broadcast network does reporting in Russian. This not only
reaches Russian-speaking Finns, but also achieves influence across the border across the
border.173 Finland’s government has employed effective strategies generally against
Russian disinformation and specifically in the cases regarding operations targeting
Jesikka Aro and child custody. By bolstering its institutions and inculcating resiliency
among its people, Finland has shown how Kremlin disinformation can be disrupted. This
integrated, resilient response accords with expectations of my framework.
Lessons Learned
As a case study on how to deal with Russian disinformation, Finland is a clear
example of a high will low capability state. Its response was in line with predictions from
my framework. It employed defensive efforts like alliances and public education
campaigns. Finland protected its democratic institutions and processes domestically and
built domestic resiliency. It also clearly coordinates integrated responses involving a wide
range of actors across society. The context of Finland, specifically, offers three main
lessons for the framework: disinformation should not be considered in isolation,
Finland’s efforts building resiliency predate the 2013 escalation, and context matters:
what works in Finland may be impossible to repeat fully in other states.

171. Pynnöniemi, 2019
172. Nyberg, 2018, Jopling, 2018, and Schia and Gjesvik, 2020.
173. Tiido, 2019.
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First, Russian attacks on Finland show that disinformation cannot be considered in
isolation. In developing my framework, I considered disinformation operations as a
Russian line of effort this is incomplete. Russia employs disinformation as part of “wider
influence operations that use political, economic, legal, and other tools to exacerbate
ethnic, cultural, demographic, diplomatic, linguistic, regional, and other divisions.”174
Focusing only on disinformation will misinterpret the broader application of Russian
malign influence as it situationally combines different elements of its state power. And
disinformation must also be considered in recent historical attacks. The Russian
generated crisis at the border with illustrates these points. Russia did not just tell lies
about how inept the Finnish government was. Rather, the Kremlin mixed the lies with
public actions, bringing Afghan refugees to a border crossing at a time when all of
Europe was dealing with a flood of Syrian refugees. The crisis involved real victims and
exploitation, real racism and xenophobia and aimed at provoking a real overreaction in
Finland to feeding what Bjola and Papadakis (2020) have termed “information
impulses.”175
The physical actions and the disinformation each complemented the other, so states
should be prepared to have options that include physical responses. The disinformation
campaign repeated patterns seen previously at the Norwegian border, then again in 2021
at the Polish border with Belarus. Understanding the repetitive nature of Russian
operations makes the false narratives less likely to gain wide acceptance in target

174. Lucas et al., 2021.
175. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 652. “Events like this can be seen as ‘information impulses’ because rather than
being disinformation as such, they combine disinformation with public actions. Put simply, this event was more than a
traditional threat from a larger country to a small country”
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populations and it should provide opportunities for better coordination of physical
responses by border guards, nongovernmental organizations, and communicators.
Second, Finland has found a way to resist Russian disinformation, but their approach
had been established long before 2013. The Russian threat in Finland is real, pervasive,
and existential. Therefore, Finland has invested for decades in two things: shoring up
resilience at home and emphasizing cooperation abroad.176 The Finnish approach
balancing NATO and Russia is central to this approach. Finland maintains what it
believes necessary to deter an attack, but hedges by engaging widely with NATO, the
European Union, the United States, and other states around the Baltic Sea to make sure it
has layers of integration internationally. This balance over time has shaped Finland’s
investments in society-wide readiness, which, as Pynnöniemi and Saari describe:
means increasing society’s crisis tolerance and resilience, ensuring the readiness
and ability to act of the political and administrative leadership of the country,
updating legislation, and investing in defence and intelligence. The Finnish
tradition of comprehensive “societal security” offers an excellent basis for
national cooperation on hybrid influence between various actors: government,
local governments, civil society, and business actors.177
The traditions that yield societal security include characteristics which decrease the
spread of intentionally destructive disinformation. One final indicator of Finnish
resistance to consider: since the Russian invasion 2014 into Ukraine, Finnish public
opinion regarding Moscow has become more negative, but because the public has such
trust in its government, Moscow remained low among a prioritized list of worries even

176. Pynnöniemi and Saari, 2017.
177. Ibid.
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four years after the attack.178 This means that my framework should account not just for a
country’s will, but the dynamic nature of will over time. A consistently high will state
will react differently when attacked than a state which is in a period of heightened or
lessened will.
Finally, the third lesson from this Finland case study is that what works in Finland
may be impossible to repeat fully in other states. Ambassador Nyberg argued that for
better or worse, the Finnish will to resist Russian aggression is born of its sustained fight
for survival. That fight has deeply ingrained resilience in Finnish culture.179 And Jed
Willard, the director at Harvard who trained Finnish officials on narrative control has also
said that the state is an outlier with a small homogenous population, high standard of
living, strong social welfare, and world class education system. This, combined with the
government’s appreciate that disinformation is “as real as war” has allowed the
government to provide comprehensive leadership that its people reward with trust enough
to follow.180 This is a rare combination and tough to replicate. It will put Finland in good
position to deal with future attacks that are sure to come. This means that other states in
the high will low capability group would likely each have unique elements which
contribute to their own will to resist disinformation.

178. Szymański, 2018, p. 23. “The Russian threat has such a distant place in the poll on the one hand because this topic
is on the margins of public debate and, on the other because Finns are used to the neighbourhood with Russia and trust
their public institutions, in particular, the army (this level of trust is the highest in the EU).”
179. Nyberg, 2018. “Whether one considers Finland lucky because resilience came naturally to its citizenry as a matter
of national survival, or unlucky because it did not have that choice, its example demonstrates that resilience is not
something that a nation can acquire in a short period of time.”
180. Standish, 2017, p. 3. “’This stuff is real. It is as real as war,’ said Willard. ‘But the Finns very quickly realized this
and got out in front of the problem.’”

105

Future Challenges
Moving into the future, factors will change that have for decades driven of Finnish
security strategy, which will impact how it responds to disinformation. Finland is still
likely to remain focused on building domestic resilience but will have to adapt to
changing technology. And, given Russia’s 2022 further invasion into Ukraine, Finland is
increasingly likely to become a full member of NATO, risking Russian escalation in
response.
Domestically, some of the historical protections which have favored Finland’s ability
to resist Kremlin disinformation will weaken, requiring an adaptive focus sustaining
societal resilience. For example, the Finnish language as an effective screen against nonnative speakers will become less effective. Already, digital applications are much more
effective in translating messages to any number of languages. It is right now possible for
English speakers to interact now with Russian or Ukrainian language tweets coming out
of the war zone.181 In short order the translations will become more accurate, enabling
disinformation to penetrate filters that used to prevent its spread.
Also, despite its success defending against disinformation at the societal level, Finns
are still human; there will always be a risk of being undermined by day-to-day
disinformation as it continues to be targeted at lower and lower levels over time.182 If
enough individuals start forming an effective counterpublic, as the Russian speaking

181. Swisher, 2022. Interviewed Clint Watts, who said that language is not the barrier it used to be. For example, it is
possible for non-Russian speaking Twitter users to engage with Russian content during the war in Ukraine by having
real-time translation.
182. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 638. Finland’s overall societal resilience has come from institutions enacting
“transparent and proactive policies grounded in collaboration and research. However, these efforts are at risk of being
weakened by the rise of influential counterpublics unless” Finland can prevent disinformation from spreading at the
individual citizen level.
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population has thus far not formed, Finland remains susceptible to harm. The Finnish will
to resist remains an example, however, and is deeply felt in its culture. The struggle to
maintain that independence will continue indefinitely.
Internationally, the 2022 Russian escalation in Ukraine has the potential to
fundamentally alter Finland’s decades old security strategy. Finland has been formally
neutral in the struggle between Moscow and the United States. For fear of provoking
Russia, Finland has balanced engagement and participation with both powers, never
wanting to be perceived as fully aligned either way. Finland was a proponent of sanctions
for Russia’s 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea. The resulting balance between
“NATO and Russia has created an arena for both NATO and Russia to continue fighting
for influence inside the country.”183 This is sometimes seen as weakness, derisively
mocked as “Finlandization” in Russia, but has at times given Finland leverage. Finland
used its neutrality and interactions with NATO strategically to advance its own national
security goals, not to expedite membership.184 In recent years, though, the influence
operations out of Moscow coupled with military aggression may alter Finland’s decision
to stay neutral.
As Ambassador Nyberg stated, “The border incidents exploited the Finnish
population’s anxiety over the growing number of refugees. It backfired and has not been
forgotten. The April 2016 report on The Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO
Membership, commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted ‘Russia’s
propensity to create a problem, then leverage it and offer to manage it without necessarily

183. Haynes, 2017.
184. Ibid.
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solving it.’”185 And, even while Russia is fighting in Ukraine, the Kremlin makes sure to
signal threats to Finland over joining NATO.186 The threats against NATO are the same
ones Russia made against Ukraine. Had Ukraine been a member of NATO, it is unlikely
Putin would have invaded and Finland sees that recklessness as an existential threat.
Finally, the engagement that Finland has pursued with Moscow increasingly comes
with security risk.187 It remains to be seen how isolated Russia will be from the United
States and European Union because of recent sanctions, but even before the sanctions
economic relations with Russia was a risk. The trade between Finland and Russia,
particularly of energy supplies, is problematic since energy is one of the complementary
elements of power the Kremlin weaponizes in conjunction with disinformation. Again,
the critical thinking of Finland’s population is taking on new information and changing
opinion. This time, the mix of Kremlin information attacks on Finland, its manufacturing
of a border crisis, and its further invasion of Ukraine have Finns discussing NATO
membership with renewed seriousness. Before this crisis, support for joining NATO
occasionally reached 20 percent support among Finns. After the invasion, that increased
to over fifty percent and two months into the war support polled at 68 percent.188 Finland
has not survived Russian influence and aggression for this long to risk being the next
Ukraine. The last decade of Kremlin disinformation as part of a suite of aggressive
actions taken against its neighbors may backfire, making Russia look out of control,

185. Nyberg, 2018.
186. Bunyan and Finch, 2022.
187. Pynnöniemi and Saari, 2017 “To cope with problems stemming from Russia’s geoeconomic ‘actorness’,
policymakers need to be more aware of Russia’s inner logic in Finland and elsewhere… Russia does not hide its
geoeconomic logic of action in its external and internal energy policies.”
188. Langfitt, 2022.
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reckless, and desperate. This appears to be driving Finland closer to full NATO
membership.
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CHAPTER 5
UNITED STATES: LOW WILL, HIGH CAPABILITY
“Following attacks like Pearl Harbor and 9/11, United States presidents have rallied the country
and the world to address the challenges facing the nation. Yet the current President of the
United States has barely acknowledged the threat posed by Mr. Putin’s repeated attacks on
democratic governments and institutions, let alone exercised the kind of leadership history has
shown is necessary to effectively counter this kind of aggression. Never before in American
history has so clear a threat to national security been so clearly ignored by a United States
president. The threat posed by Mr. Putin’s meddling existed before the current United States
Administration and may well extend beyond it. Yet, as this report will demonstrate, the Russian
government’s malign influence operations can be deterred.”
From “Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for
United States National Security”, 2018, p. v.189

Introduction
Having just considered Finland in the previous chapter, it is useful to study a very
different case: the United States. In contrast to Finland, the United States is a much more
powerful state—the world’s lone superpower—with greater information capabilities, but
it lacks Finland’s unity and will (as well as a border with Russia). Given these
differences, we might also expect a different approach to Russian disinformation
campaigns. This chapter investigates whether that was the case.
In Chapter 3, I argued that the United States is a low will high capability state, which
implies that it should respond to Russian disinformation campaign with a weakened state
reaction, use of disinformation against domestic audiences, democratic backsliding, and
deepening domestic division.
Overall, I find that my framework predicted some, but not all, of the United States
government’s responses. The most successful attack during the Kremlin’s global

189. “Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for United States National
Security”, 2018, p. v.
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disinformation operation was the 2016 attack on the United States Presidential election.
The United States did little in response during the attack and the winner of the 2016
election, Donald Trump, himself spread significant amounts of dis- and
misinformation.190 However, the United States Congress— and many executive branch
agencies— did pursue vigorous responses after the election attack that aimed not only at
addressing Russian disinformation domestically, but also helping other democracies
develop their defenses. This tension—between the government’s countermeasures and
Trump’s refusal to condemn Russian disinformation—highlights the inconsistency of the
United States response.
The United States was consistent with my framework’s other expectations of a low
will high capability state. It did suffer continuing institutional weakening and degraded
individual rights after Russia’s campaign to subvert democracy. After being reformed in
the image of President Trump, one of the two major American parties has become less
committed to democracy embracing election disinformation and loyalty tests as tools for
maintaining power domestically.191 Relying on a partisan feedback loop that includes an
activist media ecosystem and elected officials192 the Republican party has employed
disinformation to undermine confidence in free and fair elections, advocate and use
violence against peaceful protests, and abandoned many norms that undergird

190. Senator Ben Cardin writing in “Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for
United States National Security”, 2018, p. v. It “must be noted that without leadership from the President, any attempt
to marshal such a response will be inherently weakened at the outset.”
191. Bennett and Livingston, 2018, p. 126–127. Declining public confidence in democratic institutions undermines the
credibility of official information in the news and thus opens publics to alternative information sources.
192. Benkler et al., 2018, p. 8. The right-wing media sphere has been so closed that it makes the United States public
discussion “vulnerable to disinformation, propaganda, and just sheer bullshit”
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democracy.193 The weakening of the institution, then, correspondingly weakens
individual rights. This chapter outlines how these impacts at once show the ineffective
response to, and the cumulative damage from, a serious threat posed by Russian
disinformation. My framework anticipates this reaction from a low will high capability
state.
Background and Context of Disinformation in the United States
As highlighted throughout this work, Russian disinformation adapted Soviet
disinformation techniques for a changed context. The United States and the Soviet Union
fought for influence globally for decades, including using disinformation. The United
States eventually abandoned disinformation campaigns, as these inherently undercut its
values and interests.194 The Soviet Union, however, continued to develop anti-democratic
disinformation tactics and techniques until its collapse.195
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an important change in the United
States’ media environment that make it uniquely easy to exploit using updated
information technology. According to Humprecht et al., the United States media is “lowtrust, politicized, and fragmented,”196 making it the most vulnerable worldwide to online
disinformation:
The country stands out because of its large advertising market, its weak public
service media, and its comparatively fragmented news consumption. The
enormous size of its market—and its competitive and commercial culture—
makes the United States attractive for producers of disinformation targeting
social media users. Moreover, the country is characterized by high levels of
populist communication, polarization, and low levels of trust in the news media.
193. Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018.
194. Rid, 2020.
195. Ibid.
196. Humprecht et al., 2020, p. 506.
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Based on the contextual conditions shown by our empirical analysis here, the
United States must be considered the most vulnerable country regarding the
spread of online disinformation.197
While media and technological context has changed, the United States remains its
main external threat in the Kremlin’s perspective. Not only is the United States the most
powerful democratic state, but it is also the leader of global democracy with outsized
influence in multinational organizations that keep Russia down.
Combined with the vulnerabilities listed above, then, it is not surprising that the
United States has been the biggest and most frequent target of Russian disinformation.198
Russian disinformation targeting the United States can achieve many objectives
simultaneously. A weaker United States means not only a stronger Russia, but also
weaker pro-democracy efforts worldwide. Therefore, according to Richey, the sustained
global operation beginning in 2013 sought to subvert democracy by:
(a) dissuading rival political entities, especially the USA and Europe, from
challenging Russian kinetic action; (b) generalizing cynicism about domestic
and international politics, discrediting the idea of global governance based on
international law and norms, and popularizing Russian policy agendas within
international populations; (c) legitimating artificially constructed “facts on the
ground”; (d) causing dissension within and among states allied against a given
Russian action.199
This background highlights the importance of the United States’ will and capability to
mitigate the Kremlin operation’s effects. The Putin regime cannot compete in an open,
rules-based order, it cannot defeat the United States’ capability directly, and so it chooses
subversion. The biggest target of a global antidemocratic subversion was to attack the

197. Ibid.
198. Martin et al., 2020.
199. Richey, 2018, p. 109.
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United States’ will, degrading it over time through disinformation.200
The resources and effort Russia has committed to undermining American selfgovernment demonstrates the value they assign to the objective. Through exacerbating
conflict and division in the United States, it targets will to undermine capability. This
reinforces my framework’s logic; capability and will are both important variables that
determine states’ policy responses, but of the two, will is more important. It is will that
that organizes a response to the threat from disinformation. Russian disinformation
attacks against the United States shows that the Kremlin shares this assessment; the next
section will detail some specific recent attacks that have targeted the United States’ will.
Russian Disinformation in the United States
Capabilities and Targets
To understand the United States’ response to Russian disinformation, it is first
important to understand the Kremlin’s attacks. Understanding Russian capabilities and
target audiences is important for developing a United States Government response.
As mentioned previously, before invading Ukraine in 2014, Russia committed
significant resources planning then conducting a global pro-Putin, anti-West campaign.
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) was at the heart of the operation,201 with over 1,000
people and at least a $25 million budget targeting initially Russians and Ukrainians, then
Americans ahead of the 2016 election.202 The Internet Research Agency was not the only
Russian effort in this global campaign, however. The United States Director of National

200. Richey, 2018, p. 109.
201. Gregor and Mlejnková, 2021, p. 85. The Internet Research Agency (IRA; Agentstvo internet issledovaniya),
known broadly as the Russian troll farm was founded in 2013 and is the most important symbol of Russia’s campaign
to spread propaganda and disinformation.
202. DiResta et al., 2019, p. 6.
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Intelligence described the complexity of the operation, which incorporated "covert
intelligence operations such as cyber activity-with overt efforts by Russian Government
agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or
'trolls."203 The third-party intermediaries include witting and unwitting agents, including
Americans.204
The Americans enlisted in this operation did so for several reasons. Some, like Larry
King and Jesse Ventura205 got paid to work producing shows for RT. Others held views
that aligned with Russian objectives, so were useful in spreading Russian views
organically.206 Still others, like those who support the global white nationalist
movement,207 the Patriot movement,208 or secessionists in Texas and California209
provided American audiences that worked both as targets of disinformation and nodes of
amplification. The Kremlin used its troll army in conjunction with American voices that
knowingly or not helped advance Russian narratives. It further amplified these voices
using automated accounts (bots) which mimicked actual human engagement to game

203. Dew, 2019, p. 156.
204. Bodine-Baron et al., 2018, p. 27. Four potential categories of Russian agents includes “witting and unwitting
participants who are motivated to spread messages convenient to Russia’s goals for their own reasons—including those
simply holding views the Russian government seeks to promote—and therefore provide an additional channel to
achieve Russian goals, such as creating or expanding divisions in American society.”
205. Ibid.
206. Pynnöniemi, 2019, p. 162.
207. Gregor and Mlejnková, 2021, p. 85. “Another important actor in the spread of disinformation and propaganda is
the global white nationalist (or far right) movement, with its own media and communication channels…The traditional
neoNazi and neo-Fascist Far Right has been using the Internet since the 1990s to spread their traditional conspiracy
theories, including their infamous Holocaust denying. The location of many such websites in the United States is
typical due to different limits of freedom of speech”
208. Butt and Byman, 2020, p. 140. “Russian media performs an open and leading role, playing up migrant crime in
Europe and other white-nationalist hot-button issues. The ubiquitous 24-hour, government-funded news station RT
regularly hosts far-right commentators, helping to infiltrate their ideas into the mainstream. These commentators have
included Holocaust deniers, members of the United States-based Christian Patriot movement who reject federal
authority, American far-right leader Richard Spencer and other voices once confined to the information wilderness.”
209. DiResta et al., 2019, p. 9. “The IRA sowed both secessionist and insurrectionist sentiments, attempting to
exacerbate discord against the government at federal, state, and local levels. Content focused on secessionist
movements including Texas secession (#texit) and California (#calexit). These were compared to #Brexit.”
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social media algorithms and promote weaponized information.210 This mix of capabilities
resulted in a cacophony on social media, which percolated into traditional media and
drove divisive narratives in the United States.211 The confusion and division was aimed at
lowering American will over time.
According to my framework of will and capability, the Russian attacks reveal the
effectiveness of coordinated attacks on will. Capabilities available to Russia are different
in the United States than the mix available for use in neighboring states like Ukraine or
Finland.212 The effect of the Internet Research Agency’s thousands of employees and tens
of millions of dollars was to distract, divide, and dismay a state with hundreds of millions
of citizens and budgets in the Trillions. Since the United States is so far away from
Russia, and because the United States military is more powerful than Russia’s, the
Kremlin chose asymmetric weapons like disinformation to attack the United States This
relatively small organization coming from a relatively weak Russia highlight why the
United States did not demonstrate a high will to defend itself; the United States
Government failed to coordinate an effective defense against the threat because it did not
take the threat seriously enough. Further, the themes that Russia spread with the
capabilities show specific ways that the American system is vulnerable to such a
leveraged use of information.

210. Polyakova and Boyer, p. 4. Key actors in the campaign included overt actors like RT, Sputnik, and Ruptly TV.
There are also covert actors such as: Social media trolls, bots, impersonation accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram, WikiLeaks, and DCLeaks.
211. Benkler et al., 2018.
212. Radin et al., 2020, p. 2. “The threat of Russian subversion to different countries varies based on the intensity of
Russia’ interests and the resources available to undertake subversion. In western Europe and the United States, Russian
subversive tools appear to be limited to information, cyber, and political ones. In neighboring former communist
countries, Russia uses a wider range of military and economic tools.”
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Attacks Since 2013
According to my framework and the tactics of Russian disinformation, Kremlin
attacks in the United States have been attacks on American will. Viewed through this
perspective, the disparate target audiences and capabilities from the previous section have
one thing in common; each is a resource for sowing division, distrust, and discord.
Similarly, the employment of those resources, though continuous for nearly a decade has
concentrated around themes and events which seem unrelated. Over time, however, the
Kremlin pushes the same themes opportunistically adapted to fit changing events.
The Kremlin found opportunities in changes social media created in the media
environment. The themes Russia has pushed in recent years are those which filtered up
through the survival of the fittest approach of algorithmic natural selection. Because
social media outlets prioritized engagement and humans engage most with intensely with
outrage, themes of Russian propaganda were outrageous: racism, anti-Semitism,
inequality, pedophilia, satanism, guns, and others.213 Russian propagandists did not take a
moral stance on any of these issues, of course, often amplifying both sides of a
contentious issue.214 Division is desired effect. Ultimately, sowing division and distrust is
aimed at a purpose of destroying a system that depends on majority rule, norms for
protecting minority rights, and trust that improvement is possible through iterative
interactions.215 The divisive themes were particularly salient in attacking American
democracy through regular, planned events and taking advantage of targets of

213. Nimmo, et al., 2020.
214. DiResta, et al., 2019.
215. Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018.
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opportunity.
Planned events, specifically elections, provided a target rich environment for Russia
to attack American will. As Mason argued, many of the existing divides exacerbated by
disinformation prevents our ability to act collectively; within the United States, partisan
identity is increasingly central, aligned with race, religion, education, and other cleavages
that make it easy stoke discord.216 Elections are a heightened time in the United States for
two reasons: elections are backdrops against which to drive divisive narratives, and
elections are opportunities to distort collective decisions in ways that lead to political
self-disorganization by choosing officials who work counter to American interests.
Elections are the mechanism by which democracies confer power on leaders. Precisely
when Americans come together to address issues, one of its major political parties now
actively employs domestic disinformation to seize and maintain power.217 To the degree
that Kremlin propaganda fuels this outcome, it is an example of the Russian concept of
reflexive control.218 The Kremlin targeted multiple American elections, then, as a direct
attack on degrading Americans’ trust in government through election fraud conspiracies
and on distorting the expression of that will by promoting extreme positions and
candidates.
Other recent attacks have used unplanned events as new opportunities to push old
narratives. The massive Black Lives Matter protests and the COVID pandemic,

216. Mason, 2018.
217. Benkler, et al., 2018.
218. Pynnöniemi, 2019, p. 159. “The theory of reflexive control, intensively developed by Soviet military and civilian
theorists since the early 1960s, explains and provides practical means for achieving the “self-disorganization” of the
enemy. According to V. A. Lefebvre, one of the thinkers behind the theory, reflexive control is ‘a process by which one
enemy transmits the reasons or bases for making decisions to another.’”
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specifically, presented major opportunities to inflame tensions within the United States.
The Kremlin has for years prioritized cultivating Black American assets and audiences to
exacerbate existing racial divisions.219 Additionally, the COVID pandemic has presented
an opportunity for internal division by pushing medical disinformation, conspiracy
theories, and racist disinformation that recalls Soviet themes during the 1980s AIDS
epidemic.220
These attacks have contributed to existing divisions and made things worse by
amplifying extremes. By 2021, election related lies and conspiracy theories pushed the
threat of political violence, and physical attacks were both planned and executed across
the country. For example, according to Kleinfeld, “From death threats against previously
anonymous bureaucrats and public-health officials to a plot to kidnap Michigan’s
governor and the 6 January 2021 attack on the United States Capitol, acts of political
violence in the United States have skyrocketed in the last five years.”221 The attacks all
have one thing in common; each is rooted in disinformation aimed at subverting
American will by undermining democratic institutions. Democracy depends on the
legitimacy of popular will as expressed through democratic institutions.
The successful spread of Russian disinformation in the United States conforms with
much of my framework for a low will state with high capability. As a larger, distant state

219. DiResta et al., 2019, p. 8. “The most prolific IRA efforts on Facebook and Instagram specifically targeted Black
American communities and appear to have been focused on developing Black audiences and recruiting Black
Americans as assets.”
220. Nimmo, et al., 2020.
221. Kleinfeld, 2021, p. 160. “An unprecedented number of elections administrators received threats in 2020—so much
so that a third of poll workers surveyed by the Brennan Center for Justice in April 2021 said that they felt unsafe and 79
percent wanted government-provided security. In July, the Department of Justice set up a special task force specifically
to combat threats against election administrators.”

119

to Russia, the United States failed to develop a will to deal with the threat until the
corrosive effects became quite serious. The known Russian attacks on the United States
before the election included discrediting President Obama, polarizing existing American
divisions about the Affordable Care Act and the Dakota Access Pipeline, and spreading
false reports of a chemical explosion in Louisiana.222 While these attacks were monitored
and assessed, that was by an administration and government that believed the impacts
could be contained without extraordinary effort.
It was the 2016 Presidential election, however, that got the government’s attention.
Russia’s operations increased before the election to divide Democrats, undermine Hillary
Clinton, and support Donald Trump.223 This is not to claim that the Russian attacks are
responsible for Trump’s victory. As detailed earlier, the point of the disinformation was
not to convince Americans that Trump would be a great president, the goal was to sow
maximal division. The outcome was not the goal, generating argument and confusion to
weaken America was the goal.
Still, Trump’s election was an unexpected opportunity for Russian propagandists. The
Internet Research Agency continued feeding division and pushed narratives supporting
Trump’s judicial nominees, discrediting investigations into Russian interference,
attacking Trump’s Conservative critics, discrediting American actions in Syria,
supporting Texas and California secession movements, attacking Democrats, and
bolstering the American alt-right movement.224

222. Martin et al., 2020.
223. Ibid.
224. Ibid.
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This escalation before and surrounding the 2016 election drove a reciprocal escalation
in policy responses. It became evident that the policies taken by the United States
government before 2016 were leaving the country vulnerable to manipulation that was
now serious enough to influence the system at its highest levels. The next section details
how American will and capability explain its suboptimal approach and lack of focus
dealing with Russian disinformation until the Kremlin operations became unavoidably
brazen.
United States’ Response
Will and Capability
While the United States had the highest capability in my sample, its rating for will
was low. As shown in Table 15, the United States is by far the world’s most powerful
democratic state and, as already discussed, the biggest target of Russian disinformation
operations. To underscore that point, of the thirteen states in my sample only five states
were targeted multiple times by publicly identified Russian influence campaigns. The
Netherlands, Germany, and Australia were targeted twice, the United Kingdom was
targeted three times. The United States, however, has been on the receiving end of
fourteen such attacks.225 The Correlates of War CINC average for the United States from
2013-2016 was greater than the combined total of all other democracies in the sample
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plus Russia. The United States also topped the Belfer Center’s ratings for information
control and norms components of their cyberpower rankings.
The United States is targeted so often because it is rife with sharp internal divisions
and because undermining the United States also undermines the United States-led rules
based postwar global order. With regards to trust among its people, the United States
Government averaged 35% trust among its population. That scores ninth of thirteen—
just less France and just higher Lithuania. The United States is also considered a “flawed
democracy” according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2020 ratings and has been
trending lower in its democracy score in recent years. The United States first scored as a
“flawed democracy” only in 2016, degraded slightly in 2020, and the Economist
Intelligence Unit expects that issues with the functioning of government combined with

Table 13: Will and Capability Ratings for the United States

low trust in institutions will likely continue in coming years the United States’ score
trending lower.226
Many social divisions exist domestically: race, economic inequality, religious,

226. Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020, p. 44.
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regional, educational, among others. Beyond those divisions, though, the structure of the
United States system further complicates an effective response to disinformation.
Because of the separation of powers, no one agency or entity with the government can
unilaterally react. The United States’ federal bureaucracy is sprawling. There are myriad
departments, agencies, offices, and branches with overlapping responsibilities. They are
also human endeavors which means leadership and employment involves inconsistent
abilities and motivations. In a word, the bureaucracy is complex. Even when government
officials have the will, coordinating an effort across the massive United States
government is hard.
Will in the United States is also low because of its geography and Cold War
history. The United States during the Cold War was certainly a high will leader of a
global containment strategy which eventually helped lead to the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Russia is a large state, but not one that dictates the global equilibrium. While wars still
occasionally broke out, the Cold War can be understood as a stable bipolar order
underpinned by power in Washington and Moscow.227 Washington emerged as a lone
superpower, Russia became a power much diminished, debatably regional, power
compared to the global influence wielded by the Soviet Union.
This drove a different understanding of the American assessment of threat from
Russia. In the 1990s and 2000s, the once all-consuming threat from Moscow dropped
down the prioritized list of current and likely future threats. Not only was the threat from
Russia downgraded, American strategy was to integrate Russia and China into the

227. Waltz, 1979, p. 182.
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existing global order. Quickly following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
United States prioritized Afghanistan, Iraq, and launched a Global War on Terror against
the Axis of Evil.228 Then, shortly before as Russia was ramping up its global operations
to undermine democracy around the world, President Obama announced in 2011 a United
States strategy to rebalance—pivoting away from Europe and the Middle East to China
and the Indo Pacific.229 At no point following the collapse of the Soviet Union did the
United States focus intently enough on Russia to demonstrate high will to combat
Russian disinformation.
There were still opportunities between 2011 and the eventual 2016 election attack
for the United States to summon more will to combat Russian influence. In a 2012
Presidential debate, Mitt Romney, the Republican nominee argued that Russia remained
the United States’ “number one geopolitical foe,” despite the Cold War’s end, a comment
for which the Obama campaign mocked him.230 Had Romney won that election, he
certainly would have led a more establishment Republican party and Donald Trump
would probably either have run in 2016 as a Democrat or not at all. Had Russia interfered
in a way that might have disadvantaged Republicans, he likely would never have objected
to publicly disclosing any election attack. Or, had the 2016 election gone as most people
expected it would, a Hillary Clinton administration would likely have taken stronger
action against Russia coordinated and supported by Presidential power. In either of these
counterfactuals, the United States would have acted as a high will high capability state
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more consistently. Existing structural and cultural prohibitions against American
domestic government action would have been less of an impediment to taking the threat
seriously if actions across domestic sectors were coordinated from the White House
instead of the Trump adminstration’s haranguing and denial.
The United States National Defense Strategy in 2018 highlighted the challenge of
leading competing centers of authority. Combined with the United States cultural and
systematic bias against centralized government power, coordination becomes even more
difficult compared to the effort Finland must exert to achieve a comprehensive, integrated
approach.231 For example, most capability is within the Department of Defense (DoD),
but it is the Department of State (DoS) which is the statutory lead agency.232 Public Law
115232 tasked the DoS’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) to “direct, lead, synchronize,
integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand,
expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation
efforts.”233 And Public Law 116-92 created “created a Principal Information Operations
Advisor within DoD to coordinate and deconflict” with the Global Engagement Center.234
The most relevant capabilities to challenge disinformation are illegal for domestic
use. For example, the National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command have
teams which can disrupt, degrade, or block propaganda networks from launching attacks.
Reports following the 2020 election showed that Cyber Command disrupted interference

231. Mattis, p. 5. “structural divisions limit our ability to respond to non-military aspects of adversarial competition. No
single United States Government department or agency has primacy in the prosecution of irregular conflict or
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232. Theohary, p. 2. “Within the USG, much of the current information operations doctrine and capability resides with
the military.”
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efforts by Russa, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Hezbollah.235 But these security agencies
are prevented by Constitutional free speech and privacy rights from taking down
domestic networks; the agencies are foreign facing.
This is another challenge to an integrated response from the United States
Government; although its capabilities are unequaled, it employs them outside of the
United States while the threat from Russian disinformation often gets into American
discourse through borderless technology. According to a minority staff report of the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee,
Russian efforts exploited the seams between federal authorities and capabilities,
and protections for the states. The United States intelligence apparatus is, by
design, foreign facing, with limited domestic cybersecurity authorities except
where the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) can work with state and local partners. State election
officials, who have primacy in running elections, were not sufficiently warned
or prepared to handle an attack from a hostile nation-state actor. 236
Disinformation can exploit social and legal divisions within the United States’ democracy
to skirt its high capability and erode its low will from within.

Table 14: Overall Findings for the United States

Given the United States’ low will and high capability, Table 16 shows my theory
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predicts the United States Government response will be insufficient to stem the threat of
Russian disinformation. The response will be weakened or nonexistent against the
external threat. It will involve the employment of state capability to spread
disinformation against domestic audiences. The democracy will backslide resulting in
broken trust, weakened institutions, and reduced domestic freedoms. And the country will
experience increased social division and struggle between polarized domestic actors
where shifts in balance of power produce increasingly incoherent national policy over
time. The United States mostly conformed to these expectations, but with some
significant exceptions. The next section will detail the United States Government’s
responses.
External Expectations: Weakened Response
My first expectation of a high capability low will state regards its interactions
internationally. Because these states lack will to resist, I predict they will turn inward,
responding with weak or no action against an external threat. Here, the United States’
actions were mixed. The split will within the United States Government meant that some
elements took strong actions while others took no action or outright resisted efforts to
even acknowledge a threat.
The United States Government has taken several significant actions against Russian
disinformation in recent years. For example, in the months after Russia’s attack on the
2016 Presidential election, President Obama and Congress created the Department of
State’s Global Engagement Center in December 2016 to combat Islamic State and
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Russian propaganda.237 The United States’ high scores in the Belfer rankings mostly
result from operations against Islamic State, so expanding that effort to include a focus on
Russia makes sense. And, Admiral Rogers, as Director of the National Security Agency,
attributed electoral interference to Russia during the 2017 French Presidential election.
The National Security Agency shared this attribution with France, helping France take
the proactive steps it did to mitigate the harm.238 These actions are more aligned with my
expectation of a high will state— one willing to defend not only its own democracy but to
help protect democratic norms globally.
Further, the government launched multiple investigations into Russian interference
including Intelligence Community Assessments, House and Senate committee
investigations, and the Special Counsel investigation led by Robert Mueller.239 The
Mueller investigation itself resulted in dozens of indictments both of Americans, Russian
organizations, and Russian military officers.240 And the United States Congress, even
while led by Republicans, rallied veto proof majorities to increase funding to the GEC
while escalating sanctions on Russian actors in response to Kremlin attacks.241 These
actions were stronger than my framework anticipates for a low will state.
Still, there were United States Government leaders pushing to do even more. The
United States’ Combatant Commanders around the world took the rare step of publicly
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requesting authority to declassify intelligence in time to disrupt242 Russian disinformation
in future crises and United States Cyber Command has taken offensive measures243 in
elections after 2016 to take the Internet Research Agency offline.244 These steps are
consistent with state actions my framework predicts of a state with high will, not low will
like I categorized the United States.
Other United States Government actors acted more in accordance with my
framework’s prediction for a low will state. The strong efforts listed above were for
several years carried out despite public efforts by the most powerful actor in the
government and efforts by his allies. The United States’ response was undermined by
President Trump, officials in the Trump administration, its supporters, and even actors
who sometimes also worked to counter Russian disinformation.
Trump himself is and was a consistent peddler of disinformation. As a candidate,
Donald Trump was undermining democratic allies in ways that echo Russian attacks on
democracy rather than demonstrating the will to support democracy abroad. Candidate
Trump fed conspiracy theories about Sweden, for example, creating confusion within a
steadfast ally and an opportunity that Russian propagandists seized to advance their
corrosive narratives.245 Though Russian disinformation was only one factor among many

242. Woodruff Swan and Bender, 2021. In a joint letter, the Combatant Commanders requested “help to better enable
the United States, and by extension its allies and partners, to win without fighting, to fight now in so-called gray zones,
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244. Wigell, 2021, p. 61. “For instance, blocking Internet access to the Internet Research Agency (IRA) in Russia
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that helped Trump win the 2016 election, from a Russian perspective, that attack on
democratic politics was the most successful outcome of the Kremlin’s global interference
operation.246 Even after winning election, President Trump refused to acknowledge the
threat and publicly undercut efforts at addressing it. This prolonged and deepened the
United States’ inward focus and destabilized relationships with long time democratic
allies and NATO as Applebaum wrote:
The Trump presidency was a four-year display of contempt not just for the
American political process, but for America’s historic democratic allies, whom
he singled out for abuse. The president described the British and German
leaders as “losers” and the Canadian prime minister as “dishonest” and “weak,”
while he cozied up to autocrats.”247
This reaction more closely corresponds with my framework.
Finally, it was not only President Trump and his administration that worked to
undermine United States Government response. When President Obama brought
evidence of Russian interference to Congressional leaders, Majority Leader McConnell
politicized a decision to make public the information before the 2016 election. This
highlights a miscalculation of the threat, indicating lack of will to take it seriously; in the
interpretation most charitable to Leader McConnell, he, like most other people, did not
believe Donald Trump was going to win the election. As such, he chose against raising
awareness of the attack. But the damage was done. The efforts to influence the elections
were politicized and added to internal division while the country remained under attack
by an emboldened Kremlin looking to exploit its success.248 Leader McConnell later led
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the Senate to pass veto proof and costly sanctions against Russia for the interference.249
His decision during the election and embodied the reaction of an actor with low will high
capability. He had the power to push back against disinformation but chose not to.
While the government did escalate efforts after the 2016 attack to combat Russian
disinformation, those efforts were inconsistent, late, and weakened by the leader of the
government. I consider this is a mixed result internationally. In some ways the actions
reflected expectations of a low will state. In other ways, the United States demonstrated
high will to fight back against Russian disinformation. The response domestically more
closely corresponded to my predictions for a low will high capability state.
Domestic Expectations: Self-Disinformation, Division, and Backsliding
The domestic responses to Russian disinformation within the United States have more
closely conformed to my framework. The second and third expectations of a high
capability low will government were evident. State capabilities became nodes of
antidemocratic disinformation. President Trump and administration officials used their
influence and the influential reach of official White House positions to become the
largest node in a network of right-wing disinformation outlets.250 The President and
others used their power to spread lies at an unprecedented rate throughout his campaign,
administration, his unsuccessful 2020 bid for reelection, transition to his successor, and
continue as of this writing.
His leadership shows the danger of self-disinformation. The National Intelligence
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Council released an unclassified retroactive report on the 2020 election which highlighted
foreign threats to that 2020 election. Despite the United States President’s denials and
false claims, the report highlights the threat of disinformation and is mostly about
Russia.251 Instead of having a government led by a president defending American
interests, the administration was undermining institutions and trust to advance its own
narrow interests of power maintenance.
At this point, it is no longer necessary for the Kremlin to develop and seed
disinformation in the United States. Rather, some Republican propagandists are doing the
hard part for Russia. Trump and a small but influential group of Republicans was even
vocally pro-Putin in the lead-up to the 2022 Russian war of aggression in Ukraine.252
This domestic adoption of pro-Russian tactics further degrades effective governance,
lessens trust, and decreases American will. In fact, lying has become so central to the
American right-wing, that now the Kremlin just adopts and amplifies disinformation
emanating from United States’ outlets for use in manipulating Russian domestic
audiences.253
There has also been ample evidence of the third expectation of a low will high
capability state. Disinformation that amplifies and mimics Russian disinformation has
resulted in further loss of trust, weakened institutions, and erosion of democratic norms.
Former President Trump used disinformation as a technique to build and maintain power
then used that power to facilitate a systematic effort erecting barriers to opposition.
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Within his party he has marginalized anyone perceived as insufficiently loyal. During the
election and in the middle of a global pandemic, he worked for months to undermine trust
in the United States Post Office and mail-in ballots to raise doubts ahead of the
election.254 This campaign echoed Russian tactics of smearing the legitimacy of elections
by appealing not to evidence or logic, but to base emotion.255
The months of seeding mail-in fraud disinformation also set the stage for supporters
to accept fact-free challenges to the result.256 President Trump and his team lost dozens of
legal challenges, some so frivolous that lawyers bringing the cases have faced
professional discipline, financial sanction, and potential disbarment for their efforts.257
The efforts sowing discord resulted in a violent attack on Congress’ certification of
Trump’s defeat.
The United States’ democracy entered this period with significant issues in its
democracy, but throughout the period disinformation became central to a Presidential
administration and one of two major political parties. By 2020, that democracy continued
to decline and the country even began experiencing unprecedented political violence
based on lies and threats against even low-level election officials. Nearly 80 percent of
normally anonymous elections administrators surveyed in 2021 now wanted security.258
This shows strains on democracy in multiple ways; threats of violence are likely to
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discourage turnout and it can no longer be said that the United States has an unbroken
tradition of peaceful power transitions.
These effects are evidence of democratic backsliding, consistent with expectations for
a low will high capability state. The United States’ ability to function is being hamstrung
by including more and more political actors in seats of power who are outright conspiracy
theorists themselves, or who are failing to check the spread of conspiracies and
disinformation from their colleagues. If this trend continues, will over time will decrease;
a potential future disinformation attack like Trump’s big lie has increased chances of
success to the degree that supplicants will be in position of authority when it happens
again.
The last expectation for low will high capability response is increased social division,
struggle between domestic sectors, and that the balance of power determines the state’s
future direction. This expectation was also evident.
Others stepped in when the administration failed to act. Campaigns, now operating in
an environment where disinformation is increasingly utilized by Americans against
Americans, hire expensive cyber and information experts to help navigate threats.259 This
raises the cost for participating in politics and increases the threshold that candidates
must clear even to compete for office, further undermining democratic participation.
Civil society organizations like the Atlantic Council Digital Forensics Lab stepped up to
expose and counter disinformation as a means of combatting Russian hybrid attacks
against democracy.260 And other government organizations took actions of their own
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accord. In September 2017, the Department of Homeland Security informed 21 states that
Russia had attempted to access their state voter databases.261 Officials from the Obama
administration and even the early Trump administration including Secretaries of State
and Ambassadors to the United Nations noted the uptick in Russian “hybrid warfare”
operations around the world.262 Finally, as already pointed out, a veto proof majority in
the then-republican controlled Senate imposed increased sanctions on Russia ahead of the
2018 midterms.263
But President Trump was already consolidating power within the Republican Party
and anywhere Trump held sway, efforts to punish Russian propagandists were
minimized, opposed, and silenced. His power in the party only grew over time and the
degree to which he or other similar-minded leaders control levers of power, the United
States will be less effective in confronting external disinformation with the considerable
capabilities it possesses.
Right up until the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the former President was still praising
Russian President Putin as a genius. And, as the lie outlasts the liar, a small but vocal
group of Republican officials and media outlets continue spreading pro-Russian, proPutin propaganda. The main adversaries in the fight for United States democracy are now
domestic constituencies competing to undermine its democracy using lies and
disinformation in patterns easily recognizable in Kremlin operations. American security
agencies will keep disrupting Russians externally, but it will need to be non-state actors
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that address the threat from within as domestic actors have internalized Kremlin tactics.
Overall, the trends in United States domestic response to Russian disinformation has been
more closely aligned with my framework’s expectations.
Lessons Learned
My framework’s predictions for the United States Government’s response to Russian
disinformation since 2013 was mixed. In some ways the response conformed with
expectations. For example, Russian tactics employed within the United States have
damaged American democracy. Democratic rankings for the United States system have
decreased, trust continues to sink, and protections for individual freedoms and rights have
been under attack. Also, the last several years have seen multiple cases of disinformation
intensifying divisions, fueling threats of violence against election officials, and
motivating political violence at the Capitol. These trends are consistent with predictions
of a state with great capability, but no will to use those capabilities against Kremlin
attacks on democracy.
The other expectations were not as clear. These expectations were: 1) weakened or no
state reaction, and 2) employment of state capability to use disinformation against
domestic audiences. The state response was indeed weakened during the Trump
administration, specifically, since it was led by a Chief Executive who publicly ridiculed
elements within the government who were acting against Russia. But those actions went
ahead anyway, many times helping allies protect democracy internationally. This
expectation is more aligned with what my framework would predict for a high will state.
Further, while President Trump and his administration did use their positions and
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influence to mobilize their supporters through disinformation, the major capabilities that
account for the United States’ high Belfer ratings remained legally blocked from
operating domestically. The inconsistency in these two expectations show that my
framework is incomplete.
Considering the United States as a low will high capability state is too simplistic.
There are significant elements within the government, especially those within the relevant
parts within Department of State, Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community,
and Department of Justice that consistently displayed high will. That will is mostly
focused externally. Kremlin tactics at their most effective find authentic domestic voices
to spread harmful narratives. To the degree that Pro-Russian, antidemocratic narratives
spread from within the United States, this circumvents the best American Government
capabilities to respond. And it is also inadequate to consider only State capabilities. Even
though the capabilities which exist in the United States are greater than any other state in
my sample, there are in the United States many non-state capabilities with expertise in
combatting disinformation. Tying my two case studies together, for example, it was an
American University to which the high will Finnish Government recently turned for
training its officials.
My framework could be improved by accounting for other factors including structural
constraints that, by design, make it difficult to achieve unified effort. In the United States
system, absence of unified effort is not necessarily evidence of absence of will. Similarly,
because state capabilities are foreign facing, my framework would better explain the
United States’ response if it made a clearer distinction between foreign and domestic
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spheres. To do this, my framework would have to expand to include response from nonstate actors. Although they do not command resources on a level comparable with the
United States Government, Civil Society Organizations (CSO) still have important parts
to play. CSOs have been effective in exposing disinformation by attributing attacks,
through investigative journalism, and in analyzing publicly available information.
Finally, as in several of the other state responses I evaluated for Chapter 3, the United
States’ response has a temporal component. Early in the period, the threat was not as
apparent as it should have been. The 2016 election, electoral fraud conspiracy theories,
and COVID all provided ample opportunities for antidemocratic propaganda. As a result,
American democracy declined even to the point of violent insurrection. But the situation
will change. The final section outlines what is likely to come next.
Future Challenges
According to my framework and lessons learned researching this case study, several
themes emerge which will likely continue in upcoming years.
First, the gap in the United States Government’s foreign facing capabilities and
domestic limitations is fundamentally rooted in expansive rights for individual citizens.
This gap will persist and will bifurcate the United States response moving forward: the
government will fight Russian disinformation internationally, CSO will fight it
domestically.
The foreign facing security posture of American security agencies is not a historical
accident. The country was founded on the idea that government derives power through
periodic conferral by the people. Keeping defense and intelligence focused outward is
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meant to protect individual rights and freedoms domestically, emphasizing a belief that
an open society is ultimately the best long-term security against tyranny. The norm is a
significant barrier to achieving anything like unity of action in the United States. Such
unity typically only happens after a shocking attack like Pearl Harbor, or 9/11.
Disinformation, on the other hand, is designed to prevent unity through plausible
deniability and stoking division. So, the future threat of disinformation will not be a
shock, rather it will continue as a long-term infection aimed at United States will.
Offensive government capabilities will remain focused abroad and, especially when not
led by a President who is himself a node of disinformation, will look more like a high
will high capability state internationally. Other capabilities will continue to develop
domestically to combat disinformation.
Just as Kremlin disinformation aims to eliminate the line between war and peace, it
also seeks to blur the line between foreign and domestic. The threat from Kremlin tactics
has been internalized and no longer requires the Kremlin to continue having an impact on
American democracy. Lies outlive the liar and disinformation in an American context
does not require a President Putin or President Trump. Other groups will continue using
lies to motivate, organize, and radicalize counterpublics in the United States. These
groups include the Patriot Militia movement, white supremacists, Christian nationalists,
and other groups who, for other reasons beyond their speech, can bring government
capabilities to bear. To the degree these groups do so in furtherance of crimes, especially
with international links, the United States Government capabilities can be used to disrupt
their efforts. But, more fundamentally, it will not be government capabilities that decide
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the effectiveness of American resistance to disinformation. CSO will play an increasing
role in understanding, exposing, and discrediting domestic propagandists. The
government will focus out, Civil Society will focus in. There will be several upcoming
tests for this arrangement in coming years.
Fly has described COVID as a “playground for disinformationists.”264 From the
perspective of Kremlin-backed propagandists, that will likely be true for the period
beginning shortly before the 2014 invasion of Ukraine and, fittingly, ending shortly after
Russia’s 2022 escalation Ukraine. The scale and scope of a highly resourced Russian
disinformation operation was only matched by the degree to which the United States
Government and society were uncoordinated, disinterested, and unprepared for response.
The United States has the capabilities to fight disinformation. Abroad, the United
States government is showing leadership in blunting Russian disinformation in Ukraine.
The government and America’s allies have clearly learned lessons on preempting Russian
narratives. The United States Government has looked more high will than low, leading a
unified diplomatic campaign with the same allies the Kremlin has targeted for division:
NATO and the European Union.
There will also probably be yet unknown crises. Every crisis is an opportunity for
adaptation of disinformation exploiting existing divisions, not a new phenomenon every
time.265 If enough domestic leaders continue to employ disinformation domestically,
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divisive and hyperemotional narratives will continue to stoke unrest. Snyder describes
how this turn away from truth is a turn towards American fascism. Specifically,
Republican presidential candidates in 2024:
will presumably have a Plan A, to win and win, and a Plan B, to lose and win.
No fraud is necessary; only allegations that there are allegations of fraud. Truth
is to be replaced by spectacle, facts by faith. Trump’s coup attempt of 2020-21,
like other failed coup attempts, is a warning for those who care about the rule of
law and a lesson for those who do not. His pre-fascism revealed a possibility for
American politics. For a coup to work in 2024, the breakers will require
something that Trump never quite had: an angry minority, organized for
nationwide violence, ready to add intimidation to an election. Four years of
amplifying a big lie just might get them this. To claim that the other side stole an
election is to promise to steal one yourself. It is also to claim that the other side
deserves to be punished. Informed observers inside and outside government
agree that right-wing white supremacism is the greatest terrorist threat to the
United States…[when] violence comes, the breakers will have to react. If they
embrace it, they become the fascist faction.266
If Trump or someone else with low will to combat Russia wins the 2024 election,
then it is unclear whether the United States will continue to demonstrate high will
internationally. It is also likely that the country will not show much will domestically
either; should one of Snyder’s so-called breakers succeeds in taking power domestically,
that will occur in a bureaucracy that is still dealing with years of neglect and attack from
within by Trump appointees.267 Further, a leading Ohio Senate candidate underscored
recently that the attack on the already hobbled bureaucracy should be escalated
dramatically:
‘I think Trump is going to run again in 2024,’ he said. ‘I think that what Trump
should do, if I was giving him one piece of advice: Fire every single midlevel
bureaucrat, every civil servant in the administrative state, replace them with our
people.’
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‘And when the courts stop you,’ he went on, ‘stand before the country, and
say—' he quoted Andrew Jackson, giving a challenge to the entire constitutional
order—'the chief justice has made his ruling. Now let him enforce it.’268
This would continue the assault on American democracy so far highlighted by the
January 6 attack on the Capitol. If that assault succeeds it would be another major
weakening of American institutions, further degrading the bureaucracy’s will to address
external threats.
The threat previously posed by Kremlin disinformation tactics is now even more
dangerous, having been adopted by American actors for partisan gain. Whether power
resides in coming years with domestic organizations have sufficient capability and will to
bear costs fighting disinformation or those actors who calculate that the benefits of using
disinformation domestically outweigh its costs, will determine whether the United States
has a chance to bounce back as a leading democracy or a further move towards
authoritarian rule.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
Russian disinformation continues to threaten democracy globally. A massive
escalation in 2013 was a logical exploitation of success the Kremlin found after roughly a
decade of the Putin regime’s experiments controlling the Russian domestic information
environment, subverting its neighbors, and adapting tactics to advances in media
environments. Different democratic states responded to the Kremlin’s global operation
with varied combinations of will and capability.
My framework predicted responses based on grouping states according to their will
and capability endowments. The framework was generally a good predictor of responses
for a varied group of states that Russia attacked from 2013-2020. By studying the thirteen
different states, some patterns emerged. I learned that of the two endowments, will was
the more important variable. All states in the sample suffered democratic backsliding
whether they had high or low capability. Although some states with high will also
suffered setbacks during the Kremlin operation, it was the high will states that innovated
new approaches to pushing back on Russian disinformation which appear to be paying
off in Ukraine in 2022; more on that later.
Though the framework was generally a good tool for predicting the kinds of
responses each kind of state would choose, the case studies provided much greater
context on will as a mechanism—why will is so high in Finland, why the United States
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will was so bifurcated, and why one of the smallest states in the sample succeeded in
resisting when the largest struggled.
In Finland, for example, the country’s high will long predates the latest Russian
influence operations. Finnish history is one long story of living in the threatening shadow
of its much more powerful neighbor. Finland has had to fight costly wars to maintain its
independence. It spent the decades of the Cold War fending off intensive influence
operations from Moscow and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, never let its
guard down. Finland understands the threat posed by Russia and prepared a resilient
society long before the Kremlin adopted its tactics to a changed context. In many ways,
Finland responded well because it has cultivated a unified and flexible population with a
clear understanding of Russian aggression. That shows in Finland’s high Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Trust rating and explains how one of the lowest
capability states in the cross-national survey is also one of the few success stories
resisting the Russian disinformation onslaught.
The United States case study generated different takeaways for the framework. In
contrast to Finland, the United States has consistently downplayed the threat from postCold War Russia. Though Russia is not a peer competitor with the United States like the
Soviet Union used to be, Russia has adapted to the changed power dynamic by adopting
asymmetric capabilities like disinformation to close the growing divide. Foreign facing
elements of the United States Government have the demonstrated ability to disrupt
propaganda networks, but the attacks in Russia’s post-2013 operation moved into the
American domestic sphere and exploited gaps and seams in the United States’ system.
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The best government capabilities could not operate against domestic networks because of
Constitutional restrictions. This means that the United States has high will, but in some
ways looks low will by not acting stronger in a domestic context.
Why This Matters
As Polyakova and Fried point out, democracies have learned through a decade of
attack:
Unevenly, but steadily, a structure for democratic defense against disinformation
is emerging, consistent with the principles of transparency, accountability, and
respect for freedom of expression. It includes: a growing network of
disinformation detectors (led by civil society sometimes informed by
government agencies); social media companies (responsive to public and
legislative pressure) that constrict disinformation on their platforms; an
informed media that exposes disinformation; and, potentially at a next stage, a
regulatory framework that seeks to filter out inauthentic and deceptive
behavior.269
Many of the democracies in the cross-national survey, even the low will states, over
several years came to recognize the threat posed by a flood of disinformation. It will take
time to adapt to the problem. And while democracies adapt, so will propagandists.
Researching this dissertation, several lessons became clear that indicate the need for
democracies to prioritize improving will and building capabilities resisting
disinformation.
First, whether governments under attack from Kremlin disinformation acknowledge it
or not, Russia uses information as a weapon targeting will. Lucas et al., for example,
describe this as
perhaps the single most important aspect of information operations: they should
not be seen in isolation, but as part of wider influence operations that use
political, economic, legal, and other tools to exacerbate ethnic, cultural,
269. Polyakova and Fried, 2020, p. 2.
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demographic, diplomatic, linguistic, regional, and other divisions.270
States invest in defending their populations against any number of threats, disinformation
should be among them. And disinformation attacks serve multiple roles for the attacker.
It is a weapon for organizing subversion, a tool for making democracies act counter to
their self-interests, or can be active measures aimed to achieve an inherent political
effect.271 Recognizing the threat is obvious now— both after the sustained Russian
campaign against the West since 2013 and particularly after the shock of the Kremlin’s
2022 escalation in Ukraine.
Second, there is a temporal mismatch between attackers and defenders.
Disinformation attacks have not been constant, the tactics have adapted over decades
with changes in technology. Each time a new medium emerges, some actor or actors,
such as the Kremlin, adapts to changes to weaponize lies for the purpose of organizing
extremists, dividing opponents, and conducting political attacks. The techniques never go
away, but their use ebbs and flows while society sorts through transformational changes
in the information environment. The shock of recent operation spurred governments to
action. By the 2020 election, the United States, for example, had effectively taken the
Internet Research Agency offline. After the shocks of the 2010s attacks and Russia’s
aggression in Ukraine, the threat will continue because the goal of subverting the West
will not disappear.
Third, understanding how to maintain will and capability to resist Russian

270. Lucas et al., 2021.
271. See Pynnöniemi, 2019, p. 156 for discussion of information as an organizational weapon, achieving reflexive
control, and conducting Active Measures.
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disinformation matters because other actors have studied Russian actions and seek to
mimic its malign influence. These actors include the Chinese Communist Party, which
since 2017 has shifted away from an information operations charm offensive toward a
more Kremlin-like aggressive use of disinformation to subvert the West.272
Although Russian cultural expertise gives it advantages identifying and exploiting
social divisions in multiple states, the tactics could still be useful to the different strengths
of the Chinese Communist Party. If Chinese propagandists committed to a global
operation like Russia’s, the effect could be even more pronounced because China would
do so with significantly greater capabilities. Its more systematic, far-reaching, and tightly
controlled set of tools could seed messages with even greater resourcing than Russian
intelligence arms and organizations, while at the same time allowing for a more robust
defense against Western countermeasures. 273 Globally, a Chinese operation might be
even more of an issue for democracy than Russia’s 2013 operation.
Further, the actors pursuing disinformation as a strategy for subversion are not limited
to foreign actors. Modern communications technology blurs the line between domestic
and some domestic actors see it in their advantage to undermine democratic
governance.275 Bola and Papadakis summarize the internalization of Kremlin tactics:
The formation of ‘unruly’ counterpublics, some of them with a clear
antidemocratic profile, is a tangible result of disinformation… Counterpublics
are not only about subordinated social groups seeking to call attention to
progressive issues in an effort to expand the agenda of the public sphere. As our
study shows, counterpublics are also about groups constituted online and
empowered by digital platforms, seeking to use themes and topics, often in
272. Charon and Jeangene-Vilmer, 2021.
273. Ibid.
275. Polyakova and Fried, 2020, p. 2. “Purveyors of disinformation have grown more sophisticated and their tactics
continue to advance. The line between domestic and foreign disinformation has blurred, with Russian agents using
local actors as proxies to carry out disinformation operations.”
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alignment with the digital propaganda of a foreign government, to undermine
or even block the functioning of the public sphere.276
Understanding how disinformation works and how to respond matters because the
universe of attackers is growing, not shrinking. Two events largely outside the main
scope of this project highlight how future events will impact democratic will and
capability: the COVID-19 and the 2022 Russian war in Ukraine.
Shocks: COVID and Ukraine
For developing a workable scope for this dissertation, I chose to focus mainly on
2013-2020. The period is important to studying Russian disinformation because it
covered a period of Russia’s significant escalation attacking the West with weaponized
information exploiting conflicts within and between democracies. 277 The escalation
coincided with Russian invasion of Ukraine to cease that state’s momentum favoring
greater integration with Europe and disfavoring its ties with Russia. Disinformation was
part of achieving strategic surprise enabling the annexation of Crimea.
The Russian operations of the period had some very significant effects. Not only the
twin democratic disasters of Brexit and President Trump, but also large and small impacts
felt by every state in my cross-national sample. The effects, relatively cheaply achieved,
were sure to spread. The period closes with the beginning of 2020, as COVID exploded
into a pandemic. By then, Russian tactics had proven themselves as effective means to
the ends of disrupting democracy. Other state actors like China, Iran, Venezuela, and

276. Bjola and Papadakis, 2020, p. 657.
277. Haynes and Scott, 2021. Quoted Thomas Rid, What Russians mean “by unresolved contradictions is frictions, for
example nascent antisemitism in Germany in the 1960s or unresolved racial tensions in the United States also in the
1960s or even today, and then designing and driving a wedge into those cracks in order to pry them open— for example
to drive a wedge between West Germany and the United States or between NATO allies.”
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Hezbollah in Lebanon adapted Russian techniques and antidemocratic segments within
democratic societies did too.278
The isolation, confusion, uncertainty, inequality, and fear accompanying the
pandemic made COVID a “playground for disinformationists.”279 The COVID pandemic
shows that while events change, disinformation themes repeat. According to a British
expert on Soviet strategy, the Russian Government is using the pandemic and medical
disinformation to continue driving wedges into many of the democracies in my sample:
There's a reason why countries with with Russia has an argument find
themselves facing public health crises because of well funded and well
organized anti-vaccine campaigns. It is all just a measure to destabilize and
erode and subvert adversary societies and not necessarily for any particular
political outcomes.280
Russia has sown disinformation (incorrect and with intent to harm) and amplified
misinformation (incorrect but not meant to harm) to create confusion and conflict around
during the pandemic. Public health measures, which adapted as officials worked to
understand data during a rapidly changing pandemic, and vaccines, which are an existing
controversy for an already unruly minority of Americans, created a great opportunity for
malign influence. Approximately one million Americans have died from COVID at the
time of this writing. Future studies could attempt to define the number of those deaths
attributable to disinformation and misinformation, but the number is not zero.
Also, supporting my conceptualization highlighting trust in government as an
important variable for predicting state responses to disinformation, a 2022 article in The

278. Pomerleau, 2021. And Wigell, 2021, p. 49. “disinformation campaigns have become increasingly evident since the
2016 United States elections and have stepped up in the midst of the COVID19 crisis. Russia, and increasingly China,
are deploying disinformation to aggravate the public health crisis in Western countries.”
279. Nordlinger, 2020. Quoting Jamie Fly.
280. Haynes and Scott, 2021. Quoted Keir Giles.
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Lancet attributed lack of trust in government as a major contributor to excess death
through low vaccination rates and preventable death.281 The pandemic, then, just became
a more immediately lethal vector for disinformation. The attack here is an active
measure; information used as a direct attack.
The pandemic has also been an opportunity to use disinformation as an organizational
weapon. Medical disinformation has been twisted into well-funded anti-vaccination
campaigns and anti-government trucker rallies in Canada and the United States. The
rallies have caused economic disruption and increased dissatisfaction, but also have been
an effective rally point for disgruntled segments of society to meet, raise money, and plan
future actions. In the name of repealing mask mandates, many of which have already
been lifted, these rallies are an example of disinformation creating division within society
setting the conditions for further deterioration of democratic will in the long term.
Finally, other antidemocratic actors, having seen the impact of Russia’s 2013
campaign, began adopting similar techniques. China, for example, has changed its
operations to become more like Russia. Since 2017 the Chinese Communist Party has
been less focused on maintaining a positive image around the world and has instead been
more oriented on aggression and coercion282. The disinformation surrounding the

281. “Pandemic-preparedness indices, which aim to measure health security capacity, were not meaningfully associated
with standardised infection rates or IFRs. Measures of trust in the government and interpersonal trust, as well as less
government corruption, had larger, statistically significant associations with lower standardised infection rates. High
levels of government and interpersonal trust, as well as less government corruption, were also associated with higher
COVID-19 vaccine coverage among middle-income and high-income countries where vaccine availability was more
widespread…”
282. Charon and Jeangene- Vilmer, 2021. “For a long time, it could be said that China, unlike Russia, sought to be
loved rather than to be feared; that it wanted to seduce, project a positive image of itself in the world, and arouse
admiration. Today, Beijing has not given up on seduction, on its attractiveness, and on its ambition to shape
international norms. Not “losing face” remains very important for the CCP. And yet, Beijing is also increasingly
comfortable with infiltration and coercion: its influence operations have been considerably hardened in recent years and
its methods increasingly resemble Moscow’s.”
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pandemic has had advantages spreading far and wide like the virus; the world moved
more online than before, people suffered and were afraid, and many people were angry
about disruptive public health actions taken to prevent needless death. The environment
was permissive for propagandists to target dissatisfied groups and to drive wedges within
and between democracies.
While the pandemic has been a pessimistic episode since Russia’s 2013 operation that
shows disinformation works even with a high death toll, another recent event offers
reasons for optimism. In 2022, the Kremlin attacked Ukraine again and the response from
Western democracies has so far shown that the United States, the European Union, and
NATO have adapted since 2013-2014 annexation of Crimea, rallying the will to put
Russia on the defensive competing in the Western information environment.
The lead up to Russia’s attack on Ukraine has demonstrated that indeed many
Western governments have applied lessons on combatting the Kremlin’s disinformation.
In 2021 and 2022, the Kremlin again escalated having already invaded in 2014. The
Russian Army mobilized large escalation included a large information component. So did
2013. But this time, Western democracies were alert to the threat.
The difference between the operations is stark. Even before more troops invaded, the
Kremlin employed cyber-attacks and disinformation targeting the Ukrainian resistance.
The United States, NATO, and the European Union have been more unified in response
to this aggression than perhaps the Kremlin assumed would be true. The United States,
particularly, is now able to contribute much more like a high will and high capability
state. Because the attack is not happening within the United States and because the
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President is not a major node of right-wing propaganda, the United States is able to
commit its world class capabilities to the effort.
Russian disinformation has been called out before Russia has been able to deploy it.
Multiple intelligence agencies especially in the United States and the United Kingdom
have preemptively called out multiple potential Russian disinformation operations before
they have even been launched, depriving Russia of the strategic surprise that it enjoyed in
2013. This seems to indicate that states in my sample are displaying a new seriousness to
combat the threat.
On the other hand, influential right-wing propagandists like Tucker Carlson in the
United States have continued pushing pro-Putin disinformation. The Republican party
elite has mostly rallied to support Ukraine, but there remains a vocal minority including
several Congressional Representatives and a former President that shows antidemocratic
voices still hold sway in the party.
This is the dynamic which will most likely be the clearest evidence whether the
United States has hit an inflection point in democratic decline or if it will yet decay
further. So, the information space remains contested. The Biden administration has been
aggressive in calling out Russian disinformation at several points during troop buildup
around Ukraine and throughout diplomatic efforts in 2022. This is a deployment of
United States capability to bolster international democratic will to fight a war built on
disinformation.
The current crisis in Ukraine did not start in February 2022, but it escalated President
Putin’s 2014 invasion. Invading Crimea in 2014 was a serious escalation, not only for its
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immediate violence against Ukrainians, but also for long-term corrosive information
attacks against the West. Of note, Ukraine did not appear in my cross-national survey.
Ukraine’s system according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s measures only narrowly
missed earning the same “flawed democracy” classification applied to the United
States.283
But Ukraine is a NATO Extended Opportunity Partner state, and it has certainly been
attacked by Russian disinformation since 2013. In fact, Russian intelligence agencies and
the Internet Research Agency have conducted relentless digital operations against
Ukraine as part of its global attack on democracy. The operation began as cover for
invading Ukraine and, as Nimmo et al noted, since 2014, the most repeated Kremlin
theme by a wide margin labeled Ukraine as a failed state. The other two favored themes
were that NATO and the West were the true aggressors, and that Europe is weak and
divided.284
Additionally, the Belfer Center’s rankings for Ukraine place it only slightly ahead of
Lithuania which ranks lowest in the sample by capability.285 The shock of 2022 has, in
the short term, elevated and unified the West’s will to resist Russia. Ukraine, a very low
capability hybrid regime moving in the direction of joining the West as a new democracy,
is showing a case of extreme will and finding success dominating a narrative battle
globally outside of a handful of pro-Russian states.
Western democracies have made strides to defend against Russian influence.

283. Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, 2020.
284. Nimmo et al., 2020.
285. Voo et al., page 12.
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President Putin’s flood of lies targeted democratic will. That was having an impact. In
recent years, the prevailing narrative was one which supported Russian narratives that the
West was in decline, that democracy is weak, and that continued rise of authoritarian
regimes’ power would not be resisted.286 But again, the aim of Kremlin disinformation is
the long-term subversion of global democracy; the logic of my project suggests this will
remain true after the short term implications of COVID disinformation or the likely loss
of Russian power after so badly misjudging Western resolve over attacking Ukraine.
Moving Forward
Applying my framework to anticipate future trends in disinformation, I believe the
logic of my argument indicates multiple likely trends: Russia is likely to double down on
its disinformation capabilities, and disaffected domestic populations will continue
engaging with Kremlin propaganda as part of a feedback loop which will continue
attacking democratic will.
First, whatever the outcome in Ukraine, Russia is likely to continue emphasizing
disinformation. The Kremlin’s 2022 attack into Ukraine has been a major shock to the
world. Western democracies have rapidly come together to punish Russia for its
aggression and to deny a disinformation screen for the military campaign. The will
shown, both by Ukrainians and Western governments, has been a surprise. Facts on the
ground have made Russian lies look ridiculous and Western audiences, confronted with
the reality of military assault on civilian targets, are by wide margins rejecting Russian

286. “Fog of falsehood: Russian strategy of deception and the conflict in Ukraine”, 2016, p. 42: “deception, both
concealment and misrepresentation, aims at intellectual domination – at putting the West in a state of ignorance about
Soviet activities and intentions that is linked to a sense of looming power. The desired psychological outcome is to
displace faith in self-defence with faith in appeasement”
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narratives.
Differently than 2014, Ukraine, with support of the United States and European allies
in exposing Russian pretexts early on, has definitively attributed this war to Putin. In
2014, Russia created disunity in NATO and the European Union by throwing up a cloud
of confusion. In 2022, Russian troop movements and disinformation tactics were called
out repeatedly and beforehand, prebutting Russia’s planned pretexts.287 This clear
attribution has provided clear evidence that Russia is a threat and increases states’ will to
combat Russian disinformation more widely.
The threat has facilitated the very unity within and between democracies that the
Kremlin has long targeted for subversion through disinformation. By moving beyond
information attack and into physical war, however, he is bringing the West together.
States like Finland and Sweden have already signaled increasing desire to join NATO,288
for instance. The shock from this latest Russian aggression creates a security dilemma for
its neighbors.289 And it has driven a reversal even in Germany’s long post-war aversion to
militarizing its foreign policy. Now, not only has Germany ended Nordstream 2, it has
also announced significant expansion in its defense spending.290 Russia feels threatened
by democracy, so attacks to create a buffer. That has created a moment where not only

287. Lomas, 2022.
288. Milne, 2022. “Russia’s sabre-rattling in Ukraine has reignited a debate in Finland about whether the Nordic
country should join Nato, defying Moscow’s demands that the military alliance limit its expansion in Europe.”
289. Haynes, 2017. “Since the end of World War II, Finland has remained relatively neutral when it comes to military
and political relations with Russia and the West. While Finland occasionally works with NATO and cooperates with
Russia on trade agreements, it almost never fully commits to aligning with either side.[i] This disposition is out of
concern that Russia could retaliate if provoked, particularly since the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Finland’s
resulting balance between NATO and Russia has created an arena for both NATO and Russia to continue fighting for
influence inside the country.” And Szymański, 2018, p. 6, “the increasing potential of the Russian armed forces and the
military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine have made Finland decide to intensify its defence co-operation with
NATO and the USA.”
290. Howard, 2022.
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are Russian narratives roundly rejected, but where will is sufficiently high to defend
against Russia that decades of forced neutrality may no longer be sustainable.
With will so high across the West, it can even seem like Russian disinformation has
lost its impact. The lies have become simply too detached from reality for anyone to
believe. But this dissertation shows that it will adapt. Russian capabilities still exist, but
are themselves disorganized, tied up in short term internal chaos created by their
president’s newest war and by incoming attacks by actors of a united West. The
Ukrainian President and millions of his people are having success advancing their own
narratives even reaching into Russian society. Anonymous targeted the Russian
government, global media coverage surged to provide rigorous nonstop coverage, and
people around the world got engaged. This level of unified effort has overwhelmed
Russia’s usual success spreading untruth. Unfortunately, maintaining that will is likely to
become increasingly difficult. The world’s attention will eventually move on, especially
once the intensity of the physical attacks decreases. At that point, if President Putin holds
on to power, he will in the coming decade, be more incentivized than ever to reach again
for weaponized information.
The biggest threat from another such attack would still be disrupting America’s
democracy and it will reveal whether domestic actors have learned how to combat
disinformation in its own democracy. Regular events including the 2022 midterm and
2024 Presidential elections are predictable targets for interference. Following the 2016
election attack, major social media companies like Facebook and Twitter acted
independently to curtail the spread of false information. By 2018, the reduction on the
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platforms was significant.291 By 2021, President Trump was banned from Twitter for
violating terms of service by encouraging insurrection. By 2024, he is likely to be a
candidate, or President-elect, again. This will raise questions about how he should be able
to engage with social media platforms.
Although social media companies have recognized the problems posed by
disinformation, they continue to resist oversight and any external checks on their outsized
power. According to whistleblowers, internal debate at Facebook after the 2020 election
and surrounding the January 6 insurrection prove that the companies, at least Facebook,
know ways to limit the worst effects of disinformation; Facebook implemented their
“break glass” set of rules around the election, tapered the restrictions after the election,
then, witnessing the violence being coordinated on its platform reinstated all the
protective measures on the day of the insurrection.292 Former President Obama noted that
these companies try to have it both ways: denying to regulators the companies’ ability to
influence individual users behavior while basing their business models on opposite
claims made to advertisers.293
Because these companies are so central to the way Americans create and consume
information, they should be subject to oversight. Constitutional protections, especially the
first amendment, must remain sacrosanct but there are plenty of ways that social media
companies can continue running their businesses without threatening democracy.
President Obama argued that debate around Section 230 is not likely going to have the

291. Allcott, et al., 2019.
292. Bond and Allyn, 2021.
293. Dwoskin and Scott, 2022.

157

best effect, but that laws can be designed to increase transparency regarding algorithmic
promotion and amplification while encouraging innovation and balancing the companies’
needs to protect intellectual property.294
And besides social media, other media organizations and civil society actors will need
to engage domestically. Traditional media outlets helped allow disinformation to thrive in
2016 by following longstanding norms of professional journalism including elite bias (if
the President says it, it is news) and neutral objectivity (both sides deserve equal space to
talk).295 In 2016, Candidate Trump was famously given ample free airtime on television
channels, which aired his comments unfiltered and live. Because he established such a
pattern of lying throughout his presidency, this dynamic changed and so did his coverage
leading up to the 2020 election. Journalists and editors will be tested again in 2022 by a
spate of candidates running for all levels of office committed to election lies propagated
by the former president. And if he runs again in 2024, the coverage will again be more
intense than in 2016, or, now having inspired an insurrection, than it was even in 2020.
Filtering, real-time fact checking, labeling, and contextualizing will all challenge media
coverage of those committed to disinformation as a tactic to gain and maintain power.
As for Russia, as outlined in Chapter 2, it is the power asymmetry with the West
which led the Kremlin to invest in a global disinformation operation in the first place.
Even before the 2022 war in Ukraine, Russia assessed it could not win a shooting war
with NATO, instead emphasizing investment in weapons to level the playing field.
Competing with bigger, richer adversaries made several options attractive. Russia

294. Ibid
295. Benkler et al., 2018.
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complemented its already large conventional military capability with advances in
asymmetric capabilities: nuclear, cyber, and disinformation. Now that the conventional
Russian military appears much weaker than most analysts predicted, Russia will either be
forced to accept defeat and diminished power, or it will need to rely even more on its
asymmetric capabilities.
Further, increased sanctions and technological advances will make disinformation
even more attractive to Russia. Today’s version of the Russian military is the result of
reforms pursued after its 2008 invasion of Georgia. Reforming the military takes is
expensive. It takes money and it takes time. Russia is likely to emerge from the Ukraine
war with neither; economic sanctions will degrade the Russian Government’s ability to
replace, fix, or upgrade its armed forces after taking unexpectedly high damage during
the war. And Russia’s petro-state economy was already growing slower than its
adversaries’ economies. By contrast, spreading disinformation is cheap and fast.
President Putin will return to use of inexpensive effective efforts like sowing
disinformation in democracies. In fact, reports are already emerging of efforts to
reconstitute the Internet Research Agency’s influence outside Russia by spreading
disinformation about the war.296 The West must maintain sufficient will, especially when
the obvious threat of Russian military aggression fades from the news. Disinformation
will continue and so must efforts to resist it.
Several recommendations would help maintain the right balance of capabilities
supported by sufficient democratic will to resist:

296. Silverman and Kao, 2022.
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1. Do not overestimate or underestimate threat from Russia. In the peak years of the
Kremlin’s global operation, part of its mission was to make Russia and especially
President Putin seem more powerful than they were. This drove a form of psychological
control that Vindman describes as self-deterrence: unilaterally deciding not to take some
actions against Russia for unjustified assessments of Russian responses.297 After Ukraine,
there may be tendency to underestimate Russian capability. This is also problematic.
Overestimation and underestimation both distort democratic decision-making and are
forms of reflexive control. Instead, Western democracies must move ahead advancing
their own dispositive narrative, backed by other elements of state and multinational
power, to secure democratic institutions from corrosive information attacks. Threats from
Russia should not prevent Finland or Sweden from joining NATO, rather the alliance
should speed their membership with all possible haste to limit the time available for
Russia to interfere.
2. Avoid responding piecemeal.298 Many of the Russian attacks repeated over time or
from country to country. Attacks are also integrated with physical events, so the response
to disinformation should also be integrated with physical means. For example, since 2013
Russia fomented border crises at varying times in at least Norway, Finland, Poland, and
Belarus. Each crisis is its own immediate problem, but to highlight repeated attacks robs
Russian narratives of power to penetrate Western information filters. Adding context by
calling out Russian tactics makes disinformation less likely to spread. Resourcing

297. Vindman, 2021.
298. Richey, 2018, p. 112. “Indeed, a reactive strategy is what the Kremlin desires. Instead, policy-makers—e.g., in the
EU—must anticipate Russian information warfare lines of-attack and construct proactive messaging that immediately
accompanies any European action.”
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organizations like NATO’s Hybrid Warfare Center of Excellence and Strategic
Communications Task Force299 can help since their mission is to monitor Russian
subversion efforts and to advance Western influence through narratives aligned with
democratic values. These efforts need to be bolstered by security forces prepared for
agitators seeking escalation and incitement. This can help focus Western resolve
positively in the face of future efforts to distract and divide.
3. Fight corruption.300 Fighting corruption impacts Russian disinformation from both
ends of an information attack: the sender and the receiver. The Kremlin uses corruption
as a message and a means. It is a message in narratives that highlight Western hypocrisy
to distract from Russian corruption. It is a means to undermining democracy since the
Kremlin courts corrupt Western officials, especially in right-wing parties, to weaken
democracies from within.301 Steps taken to increase transparency and government
accountability are win-win to combat disinformation: decrease Russian capability while
increasing democratic will.
Second, the will and capability framework suggest that long-term democratic will is
going to remain under threat from Kremlin tactics and techniques, even when attacks do
not originate from within Russia. The 2013 operation succeeded in laying a blueprint for
subversion. The methods will be taken up by foreign adversaries and disgruntled

299. Ibid. “the EU’s Eastern StratCom Task Force should be dramatically upresourced and scaled-up so that it can
effectively persuade susceptible populations in the Baltic states and Eastern Partnership countries that a better future
lies with Brussels rather than Moscow.”
300. Standish, 2017, p. 6. “In Ukraine and Georgia, Russian propaganda often amplifies and distorts the very real
problem of state corruption, seeking to destroy confidence in pro-Western political parties.”
301. Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014, p. 20. “Putin’s Russia cooperates with European far-right parties partly because the
latter help Russian political and business elites worm into the West economically, politically, and socially… the farright’s racism and ultra-conservatism are less important than the far-right’s corruptibility.”
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domestic actors in democracies, especially in the United States. The United States foreign
facing government capabilities will continue to create domestic gaps within the most
powerful democracy.
Corrupt actors are likely to find Russian support. This support can take several forms
ranging from retweets and message amplification to financial and operational support of
subversive active measures. Right wing extremists are likely to continue using
disinformation to organize online, coordinate internationally, and advance antidemocratic efforts. In the last few election cycles, for example, violent threats against
election officials, school boards, and Congress have been rooted in disinformation about
COVID and election fraud.
Issues will change moving forward, but the tactics will be the same disinformation
will be used as: organizational weapon, reflexive control, and active measures. Returning
to trucker rallies show how these tactics play out in a non-Russian context. The rallies are
organized around a lie. It does not matter what the lie is; rally planning predated COVID,
for example, but came to be organized around mask and vaccine mandates. Eventually
they have become a venue for a mix of right-wing grievances.302 The rallies are now
physical events that inspire and radicalize attendees while building networks for future
action: this is an organizational weapon. The rallies are aimed at stressing local officials
and police, ideally creating a heavy-handed response or incident that can be characterized
as government overreach: this is reflexive control. And the rallies are physical disruptions
of the communities where they are allowed to occupy: this is employing active measures.

302. Homans, 2022.
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The same principles apply to the January 6th, 2021 insurrection: the rally was an
organizational weapon, sought reflexive control by precipitating armed conflict with
armed security forces, and actively prevented the United States Congress from its work
certifying President Trump’s loss. Events like the trucker rallies and Trump rallies will
continue weaponizing lies using Russian tactics and no longer require Russian
involvement. The biggest challenge to democracy is now a challenge from within the
United States. Within the American context, my framework shows that the will and
capability exist to confront this challenge, but most of the effort will have to come from
civil society.303 The following are a list of ideas and recommendations for likely
responses from both government and civil society organizations in coming years:
1. Support free media with transparency and competition. As Polyakova and Fried
argue that “journalists, activists, and independent investigators can be the most effective
tool of counter-disinformation. It is asymmetric — it does not directly counter
disinformation — but plays to the greatest strengths of free societies dealing with
authoritarian adversaries: the inherent attraction, over the long run, of truth.”304 Since the
United States Government capabilities are limited domestically, the country should put its
resources to promoting its most effective capabilities, which has would have the added
benefit of improving democratic norms.
Regarding social media, changes to the law should not be limited or even focused on
section 230. Social media has been more responsive to disinformation attacks since their

303. Sheives, 2022. “we have been looking for the solution in the wrong place. Civil society, not governments or social
media companies, can best diminish disinformation. But these civil society organizations need equipping, and their
tools need sharpening.”
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poor showing in 2016, but we should not trust our democracy to a small handful of firms
whose underlying motivation is profit. The United States’ first amendment protections
prevent its legislating content moderation in any meaningful way. But, there is room for
better regulation requiring transparency and competition in social media. As DiResta has
said, “free speech is not the same as free reach.”305 Anti-trust laws and disclosure
requirements regarding algorithmic promotion should be part of a strategy moving
forward.
2. Support activities and organizations that foster crosscutting identities.306 When
Americans start seeing other Americans not as existential threats, but as people who must
figure out how to live in the same country, compromise becomes necessary. Division can
easily be demagogued by appeals to populist nationalism, so bringing Americans together
should not be by distorting foreign threats, say from China, for example. Rather, creating
and supporting community service organizations that work to bridge political, economic,
and social groups can be a building block for healthier bottom-up democratic renewal.
This could help integrate, or at least mitigate, disaffected elements of society that give
disinformation in an American context outsize influence.
3. Fact check in emergencies but prepare systematic approach for day-to-day
resilience.307 The heightened will surrounding Ukraine, for instance, has mostly unified
Americans in rejecting Russian disinformation. Some right-wing media outlets have
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continued pushing pro-Putin, pro-Kremlin narratives, but they are far outweighed by
most of the coverage documenting the brutality of Russia’s war. Right wing media is
particularly vulnerable to disinformation because it is not motivated by accuracy, but by
partisan interest.308 The shock of the invasion will wear off, so while directly confronting
disinformation now is important, long-term solutions must include educating Americans
on how to recognize and critically assess disinformation.309
4. Recognize that nothing is inevitable. This corresponds to not overestimating or
underestimating Russia. The United States Government and civil society should push
Americans to take responsibility for their democracy. Democracy is under attack through
subversion, but it is not defeated. Efforts to destroy democracy could go either way. The
United States Intelligence Community’s “Global Trends 2040” report argues that
democratic decline is not preordained; democracy has been challenged before and could
be reenergized in coming decades.310 This is made less likely by politicians who question
elections. These actors are advancing Russian objectives wittingly or not.311 But
renaissance is made more likely if citizens are encouraged to participate and take
ownership in government at all levels.
In conclusion, the struggle between democracy and Kremlin disinformation will
continue for the foreseeable future. Attacks will still emanate from Russia, but will also

308. Benkler et al., 2018, p. 8. The American right-wing media ecosystem makes public discourse “vulnerable to
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311. Snyder, 2021. “An elected institution that opposes elections is inviting its own overthrow. Members of Congress
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be supported, amplified, or originated from right-wing parties across Europe and the
United States. Predictable events like elections will remain targets. Unpredictable shocks
like COVID and the Russian war in Ukraine will impact democratic will. The COVID
pandemic has revealed that while events change, disinformation themes and tactics
remain the same. The war in Ukraine has shown that democratic will may be higher than
Russia anticipated, at least in the short term and in the face of shocking military
aggression. The future trajectory of democracy will mostly depend on actions taken not
during these exceptional crises, but during the less dramatic regular functions of boring,
but essential time between crises. In that time, democracies must build and maintain the
will to resist corrosive disinformation. Every time an attack weakens democracy, future
responses become less sure. And it is always the long term which must be guarded.
Snyder frames the stakes, especially for the United States:
The lie outlasts the liar. The idea that Germany lost the First World War in 1918
because of a Jewish “stab in the back” was 15 years old when Hitler came to
power. How will Trump’s myth of victimhood function in American life 15
years from now? And to whose benefit?312

312. Snyder, 2021
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APPENDIX A
INDIVDUAL COUNTRY SUMMARIES
Low Will, Low Capability (Poland, Spain)

Table 15: Ratings for Low Will, Low Capability States

Table 16: Overall Findings for Low Will, Low Capability States

Poland
This former Soviet Republic was a state with great democratic promise at the end of
the Cold War and into the new millennium. Its ruling party has since ignored external
Russian threats in favor or employing disinformation domestically. Its democracy and
institutions have weakened; however, it still participates in NATO disinformation efforts
internationally.
Poland qualifies as low will and low capability. In each of the measures considered
here, Poland ranks low among the set of chosen democracies. The state’s average CINC
of .00549 ranked 10 of 13 democracies. The Belfer Center did not include Poland in its
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2020 NCPI rankings. However, considering that both of its closest neighbors in the
sample for this project, Germany and Lithuania, have low component scores, and the fact
that Poland is very close to Spain in other measures, it seems fair to assume that it would
likely rank among the least capable quartile. Its Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Trust rating also shows that Poland is in the lowest trust quartile with
an average score of just under 33% population expressing trust in the government. All
measures show that Poland is low capability and low trust. This does come as a surprise
given Poland’s history during the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Poland has a unique history in discussing Russian propaganda. At the time the Soviet
Union collapsed, Poland was a satellite republic and a focal state that many expected
would most fervently embrace democracy. Anne Applebaum, who has lived in Poland
since the 1990s and whose husband has served as a Polish defense minister and foreign
minister, has detailed the changes in the Polish Right over the past few decades. Many of
her friends, once staunch pro-democracy conservatives, are now unrecognizable to her.313
They have become zealous supporters of the Law and Justice party (PiS), which has
turned the power of the state against democracy in Poland. Over the period I studied,
Poland became more concerned with employing disinformation domestically than in
countering disinformation stemming from Russia.314 There, the expectations of a low
capability, low will state were evident.
First, as the state did not do anything about Russian disinformation, Civil Society
Organizations (CSO) did emerge to fill the void. Also, as expected, without the
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centralized planning or control that a state could provide, the response has been
scattershot. Project ‘Demagog,’ for instance is a CSO founded to fact check election
debates.315 Also, following the example of similar Ukrainian organizations, an ad hoc
group ‘Wojownicy Klawiatury’ (Keyboard Fighters) emerged to push back against
disinformation being spread about European Union elections while other organizations
like StopFake, Rosyjska V kolumna w Polsce (Fifth Russian column in Poland), Disinfo
Digest, and InfoOps Poland all sprouted to address Russian disinformation.316 The efforts
were not coordinated by the State, though, and were mostly modeled off of efforts in
different countries. After Law and Justice consolidated power in the country, the growth
in CSOs continued for a few years peaking in 2017 with the creation of 14 organizations
to fight disinformation. But, by 2019, there were no new organizations created.317 The
government did eventually setup a counter disinformation effort in 2018, but it was aimed
at debunking disinformation about procedures and ballots during the country’s
presidential election. The effort was a website called “Safe Elections” and did not do
anything about the main problem of Russian influence in the country318. The lack of
action taken by Law and Justice did not prevent them from having to deal with the fallout
from Russian operations. The government responded in 2020 to a false story that the
Polish counterintelligence service kidnapped a Lithuanian soldier for spying.319 Ignoring
the external threat of Russian disinformation in favor of focusing on internal domestic
control did not make the external threat go away. The Russian threat remained persistent.
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Law and Justice’s choices over the period clearly weakened democracy in Poland,
advancing Russian goals at the cost of Poland.
Second, Law and Justice has employed disinformation domestically, seeking to
consolidate power. At the same time, wittingly or not, they have been leaving the country
exposed to Russian disinformation seeking to undermine democracy. This has resulted in
weakening institutions and curtailed domestic freedoms, especially around press freedom.
After taking power in 2015, the party took control of publicly funded radio and television
networks. The outlets were set up to be neutral outlets, but Law and Justice began using
them as means to propagate party-friendly messaging. Any journalists who refused to
stick to the party line were fired.320 The television network fired at least 235 journalists
and has increasingly become an outlet that Law and Justice uses to employ the tools and
tactics of disinformation domestically.321 Law and Justice has also employed bot
networks, troll farms, and other inauthentic digital disinformation tactics also employed
by Russian agencies to influence elections and pressure those who deviate from party
messaging.322 After turning the state networks into propaganda outlets, Law and Justice
even went so far as to install a loyalist chairman over the protest of Poland’s National
Media Council (oversight board) and increased the networks’ budget substantially. The
network used some of the money to track political opponents and spy on journalists.323
Since Law and Justice took power, Poland has fallen down the list of Reporters Without
Borders’ World Press Freedom Index. In 2015 Poland was ranked 18. Poland in 2020
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slipped to 62 of 180 ranked countries.324 Law and Justice has not only looked the other
way regarding Russian disinformation but has also tried to employ the same
disinformation tools and tactics as a means of domestic control. This has hastened a
decline in democracy within a former Soviet satellite republic with the effect of
advancing Russia’s goals of undermining democracy globally and especially in states
close to its borders.
Spain
Spain exhibited all expected responses to Russian disinformation for much of 20132020. The state did begin taking stronger actions later in the period following Russian
interference in the 2017 Catalan secession vote. Since then, Spain has been alerted to
Russian election interference and medical disinformation early in the COVID pandemic.
Spain scores very similar to Poland in the measured aspects of will and capability. It
is low in both. Its average CINC score was .00764 only slightly below average for the
democracies. However, the average score for its Information Control and Norms scores in
the Belfer Center’s NCPI rankings put it in the least capable quartile. And only Italy
scored lower for average trust score in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development surveys.
The Spanish government was not a leader in the period considered for this work but
emerged in the later years to take Russian disinformation more seriously. I found little
discussion of Russian disinformation in Spain from 2013-2017 and little evidence that the
Spanish government was doing much to combat it. However, 2017 was a turning point. In
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that year, there was a vote for Catalonia to secede from Spain. Sowing such internal
divisions would be a natural fissure that Russian influence would seek to exacerbate. The
Spanish government had not addressed the Russian threat directly until then, but at the
highest level publicly accused Russia that year for interference with elections. The Prime
Minister accused Russia in meddling in the European elections325 and the Foreign
Minister stated, “I am going to put it on the record that in other areas [such as Catalonia],
not only in the community to our East, situations of manipulation and disinformation are
arising.”326 As a result, Spain updated its national security strategy to include the threat of
misinformation campaigns. Spain did not name Russia directly in the strategy, but the
document is evidence that the threat in Spain was becoming clearer to the government,
especially considered in context of the Prime Minister’s and the Foreign Minister’s
statements.327 Spain, then, conforms to some of my predictions, but not all.
First, early in the period I considered, Spain appears to have not been doing much
about the Russian threat. This could be because they were focused on countering different
threats. Spain has been fighting Islamic extremists and terrorists within Spain. As a state
with limited capability, it likely put its focus against immediate threats. However, Spain
did realize the threat from Russia in and around 2017. Even in European Union-wide, and
NATO-wide papers, Spain is rarely mentioned except that they’ve been a target of
attacks. This could indicate that they are just supporting European Union and NATO
collaborative efforts as an alternative to taking a state-level response. This is not what I

325. Booth and Birnbaum, 2017.
326. Spain Claims Russian Meddling in Catalan Crisis, 2017.
327. Jopling, 2018.

172

would expect for a low will state. This would make sense for a low will state which
comes to realize the threat late. The 2017 Catalan vote to secede prompted a strong
reaction from Spain’s national government which resulted in jail time for opposition
politicians and dissolving of the Catalan government in favor of direct rule from
Madrid.328 This is certainly a reduction in rights for citizens and a major crisis
precipitated within a NATO ally. The articles and sources did not evidence CSOs in
Spain targeting Russian attacks. Spain is a mixed case for my theory from 2013-2020;
less serious about the Russian threat in 2013 than 2020, but Spain whatever change in the
seriousness with which Spain viewed disinformation in the period I covered would
intensify with the COVID pandemic. Spain was an early epicenter from disinformation
about the disease, its causes, and vaccine disinformation. This likely focused the
government’s perception of the threat from disinformation and is worthy of further
exploration.
Low Will, High Capability (Italy, United States)

Table 17: Ratings for Low Will, High Capability States

328. Minder, 2019.
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Table 18: Overall Findings for Low Will, High Capability States

Italy
Italy displayed all expected responses for a low will high capability state. It has a
history of sympathy and support for Russia, it ignored and sometimes actively amplified
Russian disinformation domestically, and it took all the way to 2020 for the Italian
government to begin addressing the Russian threat.
Italy is the clearest example in this study’s sample of a low will high capability state.
By the average of 2013-3016 Correlates of War CINC score, it ranks fifth most capable.
However, despite its aggregate strength, its specific capabilities that could facilitate an
effective response to Russian disinformation rank lowest among all states in the sample.
Not only is Italy lowest for its Information Control and Norms scores according to the
Belfer NCPI, but it also scores lowest in average trust. On average from 2012 to 2020
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development surveys, just 25% of Italians
expressed trust in their government. Italy’s average was lowest, and it also scored the
lowest individual record of all state years for the period. In the 2013 Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development survey, only 14.6% of Italians said they trusted
their governments. These scores place Italy in the low will high capability quadrant; it is
a powerful state which did not mobilize to face the threat of Russian disinformation. Its
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unique history and relationship with Russia help explain their lack of state will to push
back and its policy choices reflect expected outcomes.
Among the sample of states, the Italian government has a unique history with the
Soviet Union and with Russia among the sample. Throughout the Cold War, Italy had a
large Communist party.329 This resulted in more sympathy for the USSR than existed in
many other states. During the Cold War and since, Italy has been one of Russia’s best
European partners. Early in 2020, this trend was evidenced in a nationwide poll where
Italians indicated more favorable views of China and Russia as a “friend” of Italy than
they did for the United States. China scored 52%, Russia was 32%, and only 17%
expressed a positive view of the United States.330 Andrew Weiss argued that this outcome
stems from Italy’s actual and perceived distance from the threat:
Countries closer to Russia’s borders, who spent much of the twentieth
century under the Soviet yoke, often view Russia as a dissatisfied
power with lingering imperial ambitions that must be confronted and
contained. Moving west, European states grow more relaxed on the
Russia question, with political leaders open to mollifying Russian
insecurity with a tighter political and economic embrace and wary
about the post-2014 direction of United States Policy.331
Its size, history, geography, and relative sympathy with Russia made Italy late to
understand the threat of disinformation, but ignoring the threat is not an effective policy
for mitigating its harms. Later in the 2013-2020 period, the Italian government did start
recognizing the threat. Its choices fit the expected steps of a low will high capability
state.
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Italy’s response to Russian disinformation was weak to none early in the period,
national politicians used Russian propaganda domestically, and the impacts show in
Italy’s broken trust. In late 2016, the Italian Prime Minister directly asked Russian
President Vladimir Putin about Russian propaganda ahead of an Italian constitutional
referendum.332 Soon thereafter, Italy established its own Joint Command for Cyberspace
Operations.333 Although Italy was a sponsor state for NATO’s Strategic Communications
Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia, Italy did not engage seriously in its mission to
combat disinformation.334 The Italian government did create an online reporting system
for citizens to report fake news to police335, but some of the country’s prominent
politicians, including the Deputy Prime Minister spread fake news and pro-Putin
disinformation even using for his official campaign website the same propagandist who
built other websites like “I’m with Putin,” and “StopEURO.336 The mid-2010s domestic
use of disinformation campaigns used by Deputy Prime Minister Salvini and other farright Five Star Movement politicians did start to raise the issue of disinformation among
priorities in the Italian body politic, but Five Star politicians remained in the governing
coalition through the end of the period covered in this dissertation. Italy, being a natural
Mediterranean crossing point from North Africa was more focused on immigration and
Islamic propaganda than pushing back on Russian disinformation.337 Of course, Russian
attacks served to highlight these issues to further undermine already low Italian trust in
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democracy. The lack of state focus did lead to some other sectors trying to tackle the
problem. Several civil society organizations formed around the issue, but Italy has no
legal, institutional, or policy frameworks for educating its people on the Russian threat.338
Finally, in 2020, the Italian government publicly named Russia and China for spreading
disinformation in Italy and released previously classified intelligence to support the
accusation.339
The actions undertaken by the Italian government were not those required by
powerful democracy to protect itself from the Russian threat. Italy’s response has been
weak and slow, its politicians have used disinformation and Russian propaganda
domestically, and the already low trust that Italians had in their country continues to poll
at the weakest levels of any state in the sample states. All of this is consistent with a high
capability state that lacks the will to confront disinformation.
United States
The United States Government responses were mixed for 2013-2020. No other state
was the target of so many Russian operations than the United States. Its high rankings for
capability are the result of counter-Islamic State successes early in the period. After the
2016 election, parts of the government acted against Russia, but the response was
hampered without Presidential leadership. One of the two major American parties has
embraced disinformation as a tool for maintaining power domestically.
The United States from 2013-2020 was by far the world’s most powerful democratic
state and, by extension, the biggest target of Russian disinformation operations. In fact, of
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the states in my sample, only five states were targeted multiple times by publicly
identified Russian influence campaigns. The Netherlands, Germany, and Australia were
targeted twice, the United Kingdom was targeted three times, and the United States was
the target in fourteen such attacks.340 The United States is targeted so often because it is
rife with sharp internal divisions and because undermining the United States also
undermines the United States-led rules based postwar global order. The Correlates of
War CINC average for the United States from 2013-2016 was greater than the combined
total of all other democracies in the sample plus Russia. The United States also topped
the Belfer Center’s ratings for information control and norms components of their
cyberpower rankings. It is, therefore, clearly a high capability state. With regards to trust
among its people, the United States Government averaged 35% trust among its
population. That scored ninth worst of thirteen— just less France and just higher
Lithuania. The United States is also considered a “flawed democracy” according to the
Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2020 ratings and has been trending lower in its democracy
score in recent years. The disparity between its capability, and its democratic will is
widening. The United States did not conform fully to expectations of a high capability
low will state, but I believe that is because the government is in the midst of change
which will either see it restore its will to resist disinformation or continue to act in ways
which will precipitate further democratic decline.
The first expected response by a high capability low will state is weak to no action
against an external threat. Here, the results were mixed. The United States did take
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actions against Russia. President Obama and Congress created a Global Engagement
Center in December 2016 to combat Islamic State and Russian propaganda.341 Admiral
Rogers, as Director of the National Security Agency, attributed electoral interference to
Russia during the 2017 French Presidential election. The National Security Agency
shared this attribution with France, helping France take the proactive steps it did to
mitigate the harm.342 The government launched multiple investigations into Russian
interference including Intelligence Community Assessments, House and Senate
committee investigations, and the Special Counsel investigation led by Robert Mueller.343
The Mueller investigation itself resulted in dozens of indictments both of Americans,
Russian organizations, and Russian military officers.344 Still, these efforts were weakened
by elected Republicans, President Trump, and officials in the Trump administration.
When President Obama brought evidence of Russian interference to Congressional
leaders, Majority Leader McConnell politicized a decision to make public the information
before the 2016 election. Once elected in the most successful, from a Russian
perspective, attack on democratic politics,345 President Trump refused to acknowledge the
threat and took every opportunity to undercut efforts at addressing it. So, while the
government did take serious actions to combat Russian disinformation, those efforts were
also weakened by the leader of the government. This is a mixed result.
The second and third expectations of a high capability low will government were
evident. The President and Trump administration officials used their influence and White
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House positions to become the largest node in a network of right-wing disinformation
outlets.346 The President and others used their positions to lie at an unprecedented scale
and rate throughout his campaign, administration, his ultimately unsuccessful 2020 bid
for reelection. The National Intelligence Council released an unclassified retroactive
report on the 2020 election which highlighted foreign threats to that 2020 election.
Despite the United States President’s denials and false claims, the report highlights the
threat of disinformation and is mostly about Russia.347 Instead of having a government
led by an official defending American interests, instead the administration was
undermining institutions and trust. It used disinformation as a technique to build and
maintain power then used that power to facilitate a systematic effort to erect barriers to
opposition voters and even ended up organizing an attack on the Congressional
certification of his defeat. The United States’ democracy entered this period with
significant issues in its democracy, but throughout the period disinformation became
central to a Presidential administration and one of two major political parties. By 2020,
that democracy continued to decline, and the country even began experiencing
unprecedented political violence based on lies. This is consistent with expectations for a
low will high capability state.
The last expectation for low will high capability response is social division, struggle
between domestic sectors, and that the balance of power determines the state’s future
direction. This expectation was evident. Where the government failed to act, others
stepped in. Campaigns, now operating in an environment where disinformation is
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increasingly utilized by Americans against Americans, hire expensive cyber and
information experts to help navigate threats.348 This raises the cost for participating in
politics and increases the threshold that candidates must clear just to compete for office,
further undermining democratic participation. The Atlantic Council Digital Forensics Lab
stepped up to fill a void where the United States Government might typically be expected
to contribute. It is an effort to expose and counter disinformation as a means of
combatting Russian hybrid attacks against democracy.349 In September 2017, the
Department of Homeland Security informed 21 states that Russia had attempted to access
their state voter databases.350 Officials from the Obama administration and even the early
Trump administration including Secretaries of State and Ambassadors to the United
Nations noted the uptick in Russian “hybrid warfare” operations around the world.351 A
veto proof majority in the then-republican controlled Senate imposed increased sanctions
on Russia ahead of the 2018 midterms.352 Again, anywhere President Trump held sway,
these efforts were minimized, opposed, and silenced. His power in the party only grew
over time and the degree to which he or other similar-minded leaders control levers of
power, the United States will turn away from confronting external disinformation with
the considerable capabilities it possesses. Rather, the fight will turn inwards as a struggle
between competing domestic constituencies competing against each other while all
Americans remain under attack from Russian state disinformation.
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The United States’ response to Russian disinformation from 2013-2020 was mixed.
Early in the period, the threat was not as apparent as it should have been. The 2016
election was a spectacular failure which ushered in political leadership that campaigned
then governed using disinformation. As a result, American democracy declined and faces
critical years ahead. If it uses its capabilities to fight disinformation, it can improve its
democratic health. If its leaders continue to employ disinformation domestically, all
Americans will suffer and the United States-led global order will face increasing
challenges.
High Will, Low Capability (Australia, Finland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Sweden)

Table 19: Ratings for High Will, Low Capability States

Table 20: Overall Findings for High Will, Low Capability States

Australia
Australia has responded to protect norms and build resiliency domestically. It has
focused its efforts on elections and education at home. It also has been very active
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supporting international efforts against Russian disinformation, likely anticipating
China’s increase adoption of aggressive Russian disinformation tactics.
Australia is a border case when considering capability, but its government has clearly
demonstrated a high will to confront disinformation. The country’s average Correlates or
War CINC score of .00674 is below average. That measure puts it between Spain and
Poland in the third quartile. However, Australia’s rankings were high in the Belfer scores
for the disinformation-relevant components of the NCPI. Australia is higher in the second
quartile for those measures. This means that while Australia may not have the overall
capability of the powerful democratic states in the sample, it is specifically capable in
ways that matter to combatting disinformation. Further, the Australian government has
shown a will to act and enjoys comparatively high trust among its people. Australia’s
average Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development rating was roughly
46% from 2012 to 2013 which was higher than average for the selected democracies.
That trust may reflect the Australian Government’s demonstrated will in acting along all
expected techniques for a low capability, high will democracy.
The Australian has employed defensive efforts against disinformation, built resiliency
domestically, and integrated actions across domestic sectors of society. Defensively, the
government took several actions to educate its public. The government created a foreign
influence register that requires disclosure statements by anyone working for a foreign
principal to influence Australian political outcomes. And, in 2019, Australia started a
“Stop and Consider” campaign to help voters think through and evaluate the veracity of
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their sources of information.353 The government also took actions to bolster its internal
democratic institutions, especially elections. Australia created an Electoral Assurance
Taskforce in 2018. It banned foreign funding for political advertisements, requires all
paid electoral advertisements be authorized and identified with an authorization
statement.354 In addition, the government has made criminal the attempt by foreigners to
interfere in governmental processes, domestic exercise of political rights, or undermining
national security. Australia is also a part of the Christchurch Call, an international effort
to combat extremism online. “Abhorrent violent material” can be removed from the
internet under Australian law and the government has explicitly tied this language to
disinformation. The electoral commission worked with major social media platforms like
Facebook and Twitter to develop ways of blocking communications that violate these
laws.355 These efforts to educate, protect democracy domestically, and integrate separate
sectors are largely aligned with expectations for what a high will low capability
democracy would do to counter the threat from disinformation.
Following the years covered in this survey, there has been an accelerated effort from
the Australian government to push back against disinformation. The changes in
Australian law escalated conflict with Facebook. Additionally, the government has
continued to pursue a balancing strategy in the Pacific. Although it appears China is the
major threat from Australia’s perspective, still they have banded together with other
democratic states in pushing back against authoritarianism in the region. Just as Poland’s
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inaction against the Russian threat wittingly or unwittingly advances Russian interests,
pro-democracy efforts like Australia’s still counter Russian malign objectives.
Finland
Finland has a long history of opposing its much more powerful neighbor. The threat
from Russia is sustained and existential. Finland’s government, then, has been a leader
in pushing back against Russian disinformation participating and building domestic
resilience, supporting multinational efforts, and cultivating a comprehensive societal
response. Its government has the highest trust among its people and that trust increased
during the period.
If Australia is a border case for consideration as high will low capability, Finland
epitomizes the category. Finland’s CINC score ranks it as the second least capable
democracy of the selected states. The Belfer Center NCPI does not even include Finland
in their sample. If the NCPI had included Finland, it is likely that the Finland would have
been somewhere in the middle of the pack. Finland, according to its existential interests,
has over the past decades balanced stout defense domestically against Russian influence
with keeping a lower profile internationally. This is a way to stay sovereign without
unnecessarily provoking their much more powerful neighbor to the East. As such, I
expect that Finland would get high marks for “Information Control” since it has been able
to fend off Russian disinformation, but lower marks for “Norms” since it has achieved its
information control quietly. This would rank them close to Sweden— which, given their
similar approach and direct cooperation, seems reasonable. Regarding Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Trust, Finland is in the top quartile for average
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annual trust ratings among its citizens. Within that high average, however, two trends
make it even more impressive. First, Finland’s trust has generally increased from 20122020. And second the states measured each year since 2012, Finland had the highest
single-year rating of 81% trust in the most recent year measured. So, Finland is the
example of high will low capability; it is a tiny state next to a huge power and united in
its will to stay independent.
Just as Finland’s clearly high will and low capability, its governmental actions are
very much in line with expected behaviors. It has employed defensive measures,
protected institutions domestically, built resiliency, and integrated sectors of society to
combat disinformation.
Finland has employed defensive measures including bolstering multinational
institutions, public education, and defense alliances. Helsinki is host to the European
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which has been operating since
2017.356 The government has focused on working through the European Union for
regulation and actions against digital platforms. Finland recognizes that the European
Union’s market power and regulatory capability is much more likely to result in changes
than Finland could hope to achieve alone.357 And Finland has worked with other partner
states bilaterally or through defense alliances even as a non-allied state. In 2016, Finland
and Sweden jointly condemned Russian propaganda in the region.358 Finland has worked
with United States experts to train Finnish officials responding to fake news and has
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confirmed support for sanctions against Russia for attacking Ukraine.359 Finally, Finland
is a member of the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. It participates
in this multinational effort even though it is not a NATO member state.360 Finland works
with anyone who will work with it to push back against Russia: regional neighbors,
European Union members, NATO, and the United States. It also works domestically to
build resiliency.
The government has protected domestic institutions and built resiliency at home. The
Finnish intelligence service has identified dozens of recent Russian information
operations.361 In March 2019, the Finnish government passed a law that requests
candidates for security postings to prove they do not have dual loyalties to other nations
or beliefs that might undermine national security.362 Education campaigns have included
training for government officials and the public. Government officials and political
parties are trained on the science of disinformation, including emphasizing the need to
advance a positive “Finnish story” that highlights national values.363 The government also
aimed campaigns at educating its people. Since the 1960’s Finland has recognized the
security implications of Soviet, now Russian, propaganda and has emphasized media and
information literacy as a “civic competence.”364 The government has supported this goal
in school curricula and in media campaigns. Critical reading of the news is taught in
schools.365 Prominent national celebrity personalities and officials publicly bolstered the
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security and reliability of the electoral system leading up to elections in 2019.366 This
strategy of education, along with cultivating trust in the government, has been successful.
The Finnish-language version of Sputnik closed because not enough people read it.367
Finland’s government has employed an effective strategy against Russian disinformation
by bolstering its institutions and inculcating resiliency among its people. It has made
those efforts more effective by linking actions across sectors.
Finland has integrated efforts among various sectors of its society including leaders
from media, government, military, and culture. The Finnish national broadcast network
does reporting in Russian. This not only reaches Russian-speaking Finns, but also
achieves influence across the border into Russia.368 Government also integrates many
different leaders and stakeholders in developing its policies regarding media literacy.
These include leaders from Ministries of Education and Culture, Justice, Culture and
Sport, and others.369 Because the Finnish government has educated leaders across sectors
on the social science underpinning tactics of disinformation, each contributes to pushing
back against it.370 As mentioned, celebrities and public officials have supported electoral
integrity media campaigns. But the collective understanding that Russian disinformation
is a threat also impacts media coverage of Russian narratives. Main outlets were critical
of Russian narratives leading up to their invasion of Ukraine, for instance, in ways that
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contrasted with media in other countries which have journalistic norms which allow
propaganda to amplify.371
Finland is a clear case of high will and low capability. They are one of the least
powerful states among the chosen set of democracies in this work, yet perhaps because of
that, have used all tools at their disposal quite effectively to inoculate the country against
Russian disinformation.
Lithuania
Lithuania is a tiny former Soviet Republic which is highly attuned to the threat of
Russian disinformation. Russian aggression is an existential threat to Lithuania, which
has driven its government’s emphasis on joining and enthusiastically supporting NATO.
Lithuania has Finland’s will to resist, but its government is a young democracy without
the same support trust of its people. The government promotes resiliency, but the
strongest actions have come from its people, banding together in ad-hoc groups of
“elves” who fight disinformation.
Lithuania is also a clear case of a high will low capability state. It is the only state
lower than Finland in its average CINC score for 2013-2016, at a minuscule .00041. This
is less than a third of Finland’s already modest score. So, Lithuania is tiny. It also ranked
low among the Belfer Center’s ratings for Information Control and Norms in the NCPI
rankings. Only one other country ranked lower when averaging the two category scores.
Regarding trust, Lithuania is the opposite of Finland. Where Finland is among the most
trusted government according to its people, the Lithuanian government had an average
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trust rating of 34%. That is in
the lowest quartile of the selected democracies. Finland and Lithuania have very different
histories with the Soviet Union which likely drive such a divergent result in trust. While
Finland fought against the Soviets and was able to remain sovereign, Lithuania was a part
of the Soviet Union until its dissolution at the end of the Cold War. Despite its meager
capabilities, the government has demonstrated high will to fight disinformation. Its
actions fit those expected of a high will low capability state.
Defensive efforts taken by the Lithuanian government are consistent with predictions
for a high will low capability state. The government has sought to leverage alliances,
multinational institutions, and total defense doctrines. For example, it signed on with
other countries in the region to create a Baltic Cultural Fund. The fund encourages ties
between states and promotes military, media, and cultural groups working together.372
Lithuania, in addition to being a member of NATO, is part of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB-8)
regional defense framework.373 These states includes NATO members and non-NATO
members, all near their much more powerful neighbor, Russia. Lithuania coordinated
founding in 2018 the European Union’s Cyber Rapid Response Teams.374 And Lithuania
has been a strong advocate for elevating Russian disinformation in the policy agenda
within its borders and among the various multinational organization in which it
participates. The Lithuanian government has pursued a strategy of leveraging
multinational organizations as a defensive effort. These are formal and informal, military,
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cultural, and governmental arrangements designed to prevent them from falling into the
hands of Russian aggression like has happened so many times along Russia’s borders
since 2008. Besides leveraging international partners, the government has also promoted
resiliency at home.
In accordance with predictions for a high will low capability state, the Lithuanian
government has acted to bolster its domestic institutions and to educate its people. The
government has used temporary bans on Russian media found to be in violation of
broadcast laws. Lithuanian law states that 90 percent of content on television in Lithuania
must be produced in the European Union using official languages of the European Union.
Broadcasters must translate into Lithuanian content longer than 90 minutes in a language
not recognized as a formal European Union language.375 Russian is not an official
language of the European Union and must be translated. Further, even without securing a
court order the government can shut down for up to 48 hours communication nodes or
outlets propagating a disinformation attack.376 These laws are meant to limit Russian
disinformation from appearing in Lithuania or to provide ways to stop disinformation
from spreading through broadcast media. The government has also pushed for its people
to take responsibility defending against Russian invasion which increasingly has a strong
component of weaponized disinformation. Even before Russia used these tactics invading
Ukraine, Lithuania has advocated through public education like its “Guide to Active
Resistance” for all citizens’ responsibility for Total Defense resisting aggression however
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possible even to the individual level.377 Lastly, the government has also pushed back
against disinformation and publicly corrected the record in cases that threatened to drive
wedges between it and its international partners. The state prosecutor debunked a story
that alleged a rape by German forces in Lithuania during a NATO mission. The speaker
of the Lithuanian government gave regular updates during the investigation to inform the
Lithuanian public and to communicate to a broader NATO audience that the story was
fake.378 The Lithuanian government has demonstrated a high will to prevent Russian
disinformation from impacting its population or threatening its partnerships. As expected,
it also stresses integration among its social sectors.
In Lithuania, the government has made efforts to integrate efforts among various
segments of its society and there is a prominent example of success. The civilian sector is
very active in pushing back against Russian disinformation in real time. Lithuanian
“Elves” act as a volunteer fact checking effort which is hosted and coordinated at a
central website demaskuok.lt.379 The elves themselves are an adhoc group of academics,
journalists, scientists, and military members who collaborate using technology created by
a Vilnius media group.380 The website uses increasingly sophisticated software381 to
identify false narratives and has been so successful in Lithuania that a charity has
expanded the effort to a website Debunk.eu, which coordinates with partners in multiple
other countries as well. The Lithuanian elves are a demonstration of the state’s leadership
role in elevating disinformation on the international agenda. Further, the elves that
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operate through the site do so individually and collectively. This is consistent with the
Total Defense resistance doctrine. Lithuania is the smallest country of the selected
democracies. It punches above its weight in countering Russian disinformation, however,
and the government acts in line with predictions for a low capability high will state.
Netherlands
The Dutch Government was very active during this period and showed a model for
demanding Russian accountability for disinformation. Following the shootdown of nearly
200 Dutch citizens over Ukraine, the Dutch Government methodically proved Russian
culpability and sustained a campaign pushing back against the flood of false Russian
narratives surrounding the attack. The Dutch have also acted to protect their elections
and rule of law at home.
The Netherlands is a state in the high will low capability category which has been
very specifically motivated in confronting Russian disinformation in and surrounding its
invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces killed hundreds of Dutch citizens in downing an
airliner over Ukraine, prompting their government to seek accountability in the face of a
flood of disinformation. By the numbers, the Netherlands is a small state with less
capability than most of the other democracies in the sample. Its average CINC score from
2013-16 was .00398. This ranks in the least capable quartile. Dutch capabilities for the
disinformation-relevant cyber capabilities were higher, but the Netherlands still ranked
below average in the Belfer NCPI ratings for information control and norms. The country
stands out, however, in its average Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development trust rating. From 2012-2020, the Netherlands had the highest average trust
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rating of any democratic state in this study. 61% of Dutch citizens expressed confidence
in their government over the period. This is well above the average of 45% for the entire
sample and more than double the average trust in several of the distrustful states. The
Dutch government’s course of action in pushing back against Russian disinformation has
followed expectations for a high will, low capability state.
The Dutch government has employed several defensive measures against Russian
disinformation. First, it has joined on to multinational organizations dedicated to
combatting Russian malign influence. The Netherlands joined the NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom CoE) in 2016. Only the nations who
founded the Center of Excellence joined earlier.382 The government has also employed
public education campaigns and specifically named Russia as manipulative threat. Ahead
of European Parliamentary elections, the Dutch government launched a public awareness
campaign highlighting past cases of Russian meddling in other states’ elections and
warning Dutch citizens about the harms of disinformation.383 And, the expert Dutch
General Intelligence and Security Service (AVID) in its 2018 annual report directly
named Russia’s efforts to covertly interfere with elections.384 These efforts are defensive
efforts taken by an asymmetrically weaker state against a perceived threat from a more
powerful actor. The Dutch government have not tried to punish Russia or compel it to do
anything, but it has acted in concert with other states to push back against disinformation
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and it has raised awareness domestically and internationally about the threat. The
government has also taken actions to defend domestic institutions.
The Dutch government has pursued actions that protect domestic institutions and
build resiliency within its population. First, although the Netherlands understood that it
did not have sufficient capability on its own to confront Russia over the downing of a
commercial airliner over Ukraine, it acted in a way to bolster facts and evidence in the
face of a Russian campaign to obfuscate what had happened. For instance, it was the
Dutch Safety Board that found Russia responsible for downing the airliner. The
investigation was painstaking and time consuming but concluded that in 2014 Russian
forces killed nearly 200 Dutch noncombatants.385 The Dutch continued pressuring Russia
in multiple fora to take accountability for their actions.386 From the moment Russian
forces shot down the commercial airliner over Ukraine, it rolled the incident into its
information operations surrounding the invasion and the annexation of Crimea. The
Dutch pushed back with facts and investigation, favoring truth over disinformation. The
government also sought to protect the key democratic institution of elections. In 2017, the
Dutch interior minister publicly stated that the Netherlands would be hand counted to
prevent manipulation. This statement was actually a restatement; the Netherlands banned
electronic voting ten years earlier in 2007.387 Restating a policy was unnecessary, but the
government was acting to bolster faith in elections responding to recent Russian influence
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efforts. The Dutch have also integrated different sectors of society to fight
disinformation.
The Dutch government in recent years has codified new responsibilities around
disinformation and civil society organizations have also acted to stem the influence of
false information. The government assigned new duties and responsibilities in 2019 to the
National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism. The responsibilities include
detecting foreign state influence operations.388 Clarifying responsibility within
government is important to gaining unity of effort; as the axiom goes, when everyone is
responsible, nobody is responsible. The Dutch have recognized the threat from Russian
disinformation and expressly put it in the purview of a specific governmental
organization. Civil society has also responded to threats to the information domain. Dutch
newspaper articles have fact check capabilities on social media outlets in the country.389
Responses like these are those that this study’s framework anticipate from states with low
capability, but high will. These states, like the Netherlands, will use what capabilities
they do have in concert with other states, in a mostly defensive manner, and in a more
integrated approach spanning different social sectors.
Sweden
Sweden’s Government has acted similarly, and in concert with, the Finnish
Government. It has a comparably long history and experience of Soviet interference in its
domestic politics, so the threat from Russia is different but not new. The Swedish
Government has protected its domestic institutions and built resiliency while investing in

388. Hanzelka and Pavlikova, 2021.
389. Davis, 2018.

196

layers of Nordic and Baltic multinational security relationships. The government is a
strong NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner but has stopped short of seeking full
membership in the alliance.
Looking at measurable components of capability, Sweden is a small power overall
with significant capability to act in the information domain. Sweden’s scores are similar,
but less than, Australia in both average CINC score and the combined Belfer center
average of Information Control and Norms. This makes Sweden another border case for
considering whether it is a high or low capability state— it is a small state in the
aggregate, but it has significant capabilities relevant to combatting disinformation.
Specifically, it ranks in the smallest CINC quartile, and it is above average in the
combined NCPI rankings. As for its Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Trust rating, the Swedish government had an average trust rating among its
people of 55%. That is the fifth highest average among all the states I sampled and just
.0025 from scoring in the top quartile. These ratings make Sweden a high will, low
capability state in my framework and the government’s policies pursued from 2013-2020
do conform to the expectations.
Sweden employed several defensive efforts including alliances, multinational
institutions, public education, and total defense concepts aimed at pushing back against
Russian interference. The Swedish prime minister announced a new government agency
with primary responsibility for building the population’s psychological defense. The
agency is called “psykolhgiskt forsvar.” It had been disbanded in 2009, but by 2015, the
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Swedish government brought390 it back into operation. The government also in 2017 took
several steps to push back against computational propaganda, a key driver in the speed
and reach of propaganda in the digital age before the prime minister later publicly
claimed that Russia was responsible for several operations ongoing in Sweden.391 The
Swedish government has also made a point of working with partners and allies. Although
Sweden is not a NATO ally, it is an active partner nation. Sweden is a non-NATO
member of NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.392 It is a member of
the European Union. It has tried to leverage its relationships with NATO and the
European Union to track Russian strategic narratives and to elevate Russian malign
influence as a security threat.393 The government has supported European Union
sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. And, as mentioned in the Finland
notes above, has partnered with Finland in issuing a joint statement condemning Russian
influence operations in the Nordic states.394 While partnering with other states, Sweden
has also employed public education campaigns domestically. The Ministry of Defense
conducted an awareness campaign about propaganda and the National Security Strategy
names Russia’s disinformation as a national security threat.395 The Swedish government
has also taken steps to protect democratic institutions.
Sweden has acted to protect its democratic institutions including the press, elections,
and its civil service. The government proposed eliminating taxes on printed daily news
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outlets.396 This is designed to advantage local print media over the flood of
disinformation on digital outlets which is comparatively much easier to use amplifying
disinformation. Swedish officials also acted to protect elections, training local election
workers on how to recognize and combat foreign attempts to attack elections.397 Lastly,
the government published a handbook for its domestic communicators to recognize and
counter disinformation that might be used to target public employees.398 Protecting these
domestic democratic institutions demonstrates the government’s will to resist Russian
disinformation. Sweden has also worked to build resiliency in its population.
The Swedish policy approach from 2013-2020 has included many efforts aimed at
cultivating resiliency within its people. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
is specifically chartered “to have good capacity to identify and counter information
influence activities and the spread of other deceptive information within its area of
responsibility.”399 The Ministry of Defense’s public education campaign already
mentioned above includes a document “If Crisis or War Comes.”400 It is twenty pages
long and details total defense strategies that Swedish people are expected to employ
resisting any Ukraine-like hybrid invasion. The document had been delivered to
households from World War II to the end of the Cold War, but the government resumed
distributing it in 2018. This boosts resiliency in several ways: it highlights the seriousness
of the resurgent Russian threat, elevating the threat in the mind of Swedes, and provides
advice for what the population can do to resist disinformation. Further, the psychological
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defense also mentioned above, reinforces a strategy of resiliency. Part of the Swedish
approach to that defense includes identifying, analyzing, and responding to external
influence.401 Awareness of disinformation operations is a key way to blunt their
effectiveness. By working to identify, analyze, and respond, the government is
inoculating its population against the slow burn which results from ignoring
disinformation. And the government takes further steps to build resiliency through
multiple educational approaches. Education is not limited to civil servants and defense
handbooks; media literacy is also taught in Swedish schools. Students are taught how to
tell reliable from specious sources of information.402 Finally, the government is working
to integrate sectors to push back against disinformation. The government and Swedish
national television have been experimenting in digital automatic fact checking
capabilities that cuts across information silos and filter bubbles.403 The Swedish
government is doing everything that one would expect of a low capability democracy
with high will to resist Russian disinformation.
In conclusion, it bears noting that Sweden is so attuned to disinformation that it had a
uniquely shocking reaction to the Trump administration. Early in former President
Trump’s administration, he mentioned “You look at what’s happening last night in
Sweden” implying that there had been a violent attack in the country. There was no
attack, and the comment made no sense except as amplifying right-wing disinformation,
but instead of just shrugging and moving on to the next news cycle Sweden debated
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concerns about United States influence activities.404 Sweden’s long history of partnership
with NATO and the United States has been cultivated as means to defending itself from
Soviet and Russian aggression. Their history and geography make them well attuned to
Russian disinformation operations and it says a lot that a sitting United States President
triggered their detection of influence operations.
High Will, High Capability (Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom)

Table 21: Ratings for High Will, High Capability States

Table 22: Overall Findings for High Will, High Capability States

Canada
Canada is the least powerful of the high will high capability states. The lack of
American leadership on promoting democratic norms and institutions abroad has likely
made the Canadian Government shoulder even more responsibilities than it otherwise
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would. It has strengthened its elections and laws at home and led the creation of new
international organizations to coordinate disinformation responses internationally.
Further, Canada is likely to come into more direct conflict with Russia as the two states
compete in a warming Arctic.
In my sample of states, Canada is in the middle of the pack for its ratings in
Correlates of War CINC rating and in the Belfer Center’s NCPI rankings. Specifically,
Canada ranks 6 of 13 with an average CINC score of .00861, just below the median score
for the sample. And it ranks 7 of 13 among the states for the Belfer Center’s rankings of
Information Control and Norms. So, it could not be more squarely in the middle of the
sample’s power rankings. Since the states in my sample are mostly rich Western
democracies, being in the middle of the sample indicates Canada is a highly capable state.
In terms of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trust, Canada
placed higher among the sample. Its government’s average score from 2012 to 2020 was
58% trust— third highest in the sample as rated according to its own people. According
to my classification, Canada is therefore high will and high capability. The Canadian
governments actions taken 2013-2020 regarding Russian disinformation mostly conform
to expectations, but with some exceptions.
First, while Canada did employ a mix of offensive and defensive measures, it was
mostly defensive and domestically focused instead of taking on Russia directly. Prime
Minister Trudeau has named Russian disinformation as a serious threat and expelled
Russian diplomats over interference in its democracy405, but all other actions appear to be
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defensive. For example, Canada includes in its Criminal Code and Election Act offenses
which could be used to make disinformation and false statements about candidates an
offense if such acts are taken to influence an election.406 So while the threat of
disinformation from Russia is from beyond Canadian borders, the main tools its
government has for punishing disinformation is focused on domestic actors. This is
defensive since it responds to an attack but seems unlikely to preempt or deter Russian
aggression. In fact, the main actions taken in Canada seem focused on the second
expected course of action: protect democratic institutions.
Next, Canada significantly acted from 2013-2020 to protect democratic institutions, at
home and abroad. This is in line with predictions for a high will high capability state.
Canada particularly focused on protecting its elections. There, Elections Canada has
responsibility for running federal elections. Elections Canada is an independent agency,
but it integrates its efforts with other Canadian government capabilities to identify
threats, tactics, and vulnerabilities. The Security Intelligence Service and
Communications Security Establishment both work with Elections Canada to secure
elections.407 Elections have also been bolstered through legislation. The Elections
Modernization Act requires enhanced transparency and reporting requirements of digital
platforms including prohibition of foreign entities’ purchase of ads during an election
period. Online outlets must disclose purchasers of ads related to federal elections, keep
the ads for two years in a registry, and maintain the information related to transactions for
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five years beyond that.408 Additionally, the government bolstered democratic norms
domestically and in support of democracy globally. It adopted a digital charter with
popular feedback that emphasizes democratic values, prioritizes election security, and
implements strategies to inform candidates, organizations, and officials when they are
known targets of an attack.409 Internationally, Prime Minister Trudeau acted to bolster
efforts at pushing back against disinformation and extremism. He announced in 2019 that
Canada would join the Christchurch Call along with New Zealand and France following
the livestreaming of a New Zealand mass shooting attack. Although the Christchurch Call
is aimed at terrorist and extremist content, there is overlap with disinformation since
many misnamed “lone wolf” attacks are brought into the physical world through
international propaganda networks organized and inspired online.410 Canada has
promoted democratic norms and institutions. The government has taken a leadership role
in coordinating responses to malign Russian influence.
Finally, the Canadian government took a leadership role integrating domestic and
international responses to Russian disinformation. It created new organizations like the
Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force and lead the G7 Rapid
Response Mechanism setup in 2018 as part of a joint response protecting democratic
processes from increasing threat.411 It pledged CAN$7 million in media literacy efforts
ahead of its 2019 federal election, implemented the Critical Election Incident Public
Protocol to inform the public of election integrity threats, and put Russian interference in
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mainstream discussions during the 2019 election.412 All of these actions led or helped
lead response to Russian influence. Canada also responded with more than words; in
2020 it had 600 Soldiers in Latvia leading a multinational force on Russia’s border
bolstering NATO efforts to deter Russian aggression in the Baltics. The mission naturally
became the target of Russian disinformation operations. Canada pushed back against
false narratives and remained steadfast there in its mission.413
Canadian response to Russian disinformation from 2013-2020 largely conformed to
expectations for a high will, high capability state. It likely filled some roles that the
United States historically would have filled when led by a President not enamored with
employing rather than combatting disinformation tactics. For example, the United States
did not sign on to the Christchurch Call until after President Trump left office and at most
times, the United States likely could have been expected to lead the G7 Rapid Response
Mechanism. Canada continues to earn the trust of its population and has worked to
protect its democracy from Russian attack. In coming decades, Canada will likely need to
become even stronger in its efforts; already a target of influence operations, it will likely
come under increasing challenge from Russia as the two states draw into more direct
competition in a warming Arctic.414
France
Over the 2013-2020 period, France has been the clearest leader for promoting
democratic institutions and multinational approaches to Russian disinformation. France
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has acted to protect its own elections and its policies have been models for approaches
adopted by both the European Union and major social media companies. Of the three
European states in the high will high capability grouping, only France has both avoided
catastrophic interference in its politics and been unequivocally critical of Russian malign
influence.
The French government’s actions are a clear demonstration of predictions for a high
will high capability state. It is above average for both CINC and Belfer Center rankings.
France’s average CINC from 2013-2016 made it the fourth most powerful state among
my sample of democracies, scoring very close to the United Kingdom for that period. The
Belfer Center rankings for Information Control and Norms also put France high among
democracies; only the United States and the United Kingdom ranked higher. France’s
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trust score was not so high.
On average, only 36% of French respondents expressed trust in their government from
2012-2020. While this score also ranks closely with the United States and United
Kingdom, it is still below average for the sample. Considering the other elements of will,
however, the French government has demonstrated high will through statements and
actions counteracting Russian disinformation. The government has employed a mix of
offense and defense, bolstered democratic institutions and norms, and it has led—
domestically and internationally— pushing back against Russian malign influence.
France’s national government has combined direct and indirect measures to fight
Russian disinformation. Part of France’s high Belfer ranking include its effectiveness
fighting jihadist information operations during the early part of this dissertation’s
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considered period. France experienced several violent attacks inspired and facilitated
through extremist organizations adept at online recruitment, organization, and
amplification.415 The government gained experience combatting the spread of propaganda
and used those to confront Russian efforts. Direct examples include clear statements and
actions from the highest levels. As a candidate, Emanuel Macron warned about Russian
interference.416 His team hired experts to plant decoys, feed bad information to Russian
hackers, and prepare a communications strategy to combat leaked information.417 Further,
France’s National Commission for the Control of the Electoral Campaign for the
Presidential Election and the National Cybersecurity Agency had responsibility for
protecting the election. Within hours of a data leak during the 2017 election, French law
enforcement began a criminal investigation.418 Indirectly, the government has called on
its public schools to teach students about critically assessing trustworthiness of online
sources.419 And after winning election as President, Macron banned RT and Sputnik from
his media pool. He said they are not journalists, but agents of influence.420 The French
Government followed suit labeling them “Pro-Kremlin outlets.”421 This combination of
direct and indirect actions have the combined effect of limiting in France key nodes
Russia employs elsewhere while building French sensitivity to the threat. France has also
designed laws and policies that protect democratic institutions.
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France was a leader 2013-2020 protecting democratic processes and norms.
Domestically, it has empowered its Superior Council of the Audiovisual (CSA) to
remove online content, accounts, and websites to prevent disinformation from spreading
during an election. Also, French candidates and parties can petition a judge on removing
disinformation within 48 hours.422 And, in 2017 after the data breach, the French
government warned not only its citizens that there had been a breach, but also warned
platforms operating in the country that spreading the hacked and leaked information
could be grounds for criminal prosecution.423 The government was active in France
particularly around the election of 2017. In 2018, it strengthened its laws to limit
disinformation. France requires platforms with greater than five million users to disclose
authors and amounts paid for sponsoring content.424 It also requires platforms that
employ algorithms to disclose detailed statistics about how the site works and how
content is shared including “how many times pieces of content are accessed directly;
accessed through platform recommendation, sorting, reference algorithms; accessed
through platform’s internal search.”425 France’s domestic efforts have also made it a
leader protecting democracy internationally. In addition to hosting the Christchurch
conference after the attack in New Zealand, President Macron has appealed to the citizens
of Europe advocating the creation of a new European Union agency for democracy
protection and fighting hate speech.426 It would not be the first time French thought had
led the Continent. Some European Union-wide laws are already based on French law.
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Further, large media organizations like Facebook and Twitter have themselves chosen to
apply French standards to their operations throughout the European Union.427
France has been active at home and abroad in developing policies to combat
disinformation. Its mix of direct and indirect responses, protection of democratic
institutions, and leadership internationally all conform to expectations for a high will high
capability state fighting Russian disinformation.
Germany
The German Government’s responses in this period were least consistent with
expectations of a high will high capability state. Rather than being a strong leader for
democratic norms and institutions, Germany sometimes took both sides of major issues
involving Russian attacks on democracy in Europe and globally. Germany’s postwar
pacifism, its history as ground zero for Cold War disinformation and espionage, and
Russian sympathies in its population likely account for its pragmatism.
Germany is the second most powerful democracy in my sample, and one with high
trust in government among its people. However, its governmental capabilities put against
the disinformation threat and its lack of overt international leadership from 2013-2020
did not fully conform to expectations for a high will high capability state. Considering
Germany’s historical and geographic context, the lack of enthusiasm for direct
confrontation with Russia on this issue makes more sense.
Germany is overall very powerful. It is the second highest Correlates of War CINC
score among democracies in my sample and is the most powerful democracy in Europe.
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Alone, it scores nearly half of Russia’s CINC average from 2013-2016. When combined
with either France or the United Kingdom, either pairing exceeds Russia’s score. Herein
lies Russia’s strategic imperative for weakening the European Union and NATO from
within— Russia is stronger than any European state on a one-to-one comparison but
competes from a position of asymmetric weakness when dealing with a united bloc.
Germany, however, has not been as publicly active as France pushing back against
attacks on democratic institutions or in leading development of international responses to
disinformation. The result shows in the Belfer center’s rankings where Germany is only
just above the lowest quartile for cyber capabilities useful combatting disinformation.
Still, Germany enjoyed high levels of trust in government as expressed by its people
2012-2020. An average of 59% of those asked said they trusted the German government
during that period. Only the Netherlands scored higher. Germany’s history and
geography help explain how Germany has chosen to respond firmly, but quietly to the
Russian threat and why it maintains a level of trust among Germans.
First, the actions that Germany took were mostly defensive. The government
recognizes the threat. Its Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV or Office for Protection
of the Constitution) recognizes and considers RT DE an arm of Russian influence
operations in Germany.428 German officials have named Russia for hacking parliament
and for the “Our Lisa” protests Russia fomented across Germany during the Syrian
refugee crisis.429 Because of its history with totalitarianism and as a hotbed of Cold War
espionage and disinformation, German law prohibits broadcasting by state agencies.
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Recent German law also requires platforms to remove posts that “seek to disseminate
propaganda material or use symbols of unconstitutional organizations; encourage the
commission of a serious violent offense, endanger the state; and advocate the commission
of treasonous forgery, public incitement to crime, and a incitement to hatred.”430 Under
the law, the 2017 Network Enforcement Law or NetzDG, platforms can be fined up to
€50 million431 and the government fined Facebook €2 million432 soon after passing the
law. In addition to defensive laws, the German Government has pursued a range of public
education campaigns, particularly aimed at its youth, parents, and civics. Examples
include “Ein Netz fur Kinder” (an internet for kids), “Shau Hin!” (look at!),
“Demokratielobore” (Democracy laboratories). These sites provide extensive guides,
reviews, information, and practical advice for protecting children and citizens from
online harms including disinformation and radicalization. They also promote
understanding of the duties demanded by democratic participation for both kids and older
citizens.433 These efforts are all defensive, however, not aimed at Russian propagandists
but at inoculating Germans. The defensive approach extends to institutions, particularly
elections.
Second, the government has acted to bolster democratic norms and institutions but
not in the way predicted by a state of its power and elevated trust. Germany’s efforts to
protect democracy have been mostly aimed domestically, not so much in rallying
international efforts. At the same time that Russia was interfering with Brexit and the
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2016 United States Presidential election, Russia also hacked the German Parliament.434
Both Chancellor Merkel, herself having grown up with personal experience of Soviet
influence operations and the East German Stasi, and also the head of Germany’s domestic
intelligence agency warned Germans— and Russians— about using the stolen data
during Germany’s 2017 elections.435 Germany further protects its elections by using
paper ballots436 and, ahead of the 2017 election, German political parties agreed not to
employ leaked information or bots on social media.437 These steps appear to have been
sufficient in preventing Russia’s decision to use the stolen data in Germany’s election
after having just successfully attacking the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum and the
2016 United States election.438 Although my focus intentionally avoids state actions that
may have been taken beyond those publicly reported, besides warnings, Germany did not
directly confront or punish Russia for disinformation operations in Germany. That is
clearly a choice since Germany has taken direct action against Russia for other actions
and at other times. Specifically, Germany called for increased sanctions against Russia
after its 2020 hybrid attack against Alexi Navalny. The German Government almost
certainly saved Navalny’s life by demanding his release from Russia and providing
medical treatment.439 The German Government does coordinate up— at the European
Union level to prevent hate speech and disinformation, and down—to support regional
communications countermeasures both online and offline within Germany.440 Its defense
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of democratic institutions from 2013-2020 was mostly domestic, however, not as a leader
of international responses. This makes sense given its history and geography.
As mentioned, Germany has long experience with Russian and Soviet disinformation.
Following World War II, Germany remained divided as recently as 1989. It was the
epicenter and a literal battle line for the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Long lasting impacts of Russian political warfare and disinformation were
felt by Germans in Germany. Additionally, because many of its people lived in the Soviet
sphere for so long, because the East remains economically unequal to its West, and
because there exists native Euroscepticism, there are segments of the population which, if
they do not identify as Russians, certainly are more open to “understanding” Russia and
Vladimir Putin.441 The German Government, then, understandably is more muted in how
and when it responds to Russia, especially compared to other powerful European
democracies like France and the United Kingdom. As such, it did not act exactly as
expected of a high will high capability state. It was more restrained internationally than
predicted.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom suffered the biggest Russian disinformation success during this
period with the sole exception of the 2016 United States Presidential election. Brexit,
combined with the assassination of multiple former Soviet spies on British soil, caused
the government to take an active role developing domestic policy to bolster elections,
national security, and public awareness of Russian disinformation. Additionally, the
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United Kingdom developed new governmental agencies with the mission to coordinate
responses to, and to generally deter, Russian disinformation. With the major exception of
Brexit, the United Kingdom has been a leader in aggressively pushing back against
Russian influence.
Besides the United States, the United Kingdom has been the most frequent target of
Russian influence operations. It has also been the site for two key grey zone attacks
including Brexit referendum interference and the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal by
Russian agents in Salisbury. The United Kingdom has been aggressively targeted because
it is a leading democracy. Its power and prestige make it a high payoff target. According
to the Correlates of War project, the United Kingdom’s average CINC from 2013-2016
was in the top three among the democracies in my sample. And, according to the Belfer
Center, the United Kingdom is only behind the United States in demonstrated abilities
regarding information control and norms. These factors combine to make the United
Kingdom one of the most powerful states in my sample. The United Kingdom is a
middling democracy, however when it comes to its people’s expressed trust in their
government. Between 2012 and 2020, the United Kingdom government’s Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development trust rating was just below average at 40%
confidence among its population. Assessing the government’s reaction, it seems that the
United Kingdom behaved in a manner like Germany. That is, it is certainly high
capability and demonstrated high will, but it did not totally conform to what the
expectations for such a state dealing with Russian aggression.
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First, the United Kingdom did employ a mix of direct and indirect responses to
Russian attacks. At a basic level, the United Kingdom government and parliament
undertook a series of investigations to define terms and determine practical steps for
defending against Russian disinformation. The Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport
Committee (DCMS), for example, recommended doing away with the term “fake news”
in favor of using clearly defined terms like misinformation and disinformation.442 The
government published a white paper called “Online Harms” which made
recommendations on new accountability for online platforms including a legal “duty of
care” standard for content and a requirement to remove harmful content.443 Other
defensive approaches included expanding the National Security Communications Team
(NCST) and establishing a Rapid Reaction Unit (RRU). The NCST has responsibility to
deter state actors and others as part of an overall Fusion Doctrine that elevates strategic
communications to the same level as military and financial elements of national response
options aimed at achieving national security goals. The RRU is a Cabinet level agency
that bridges defense and offense. Generally, the RRU takes two approaches to
disinformation; it has a playbook for identifying and responding to threats around
predictable events like elections and it has an established procedure to guide reactions to
unanticipated attacks. Both seek to increase the availability of reliable government
information that remain visible to the public in an attack. During one disinformation
operation which sought to mislead people about a Syrian airstrike, for example, the RRU
was able to move official United Kingdom information to the top of search algorithms
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which otherwise were burying official information into the 200th-most popular
recommendation behind many specious sources.444 The government has also launched
many education campaigns for its population and government. The NCST uses a SHARE
construct in a “Don’t Feed the Beast” campaign. SHARE is a checklist that reminds users
to critically consider Source, Headline, Analyze, Retouched, Error attributes of online
sources. The RRU follows a FACT construct to guide its focus: Find, Assess, Create, and
Target. SHARE is useful for individuals, RRU is useful for communications
strategists.445 Early in the 2013-2020 period, the United Kingdom was focused mainly
defensively. This makes sense considering it was during this time that the government
was sorting through Russia’s role in the Brexit referendum. Later in the period, the
United Kingdom began acting more rapidly and directly to confront Russian aggression.
Within weeks of the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, the United Kingdom
government had established the RRU to take back a fact based narrative and British spies
and police gathered enough evidence to rally expulsion of Russian spies internationally.
This response also demonstrated that the government learned from Russia’s 2006
poisoning murder in the United Kingdom of Alexander Litvinenko.446 The United
Kingdom became more sensitive to the disinformation threat over this period and began
acting with greater speed confronting Russian disinformation. Its focus on democratic
norms also began to shift during the period.

444. Levush, 2019.
445. Levush, 2019.
446. Grey Zone, Episode 1.

216

Second, the United Kingdom defended norms domestically, but not until after the
Brexit referendum attack. Prime Minister Johnson, who would not be Prime Minister but
for his promises to deliver on the slim majority of “leave” votes in the Brexit referendum
publicly warned his pubic about Russian interference in British elections.447 Also, the
aforementioned “Online Harms” white paper recommended steps for protecting elections.
Freedom of expression is a qualified right in Britain, meaning it can be curtailed when
doing so is in furtherance of a legitimate democratic goal. Protecting elections is one such
aim.448 Like the United States, many election norms were informal. The United
Kingdom’s Electoral Commission made recommendations to codify many of those norms
including increased reporting requirements for online ads targeted at users through
demographic information, banning foreign money in British elections, and generally
maintaining a “follow the money” approach to creation of election rules. The commission
also recommended that new rules were vital since current British law is “not fit for
purpose.” For example, political ads are prohibited in broadcast media and there are
restrictions on commercial ads, but there is no regulation of digital political
advertisements.449 The United Kingdom approach for this period focused more on the
domestic fallout from the Brexit referendum and was not as focused on international
democracy as my theory would predict.
Finally, the domestic focus extended to coordination of responses. Another
government document during this period outlined the argument that the government
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needed to coordinate policy to protect domestic journalism. The Cairncross Review
concluded that there is a supply side market failure in public interest media production
which threatens the health of British democratic debate and collective decision making.450
The United Kingdom security and intelligence services also recommend that the
government needs to address disinformation as a national security threat. The government
considers malign influence operations as “fourth generation espionage” and highlights the
need to coordinate society-wide efforts protecting against not only physical threats but
also “cognitive attack and subversion.”451 The major recommendations for United
Kingdom Government action against disinformation include regulating online platforms,
rebalancing relationship between publishers and platforms, creating a new institute for
the future of public-interest news, tax law incentivizing payment for online news, and
media literacy strategy.452 While the United Kingdom does provide senior level
employees at the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence,453 and while it
has in recent years started taking the lead internationally in some instances punishing
Russian disinformation, from 2013-2020 the United Kingdom was more domestically
oriented than my theory would predict for a leading democratic state.
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